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Fiscal arrangements  in Brazil severely constrain the federal
government's  ability to fulfill its mandate as a national gov-
ernment. Municipal  governments,  meanwhile,  have more  rev-
enues  than  they  need,  encouraging  fiscal  mismanagement.  Re-
form is urgently  needed  to counteract  Brazil's fiscal  imbalance.
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Brazil is a three-tiered federation of 24 states,  *  Conditional transfers are arbitrary and
two federal territories, a federal district (the  driven primarily by political considerations.
capital), and 4,300 municipalities. In 1989 less  Programs woric at cross-purposes and the subjec-
than half of all govemment spending was  tive nature of these transfers may be sending the
controled  by the federal govemment.  Brazil's  wrong signals to lower levels of govemment
new constitution gave autonomous broad powers  about laxity in fiscal management.
to states and municipalities on certain tax and
spending functions, with municipalities indepen-  * Revenue-sharing constrains the federal
dent of and coequal to states.  govemment's ability to fulfill its mandate as a
national govemment and is conducive to fiscal
Shah reviewed and analyzed the  mismanagement as local govemments are shying
intergovenmmental  fiscal relations in Brazil.  He  away from raising revenues from property taxes
found that:  and user charges.  The municipal govenmments
have more money than they need.  The state
* Federal and state governments are involved  governments also face a financial squeeze but it
in purely local functions in an uncoordinated  should be short-lived as they have access to the
fashion.  value-added tax, a dynamic source of revenues The federal govemment's problem is structural.
* The administration of sales tax by all three  Its revenues fall far short of its spending needs.
levels creates duplication and confusion.  *  In short, existing fiscal arrangements have
* Administration of the general value-added  created a vertical fiscal imbalance.
tax by the state involves unresolved issues about
tax crediting on interstate trade.  Shah presents policy options to resolve these
problems.
* The state and municipal revenue-sharing
funds do not distribute revenues fairly and
equitably.
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Brazil represents a three-tiered federation of 24 states, two federal territories of Roraima
and Amapa  ( to become states on January 1, 1991),  a Federal District  comprising  the national capital of
Brasilia, and 4300 municipalities. Brazil represents one of the most decentralized federations in
comparison to other developing nations.  In 1989, less than 50% of consolidated federal-state-local
government expenditures were controlled by the federal government. The new Brazilian  Constitution
promulgated  on October 5, 1988  has given autonomous broad powers to states and  .ncinalities  in
certain tax and expenditure functions. Municipal  governments in other federations are usually  hand-
maiden of state governments  whereas the Brazilian  constitution recognizes  their independent and co-
equal status.
A  review of  tax and  expenditure assignment is thus critical to  an  examination of
intergovernmental  fiscal  relations in Brazil. In the following,  we review  expenditure and tax  assignment
in Brazil;  reflect on the conceptual  basis for such assignment  and present a comparative perspective  on
this issue  drawing  on the experiences  of selected federations.
1.1  Expenditure Assignment:  Theory and Practice in Brzil
1.11  Expenditure Assignment Under the 1988  Constitution.
Table 1 provides basic details on expenditure assignment in BraziL  The constitution
recognizes  three separate levels  of government in the federation and delineates their responsibilities.
Defense, foreign  relations, currency, postal'  services,  planning,  nuclear energy,  national highways  and
regulation of labour conditions, foreign and ;nterstate commerce, finance, banking and insurance,
commercial  advertising,  inter-state transport, telecommunications  and data processing,  energy, mining,
employment  insurance,  social  security,  immigration  and naturalization  and native rights  are the exclusive
domain of the federal government. Health, education, culture, protection of environment and natural
resources, hydroelectricity,  agriculture,  food distribution, housing,  sanitation, social  welfare and police
are the joint responsibility  of federal and state governments with the federal govermment  setting
standards and state governments having  the responsibility  for delivery  of these services. Municipal
12
Table  1
EXPENDITURE  ASSIGNMENT  IF  BRAZIL
Responsible  Level  of
Government  Expenditure  Category




Use  of  water  resources
National  Highways
Planning;  regional  and  natural
Postal  service
Police:  federal  and  frontier  a-eas
Regulation  of labor,  inter-state  commerce,
telecommunications,  inter-state  transport,
urban  development,  energy,  mining,
employment  insurance,  immigration,
citizenship  and  native  rights
Social  Security
National  Statistical  system
Guidelines  and  basis  for  national  education
Federal-State  (Shared)  Health
Education
Culture









State  only  Residual  powers  i.e. any subject  not assigned
to  federal  or  municipal  levels  by  the
Constitution.
Municipal  only  Public  transport  (intracity)
Pre-school  and  elementary  education
Preventive  health  care
Land  use
Historical  and  cultural  preservation
Source: NOVA  CONSTITUICAO  BRASILEIRA,  1988.3
governments  have  been given  the legislative  authority on subjects  of local interest to supplement federal
or state legislation. Furthermore, they have been assigned responsibilities  in public transport, pre-
school and elementary education, health care, land use and historical  and cultural preservation. Any
subjects not specified  by the Constitution have been reserved for state government legislation.
1.12  Conceptual Basis of Expenditure Assignment
Allocation  of expenditure  and tax  functions  to various  member units is  the most fundamental
issue  in a federation. Fiscal  federalism  literature argues that expenditure assignment  must precede tax
assignment.  This is because tax assignment  would in general be guided  by expenditure requirements at
different levels and these cannot be worked out in advance of expenditure assignment. This literature
also provides broad guidance in delineating expenditure responsibilities. For example the so called
"decentialization theorem" advanced by Wallace Oates states that "each public service should be
provided  by the jurisdiction having  control over the minimum  geographic area that would internalize
benefits and costs of suc.h  provision"  (Oates (1972),  p.55).1
The above  theory provides  strong rationale for decentralized  decit  . naking on efficiency,
accountability,  manageability,  and autonomy principles. It is argued that:
1.  Local provision allows governments to cater better to the tastes and needs of local
residents whereas central provision  often results in more uniform provision;
2.  Decision making is closer to the people for whom the services are intended.  This
induces  more responsiveness  to local concerns  as well  as more fiscal  responsibility  and
efficiency  of provision  especially  where financing  of services  are decentralized as well;
3.  Eliminates multiple layers  of jurisdiction;  and
4.  Enhances inter-jurisdictional  competition and innovations in the provision  of public
services.
A decentralized system thus ensures consistency  of level and mix of public services  with
voters' preferences as well  as provides  incentives  for efficient  provision  of such services. The following4
economic  considerations  nevertheless  warrant  some degree of centralization or compensatory  grants in
the provision  of services  for which such factors are relevant.
a.  Geographical  variations  of preferences with  imperfect mobility:  Note that the Tiebout
mechanism  of voting  with one's feet requires smali  open area and imperfect mobility.
In the presence of imperfect mobility,  a decentralized mechanism  would not ensure
matching  of public  services  with local preferences.
b.  Spatial Externalities: Spatial externalities arise when benefits and/or costs of public
services  are realized by non-residents. In the case of benefit-spillout  the jurisdiction
providing  the service does not consider  the proportion of benefits of a public service
accruing  to non-res.dents and thereforewould under-providesuchservice.  The reverse
result is obtained in the case of cost spillouts i.e. where the public service could be
financed by  exporting  taxes  to other jurisdictions.  There are also public  services  whose
benefits are considered national in scope such as defense and foreign affairs. As a
corollary,  these services  would  be best provided  by  the government at the highest  level
i.e. by the federal government.
c.  Economies  ofscale:  Certain services  require service  areas larger  thanalocaljurisdiction
for cost effective provision. Examples include transportation services,  water and
sewerage  in a metropolitan area.
d.  Administrative and compliance costs: It  is generally agreed that  a  centralized
administration leads to lower administrative  and compliance costs associated with
financing  of public services.
There are also  certain policy  functions  which can  be carried best by the federal government.
For example:
(i)  Stabilization  Policy.  Astabilization policycannot  becarriedouteffectivelybya local
jurisdiction.  Local pursuit of such a policy  would  lead to much  of the gains being  lost
to outside  jurisdictions. A monetary policy  has little srope of being  carried at a local
leveL5
(ii)  Redistribution Policies:  Effective redistribution  is possible only through w.rograms
which are  national in scope.  A local jurisdiction that  attempts to  carry out
redistributive  policies is likely to drive  out the rich. The City of New York faced a
fiscal  crisis as a result of redistributive  programs caoied out in early eighties.
The above discussion  suggests  federal government be given  exclusive  authority in carrying
outstabilization policies  andprovidingpublicserviceswhosebenefits  arenational inscope (seeBoadway
1980,1989).  The federal government  also has a redistributive  role  which could  be exercised  through the
tax and transfer system  or through joint provision  of public  services  such as education and health which
primarily  serve as "transfers  in kind". The federal government also may  be assigned a role in providing
compensatory  grants for spillout  of benefits from  state level provision  of services. A similar  role for each
state is in order for spillout of benefits from local provision of services  within their jurisdictions. All
other services would be best provided by the local governments with federal and state governments
having  some role in defining minimum  standards.
Table 2 provides a summary view of broad guidance provided by economic theory and
discussed  above. As shown by this Table, reasonably clear expenditure assignment  emerges from the
basic economic principles.  The following  paragraphs provide a commentary on the expenditure
assignment  in Brazil based on these guidelines.
1.13  Ex: enditureAssignment in Brazil  and  ImF .rations  For  Efficient  and  Equitable  Provision
of Publc Services
A comparison of Table 2 with Table I indicates that expenditure assignment done by the
Constitution corresponds  fairly  closely  to the expenditure  assignment  suggested  by economic  principles.
Current practices  in service  delivery  by  various levels  of government  are at substantial variance  from the
Constitutional assignment. In the areas of education, health, urban transportation, recreation and
culture, child and old age care and social assistance,  all three levels  are involved  in an uncoordinated
fashion leading  to much  confusion and chaos in service  delivery. 2 Current difficulties  in overlapping and
duplication  of functions  in certain areas thus must be attributable to pre-1988  Constitution traditions.6
Table  2
CONCEPTUAL  BASIS  OF EXPENDITURE  ASSIGNMENT
Service  Provision
Expenditure  Category  Responsibility  of Service  Comments
Defence  F  F  Benefits/costs  national  in scope
Foreign  Affairs  F  F
International  Trade  F  F
Environment  F  S,L  n
Currency,  banking  F  F
Interstate  commerce  F  F
Immigration  F  F
Unemployment  Insurance  F  F
Airlines/Railways  F  F
Industry  and  Agriculture  F,S,L  S,L
Education  F,S,L  S,L
Health  F,S,L  S,L
Social  Welfare  F,S,L  S,L
Police  S,L  S,L
Highways  F,S,L  S,L




For example  in the area of education the current Constitution sees Federal government  simply  setting
the norms  and leaving  the provision  to state and municipal  levels. Contrary  to Constitutional  stipulation
discussed above Federal Government nevertheless continues to be  involved in direct delivery of
education services at secondary school, college and university levels and in an isolated instance in
elementary  education as well. Furthermore the Constitution  gives local  government exclusive  mandate
in the delivery  of elementary education but the delivery  of secondary  and higher levels  of education has
beer,  left open. Local provision  of secondary  education  would  provide  incentives  for allocative  efficiency
as well  as encourage innovative  learning programs. It is best for the federal government to have a hands
off approach in these areas and the State governments  to assume regulatory  role by monitoring  student
achievement through standardized tests and by setting minimum  service standards.  Undergraduate
education because of significant spillo-.ers  beyond local jurisd: tions but presumably insignificant
spillovers  beyond  state boundaries  is a logical  candidate  for state level assignment.  University  education
on the other hand is expected to have  significant  spillouts  beyond state boundaries  and therefore should
be a joint responsibility  of Federal and State levels. As envisaged  by the Constitution, however, the
prc'  dsionof this  serviceshouldbe state responsibilitywith  the federalgoverrment assuming  a monitoring
role and providing  compensatory  grants for benefit spillouts  or to ensure minimum  standards of such
service across states.
Similar  problems  exist  in  current delivery  practices  for  urban transportation. Urban corridors
are constructed and maintained by all three levels and sometimes suffer .eglect because of unclear
responsibilities  for maintenance and upkeep. Intra-urban bus services  in some states are operated by
the State. A decentralized system  of urban transport provision  would  be more attuned to mceting  local
needs and to adjustments  based on changing  local conditions. Thus both federal and state governments
have no clear role for intra-urban transportation provision  issues. Their role should simply  be confined
to providing  technical assistance,  monitoring and setting service standards. In today's Brazil, federal
government is often invo!ved  in direct provision of urban transportation network and services  and this
sometimes  creates significant  difficulties  for  local governments  in their decisions  to upgrade  local  services
or modify  existing  networks.Some purely local functions such as fairs, public markets, slaughterhouses are also being
performed by federal and state governments  in several municipalities. Electricity  and telephones are
provided by federal public utilties.  Public provision of these essentially  private goods needs to be
reviewed. Responsibility  for water and sewer which ate generally retognized as local services was
transferred from the municipal to the state level in 1967  in view of the assistance available to state
governments  through theNational Sanitation  Plan (PLANASA).  Thischangeoverresulted  insubstantial
expansion of service to new towns but emphasis on cost r%covery  has precluded extension of these
services  to slum areas of larger cities and metropolitan areas.
In conclusion,  constitutional assignment  of expenditure function is broadly  consistent with
economic principles  but a clear case can be made for bringing  the practice or de facto assignment in
conformity  with the decentralization theme enunciated by the new Brazilian  constitution.
1.2  TAX  ASSIGNMIENT:  THEORY  AND PRACTICE  IN BRAZIL
1.21  The Theory of Tax Asslgnent
The division  of revenue sources among federal and lower levels of government is being
referred here as the 'tax assignment  problem'. Once expenditure  assignment  has been agreed upon, tax
assignment and design of transfers become critical elements in providing reasonable matching of
expenditure  needs with revenue means  forvarious levels  ofgovernment. Although tax  assignment  could
be  undertaken  independently of expenditr  assignment-a  practice which is quite  common in
developing  countries, yet the tradeoffs  between the advantages  of a centralized tax administration and
decentralized provision of public services become more apparent when tax assignment takes into
consideration  pre-determined expenditure assignment. In such a situation over-dependence of lower
levelsofgovernmenton  intergovernmentaltransferswithpotentiallydistortionaryeffectsonexpenditure
priorities could be avoided.  Furthermme, in those grey areas where theoretical guidance on tax
assignment is unclear, expenditure a  nt  can provide a powerful argument for assigning Ltxing
responsibilitytothegovermentwithgreater  oedforadditionalrevenues.  Musgrave( 1984)  usesequity9
(consistency  of revenue means  with expenditure  needs) and efficiency  ( minimizing  resource  cost)
criteria  and  suggests  the following  broad  principles  in tax  assignment;
L  Progressive  redistnbutive  taxes  should  be central;
ii  Taxes  suitable  for  economic  stabilization  should  be  central;  lower  level  taxes  should  be
cyclically  stable;
iii.  Tax  bases  distributed  highly  unequally  between  jurisdictions  should  be centralized;
iv.  Taxes  on mobile  factors  of production  are best administered  at the centre;
v.  Residence  based  taxes  such  as  sales  of consumption  goods  to consumers  or excises  are
suited  for states;
vi  Taxes  on completely  immobile  factors  are best  suited  for local  level;
viL  Benefit  taxes  and user  charges  might  be appropriately  used  at all levels.
Based  on these  principles,  reasonably  clear  guidelines  for assignment  of revenue  sources  to
various  levels  of government  emerge.  Table  3 provides  a summary  view  of  such  assignment.  The Table
suggests  that for certain taxes  such as resource  taxes or a value-added  tax (VAT) base and rate
determination  and  collection  and administration  could  be assigned  to different  levels  of government.
By following  this approach  both inter-jurisdictional  equity  and efficiency  of tax administration  and
compliance  could  be achieved.  It should  be noted that the theory  contravenes  the advice  sometimes
offered  by  international  agencies  to developing  countries  that local  taxes  on wage  and capital  income
should  be instituted.  With  factor  mobility,  bases  for such  taxes  would  be subject  to erosion.  Also,  such
a regime  encourages  tax  competition  among  various  jurisdictions.
1.22  Tax  Assignment  In  Brazl
Table  4 provides  an overview  of existing  tax assignment  in Brazil. Federal  government
assumes  exclusive  responsibility  for the taxes  on income,  payroll,  wealth  (large  fortunes),  foreign  trade,
bankin6  finance  and  insurance,  rural  properties,  hydroelctricity  and  mineral  products.  It has  partially
overlapping  responsibility  with  state and  local  governments  for taxation  of industrial  products.  The10
Table  3
CONCEPTUAL  BASIS  OF TAX  ASSIGNMENT
Determination  of  Tax  Collection
Tax  Base  Rate  &  Administration  Comments
Customs  F  F  F  International  Trade
Income  Tax  F  F,S  F  Redistributive
Estates  & Gifts  F  F,S  F  Redistributive
Corporate  Tax  F  F,S  F  Mobile  Factor
Resource  Tax  F  F,S  S  Unequally  distributed
Retail  Sales  S  S  S  Higher  compliance  cost
F  S  F  Harmonized,  lower
compliance  cost.
VAT  F  F,S  F,SC
Excises  S  S  S
Property  tax  S  L  L
User  charges  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L
Notes: F:  Federal
S:  State/Province
L:  Municipal/Local
SC:  The  Council  of States11
Table 4
TAX ASSIGNWENT IN  BRAZIL  - 1990
Responsibility  1993  Disposition of Revenues  (S)
Revenue Source  Base  Rate  Adnn.  Federal  States  Municipalities
Federal (F1:
Income Tax (IR):  53.0  24.5(a)  22.5
Personal  F  F,S  F
Corporate  F  F  F
Payroll Tax (CSE)  F  F  F  33.3  66.7  0.0
Large Fortunes  (Wealth) Tax (IGF)  F  F  F  100.0  0.0  0.0
Import Tax (IN)  F  F  F  100.0  0.0  0.0
Export Tax (IE)  F  F  F  100.0  0.0  0.0
Tax on Financial Operations and
Insurance (IDF/IOC)  F  F  F  100.0  0.0  0.0
Rural Property Tax  (ITR)  F  F  F  50.0  0.0  50.0
Tax on Industrial Products (IPI)  F  F  F  43.0  32.0(b)  25.0
Hydroelectricity Tax  F  F  F  5.0  45.0  50.0
Mineral Products Tax  F  F  F  5.0  45.0  50.0
States (S)
General value-added tax (ICMS)  S  S  S  0.0  75.0  25.0
Inheritance and gift taxes (CMD)  S  S  S  0.0  100.0  0.0
Motor Vehicles Registration Tax (IPVA)  S  S  S  0.0  50.0  50.0
Supplementary Capital Gains Tax  S  S  S  0.0  100.0  0.0
Municipal±ties (M):
Services Tax (ISS)  M  M  M  0.0  0.0  100.0
Urban Property Tax  (IPTU)  M  M  m  0.0  0.0  100.0
Tax on Retail sales of fuels except
diesel (IVVCLG)  n  M  M  0.0  0.0  100.0
Property transfers (ITBI)  M  M  M  0.0  0.0  100.0
Frontage tax (Special assessment levy)  M  r  M  0.0  0.0  100.0
Source:  1.  NOVA  CONSTITUICAO  BRAZILEIRA  1988,  Sistema  Journal  do  Brasil,  Article  VI,  RDa
Tributacao e do Orcamento", pp.67-78.
2.  Lei do Senado No. 165 (11/89)
3.  Lei Complemantar No. 104, Camara dos Deputados.
4.  Projeto de Lei Complementar No. 104-A, 1989.
Notes:  (a)  Includes 32 to finance programs to be administered by Development Banks of the North-
East, North and Center-West regions.
(b)  Includes  (a) plus an additional  102 of IPI as compensation to exporting  states for
loss of revenues from ICHS on account of exports.
(c)  The  Union  must  apply  at  least  182,  states 252,  and  municipalities  252  of all  tax
revenues and transfers on education.12
federal government allows  states to levy  supplementary  rates upto 5%  on the federal bases for personal
and corporate incomes.
The mainstay of state governments  revenues is the general value-added  tax on goods and
services.  This tax  is administered  by the Council  of states having  finance ministers  of all states including
the Federal District as its members. Any  changes  in the tax  base or rates must be presented by  individual
states for approval by the CounciL The Council  has resisted  changes in tax rates quite strongly  but has
acceded to requests from various states for exempting  certain commodities/services  from the tax base.
Inter-state tax credit issues  for the value-added  tax continue to take a great deal of the Council's  time.
The states have also access  to taxation  of inheritance and gifts and motor vehicles  registrations. States
derive 72% of their revenues from these three taxes.
Municipalities  are empowered  to levy  taxes  on services,  urban properties, retail  sales of fuels
except diesel; property transfers (intervivos)  and special assessments  (frontage).  Municipalities  raise
18% of revenues from these sources.
1.23  Implications For Tax Policy  and Administration
A comparison of Table 3 with Table 4 shows that the tax assignment done by the new
Constitution in Brazil  is broadly  consistent  with economic  principles  enunciated above. Some problems
remain, nevertheless. These problems are mainly  in the area of sales taxes. Tax bases for the federal
manufacturerlevel  salestaxonindustrialproducts and thestategeneralvalue-added tax (ICMS)  partially
overlap  but are administered  separately  by the two levels. Similarly  tax  bases for ICMS and local tax  on
services  (ISS) overlap but are administered in an uncoordinated fashion. Brazil is unique in being the
only country with a subnational VAT called ICMS. While tax collection of ICMS is in the hands of
individual  states, tax  rates and base is  determined by  the Council  of States. This should  in principle  result
in tax harmonization as well as a clearing house for interstate VAT tax credit claims. In practice, the
Council  has been quite receptive to giving  individual  states some flexibility  in defining  own tax bases for
ICMS. This has the potential of eliminating  uniformity  of the ICMS base over time. Also resolution of
interstate ICMS tax credit issues  continue to elude the CounciL13
It would be desirable to consolidate  IPI, ICMS and ISS into a single tax  administered  by the
federal government and proceeds shared with state and local governments  based on a formula which
allocates revenues to the three levels in roughly the same proportion as their current intakes and to
individual  units based on origin  principle. Tax base determination for harmonization purposes should
be the responsibility  of the federal government  whereas  states and municipalities,  if  theyso choose,  could
levy  supplemental rates.
There is no specific  advantage  in federal government administering  the rural property tax
(ITR). 1TR  is more appropriate revenue source for state and local  levels. Any  rural property under the
jurisdiction  of a municipality  should be subject to taxation by the municipality  concemed. State level
governments  on the other hand should be responsible  for both the administration and final disposition
of revenues on account of this tax in unincorporated areas within state boundaries.
1.3  Vertical and Horizontal Fiscal Imbalances
Vertical fiscal  imbalance refers to the mismatch  between revenue means and expenditure
needs at various levels and the horizontal imbalance refers to inconsistency  between revenue raising
ability  and fiscal  needs of governments  at the same level in a federation. These issues are discussed  in
the following  sections.
1.31  Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in Brazil
Some degree of mismatch  between revenue means and expenditure needs at various levels
is common to all federations.  Efficiency  in tax administration for certain revenues requires central
administration and this in itself  contnbutes to the vertical imbalance problem. Thus after expenditure
and tax assignment  have been completed, revenue sharing and transfers are frequently used to correct
for any imbalances that result from assignment of responsibilities. However, revenue sharing and
transfer mechanisms  due to difficulties  in design or due to conflicting  claims  of relative  needs by various
levels of government may not fully resolve this issue. In Brazil, constitutional transfers attempt to14
address this issue. Tables 5 and 6 quantify revenues at the disposal  of various governments before and
after revenue sharing  impacts. With the new  tax  assignment  and transfers,  federal governments  historical
position  vis-a-vis  state and local  governments has significantly  deteriorated.  States now command one
of the most dynamic  revenue base (ICMS) and municipalities  are guaranteed a large  share of federal and
state revenue collections.  While  a precise  calculation  of the magnitude  of the squeeze on the big  brother
put by the new fiscal arrangements must await more careful analysis,  Table 7 presents some rough
estimates  to outline the broad picture of vertical  imbalance  that characterizes  Brazil  of today. According
to these calculations, federal and state governments' revenue means significantly  fall short of their
expenditure needs.  The opposite situation holds for municipal  governments. The table shows that
federal government would be (if it is already not) in dire straits if it continued to follow in future as in
past years a broader interpretation of its responsibilities.  State level governments  as a whole face some
difficulties  now  but these may  not persist in the long run in view  of expected growth of ICMS revenues.
Municipal  governments  in Brazil,  on the other hand, should  be the envy  of all  governments  in developing
(or even advanced nations) world.
So far we have concerned ourselves  with reaching broad judgements on vertical balance in
Brazil alone. It would be interesting to reflect how  Brazil compares to advanced country federations.
Unfortunately, there are no satisfactory  measures at our disposal to reflect on this question.  Three
measures  proposed by Hunter (1977)  and previously  used  by Bird (1986)  and others attempt to measure
the degree of control exercised by the federal government over lower levels of governments. These
measures are termed as coefficients of vertical imbalance. The way these measures are structured
suggests that  a coefficient of zero would indicate absolute federal control over state  and local
governments and a coefficient of one would indicate that lower levels of governments are absolutely
autonomous in their decision making. Note that while a high value on this coefficient is desirable, a
value of one has never been a goal  in any federation. A value closer  to but certainly less  than one would
also be consistent  with the assignment  principles  enunciated earlier. Table 8 presents three calculations:
one considering  conditional  transfers and borrowing  only,  a second one by incorporating  unconditional
transfers and a third one by bringing  in shared taxes as well. On the first two coefficients,  Brazil does
better than selected advanced federations reported there.  On the third coefficient, considering15
Table  5
BRAZIL:  TAX  REVENUE  COLLECTIONS  BY LEVEL  OF GOVERNMENT
Year  Shares  (X1  _
Union  States  Municipalities  All
1957  48.1  43.3  8.0  100.0
1958  53.3  41.2  7.5  100.0
1959  19.6  49.6  6.4  100.0
1960  49.5  44.5  6.0  100.0
1961  49.5  44.6  5.9  100.0
1962  49.2  44.5  6.3  100.0
1963  51.0  42.5  6.5  100.0
1964  48.8  44.8  6.5  100.0
1965  50.7  42.5  6.8  100.0
1966  51.3  41.4  7.3  100.0
1967  15.8  49.4  4.8  100.0
1968  51.5  44.7  3.8  100.0
1969  53.7  42.7  3.7  100.0
1970  54.4  41.9  3.7  100.0
1971  56.4  40.0  3.6  100.0
1972  58.3  37.8  3.8  100.0
1973  58.5  37.7  3.8  100.0
1974  59.8  36.9  3.8  100.0
1975  59.0  37.0  4.1  100.0
1976  62.3  33.1  4.6  100.0
1977  60.9  34.0  5.2  100.0
1978  58.2  36.1  5.7  100.0
1979  58.3  35.9  5.9  100.0
1980  58.7  36.2  5.1  100.0
1981  58.2  36.7  5.1  100.0
1982  57.2  37.6  5.2  100.0
1983  57.8  37.0  5.2  100.0
1984  56.9  38.6  4.5  100.0
1985  57.6  38.3  4.1  100.0
1986  53.5  42.2  4.3  100.0
1987*  54.2  41.6  4.2  100.0
1988*  47.1  49.4  3.6  100.0
*  Preliminary  data
Source: MINIFAZ/SEF  unpublished  data.16
Table  6
BRAZIL:  FINAL  DISPOSITION  OF REVENUES  BY LEVEL  OF GOVERNMENT
Year  Revenue  Shares
Union  States  Municipalities  All
1957  42.7  46.0  11.3  100.0
1958  45.7  44.7  9.5  100.0
1959  43.3  47.9  8.9  100.0
1960  43.2  48.2  8.5  100.0
1961  41.8  49.7  8.6  100.0
1962  39.6  48.9  11.5  100.0
1963  41.9  46.0  12.0  100.0
1964  39.6  48.5  11.9  100.0
1965  39.0  48.1  12.9  100.0
1966  40.6  46.3  13.1  100.0
1967  36.9  45.2  17.9  100.0
1968  40.6  42.6  16.9  100.0
1969  45.8  39.8  14.4  100.0
1970  45.7  39.6  14.7  100.0
1971  47.7  38.4  13.9  100.0
1972  49.7  36.5  13.8  100.0
1973  49.1  37.1  13.7  100.0
1974  50.2  36.2  13.6  100.0
1975  50.3  36.0  13.7  100.0
1976  51.4  34.4  14.3  100.0
1977  50.2  34.8  15.0  100.0
1978  47.3  36.7  16.0  100.0
1979  47.5  36.3  16.2  100.0
1980  49.3  35.5  15.2  100.0
1981  49.2  34.8  15.9  100.0
1982  48.0  35.7  16.3  100.0
1983  48.4  35.2  16.4  100.0
1984  46.8  36.5  16.7  100.0
1985  44.7  37.5  17.8  100.0
1986  39.5  40.7  19.9  100.0
1987  42.5  38.6  18.8  100.0
1988*  33.4  50.7  15.9  100.0
1993**  36.5  40.7  22.8  100.0
*  Preliminary  data
**  Estimate
Source: MINIPAZ/SEP  Unpublished  data17
Table  7
VERTICAL  IMBALANCE  IN BRAZIL
Revenue  Expenditure  Surplus/
Share  a  Share  b  Deficiency  c
Federal  36.5  43.4  - 6.9
States  40.7  43.0  - 2.3
Municipalities  22.8  13.6  + 9.2
All  levels  100.0  100.0  0.0
Notes:  a.  Final disposition  of all revenues  based on a fully  phased in
system  of constitutional  transfers  in 1993.
b.  Actual  1988  expenditures
c.  Ignores  borrowing.18
Table  8
COEFFICIENTS  OF  VERTICAL  BALANCE  FOR  SELECTED  FEDERATIONS
Country  Y1  Y2  Y3
Australia  0.68  0.35  0.55
Canada  0.79  0.71  0.80
West Germany  0.84  0.82  0.85
United  States  0.81  0.81  0.85
Brazil  (a)  0.93  0.89  0.83
(b)  0.91  0.87  0.76
Notes:
V 1 - 1  - (Sc+B)/E
V2 - I  - (Su+Sc+B)/E
V3 - I  - (Su+SC+B+Ts)/E
Where  Sc  - Federal  conditional  transfers  to states
au - Federal  unconditional  transfers  to states
B  - Net  borrowing  by states
E  - States  expenditures
Ts  - Shared  Taxas
(a)  for  states  only
(b)  for  the  consolidated  State-Local  public  sector.
Source: (1)  Brazil  1988,  this  report.
(2)  For other countries, six year averages based on data for
1970s.  See  J.S.H. Hunter,  (1977) Federalism and Fiscal
Balance,  Canberra:  Australian  National  University,  Center  for
Research  on Federal  Financial  Relations.19
federal-state sector only, Brazil is ahead of Australia and Canada but closely  behind USA and West
Germany.  Note that calculations for selected advanced federaitions  are quite dated and somewhat
different values  are expected  to be obtained based on more recent data especially  for Canada in view  of
its significant  decentralization experience of the 1980s. The new data is however unlikely to change
Brazil's relative position in this matrix.
1.32  Horizontal  Fiscal Imbalance  in Brazil
Brazil is a large country with very diverse  economic  opportunities across its vast landscape.
Per capita income  in Rondonia, one of the poorest states is only 12% of per capita income  in Sao Paulo,
the richest state in the Union (see Table 9).  Further, per capita income in the north and northeast
regions of the country is less than one-half of the national average.  Regional equity issues have,
therefore, dominated  the agenda of all governments  in its recent history. The federal government uses
its tax, transfer and expenditure policies  in an attempt to reduce regional disparities in public services
provision. The overall impact  of the federal government as shown in Table 10 is strongly  redistributive.
Its net impact is negative in the South and Southeast (the have-regions) and positive in the north,
northeast and centre-west regions (the have-not regions). Interstate equalization due to lack of any
explicit  standard of equalization in current federal pulicies  remains an elusive  goal. The net impact  of
the federal government on the state of Para with 1988  per capita income of NCz$266  was NCz$0.04  as
opposed to NCz$52.31  in Acre, a state with about the same per capita income.  Total per capita
expenditures of states also show a great deal of disparity  as shown in Table 9. The issues  concerning
equalization  of fiscal  capacity  will  be taken up later under transfers.
1.4  Brazil In Relation  to Other  Federations:  An Impressionistic  View
Earlier sections took issue with the current expenditure and tax assignment  in Brazil and
reflected upon their implications  for vertical and borizontal  fiscal  imbalances  in the union. Problems of
the sort discussed  earlier, however, are not germane to Brazil alone and are a creation of politicalTable  9
AN ECONOMIC  PROFILE  OF BRAZILIAN  STATES
Federal  MANUFAC  V.A.  GOP  POPULATION  POP  DENSITY  TOTAL  FEDERAL  TRANSFERS  (per  capita)EXPEND 1988  OWN  OWN  REVENUES/EXPENDITURES
Unit  1984  1988  1988  1988  1988  current  NCz3  REVENUES  1988  (CURRENT  NCzS)
per  capita  per  capita  thousands  (people/sq.k  Tax  Other  Total  per  capita  1988
(NCz3)  (NCzl)  (per  capita)
Rondonia  0.17  128.74  1019.2  4.28  18  79  96
Acre  0.06  268.61  396.5  2.58  49  45  94  122.79  28  21.15%
Amazon.s  0.87  502.98  1895.6  1.21  12  10  21  95.24  76  79.09%
Roraima  0.04  286.01  113.1  0.60  123  123  368.46  307  83.33x
Pars  0.19  286.72  4724.4  3.79  9  5  14  31.23  23  74.22-
mapa  0.11  264.14  240.2  1.69  78  78  227.34  1ss  88.82x
NORTH  0.34  303.23  8388.9  2.35  16  17  33  58.39  28  50.01X
Maranhao  0.05  154.73  4970.4  15.08  9  10  19  34.02  28  82.8ox
Piaui  0.07  136.42  26e7.4  10.15  10  12  22  38.84  13  38.72x
Ceara"  0.19  234.74  8239.4  42.33  7  8  13  53.28  43  81.23X
R Grande  Nor  0.17  280.84  2238.2  42.06  12  9  21  67.38  26  38.73x
Paraiba  0.17  203.22  3152.6  58.43  9  7  18  47.81  26  56.15S
Pernambuco  0.38  345.S4  7114.6  70.43  6  8  14  48.76  35  71.40x
Alagoas  0.29  271.54  2342.3  80.47  10  8  18  41.05  20  48.37%
Sergipe  0.25  279.12  1389  62.62  18  12  30  74.51  47  63.41X
Bahia  0.43  385.98  11304.4  19.94  6  4  10  62.35  47  75.30X
NORTHEAST  0.27  276.67  41296.3  28.64  8  7  1S  51.99  38  88.741
Minas  Cerais  0.88  699.29  15345.8  28.16  4  3  7  89.72  89  98.95s
Espirito  San  0.45  581.99  2429.4  53.12  5  9  14  58.97  49  82.881
Rio  de Janel  0.78  989.54  13558.1  310.54  2  3  5  98.20  es  68.32x
Sao  Paulo  2.20  1069.45  31851.5  127.50  2  1  3  135.43  le  85.41X
SOUTHEAST  1.45  913.82  82982.8  88.14  3  2  5  113.33  96  84.41X
Parana  0.82  666.12  8732.3  43.81  3  4  7  66.63  47  71.12X
Santa  Catarl  1.14  718.53  4311.3  45.23  4  5  9  90.41  84  92.37x
R  Grande  Sul  1.15  890.38  8888.5  31.67  3  3  6  103.05  92  89.701
SOUTH  0.94  767.30  21932.1  38.12  3  4  7  86.08  73  84.52X
M Grosso  Sul  0.16  588.91  1714.5  4.80  6  12  17  109.49  es  61.781
Mato  Grosso  0.18  289.73  1829.3  1.81  10  1S  25  125.48  76  60.23a
colas  0.19  359.57  4740.4  7.68  6  5  11  73.05  42  57.04X
Distrito  Fed  0.14  838.52  1743.3  300.87  3  75  78  188.81  114  80.156
CENTER  WEST  0.17  472.81  9827.5  5.22  6  20  26  108.84  es  59.44U
BRAZIL  0.88  843.87  144427.6  16.97  6  6  11  88.02  69  78.401
Sourcoe:  IGE - Anuarlo  Estatistico  do  Brasil  1989
NINIFAZ/STN/SAFEM
MINIFAZ/SEF
GDP:  eatimted based  on  data  extracted  from  'State  and  Local  Finance  - Public  Policy  in  Brazil'  (June  89),  by  Remy  Prud'homae21
Table  10
BRAZIL:  NET  IMPACT  OF FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  ON  STATES  - 1988
CURRENT  NCzS  PER  CAPITA
Fedoral  Population  Federal  Federal Net Impact
Unit  (thousands) Budgetary  qovornent  of Federal
Revonuos  Expenditures  Govornmnt
Rondonia  1,019.2  6.64  71.90  68.26
Acre  39e.6  6.63  68.94  62.31
Amazonas  1,896.6  80.86  23.74  -7.10
Roraima  113.1  22.65  169.96  147.48
Par&  4,724.4  14.14  14.18  0.04
Amapa  240.2  16.90  91.00  75.11
NORTH  8,388.9  17.05  29.77  12.71
Maranhao  4,970.4  8.49  14.56  11.06
Plaul  2,667.4  6.87  16.97  11.60
Ceara'  6,289.4  9.63  17.78  8.16
R Grande  Nor  2,236.2  8.76  23.12  14.37
Paraiba  3,152.6  6.67  18.81  12.28
Pernambuco  7,114.6  23.07  38.16  10.08
Alagoas  2,342.3  8.47  17.64  9.07
S-rgipe  1,369.0  12.34  27.28  14.94
Behia  11,804.4  19.28  12.46  -6.82
NORTHEAST  41,296.8  13.33  19.20  6.88
Mines  Gerais  16,845.8  31.31  12.12  -19.19
Espirito  Son  2,429.4  38.68  12.68  -26.12
Rio  do Janoi  13,56.1  118.65  239.46  120.90
Sao  Paulo  31,651.6  119.90  9.31  -110.59
SOUTHEAST  62,982.8  94.90  69.66  -35.24
Parana  8,732.3  36.33  9.23  -26.09
Santa  Catarl  4,311.3  30.23  11.00  -19.22
R Grande  Sul  8,888.6  43.06  40.62  -2.54
SOUTH  21,982.1  37.46  22.26  -16.20
U Grosso  Sul  1,714.6  10.88  13.75  2.87
Mato  Grosso  1,629.3  11.68  19.02  7.34
Goias  4,740.4  10.69  12.72  2.08
CENTER  WEST  8,084.2  10.93  14.21  3.28
Sources:
- Balancos  Cerais  de  Uniso  - 1988 (vol  II  p  34)
- Anuario  Estatistico  do  Brasil  1989:  Poputation  (page  75)
Notes:
- Center  West  region  data  exclude  the  Federal  District  (OF).
- Federal  Expendituros  include  all  the intergovornmental  transfers
recorded  in  the  Balancos  Gerais  da  Uniao.
NET IMPACT=  FEDERAL  EXPENDITURES  - FEDERAL  REVENUES22
alliances in any federation.  The following sections prescnt a review of federal system in selected
countries to make an impressionistic  evaluation of the Brazilian  system.
1.41  The Practice of Federalism in  Selected Countries
USA. USA has a 3-tier system  with states as the weakest link  traditionally  in the system. In
federal-local  fiscal  relations states are often by-passed.  The intrusive  role of the federal government has
largely  been the result of urban and racial  problems  of the 1960s  and dominance  of state legislatures  by
rural  interests. Tax  and expenditure  assignment  in the U.S.  is not consistent  with the economic  principles
enunciated earlier.  Other  than taxes on international trade, exclusively  reserved for the federal
govemment and property taxes for state and local levels, all other tax fields are open to all levels of
govemment. Federal, state and local govemments have overlapping and uncoordinated personal and
corporate income tax administration. Expenditure assignment  is also not clearly  delineated. Defense,
foreign affairs  and space administration,  foreign and interstate commerce,  the postal service, coinage,
weights  and measures,  patents and copy rights and crimes  a-ainst the United States are reserved for the
federal govwunment. In housing, education, transportation, and social welfare, all three  levels are
involved  to varyingdegrees. Federal government  gets involved  im  such  local functions  as fire protection,
pothole repair, rat control, urban transit, local libraries  and museums,  and zoning  regulations  as a result
of pork-barrel  politics. Federal govemment  often exercises  strong control over local priorities through
carrot (specific purpose transfers--in early 1980s there were 492 federal programs) or stick (court
ordered racial integration of school pupils and teachers leading to a decay in schooling  in inner cities;
highway  speed limits;  withholding  of federal highway  funds from states not raising  the drinking age to
21). The hallmark  of the U.S. federal system  is diversity,  a "fend for yourself federalism"  and a "jungle
for tax administration". The efficiency  costs of such a system  are large which only an advanced nation
like the U.S. could afford. Major progress to reform this system  was made during Carter and Reagan
years.23
AUSTRALLA:  Australia  has a two-tiered  highly  centralized  system. The centre emphasizes
uniformity  of public  services  across  the nation and uses conditional  grants to achieve  that purpose. Tax
administration  and collection  is  primarily  central (80%  of revenues). Local  governments  are  handmaiden
of states but are given reasonable autonomy in local service delivery. The Commonwealth  has sole
responsibility  in defense, trade, immigration,  external affairs,  social  security  and employment. States are
responsible for education, health and social services,  transport, railways,  electricity and water.  The
federal government  nevertheless  exercises  strong influence  in -hese  areas through conditional  transfers.
In tax assignment,  customs and excises  are reserved for the Centre and concurrent responsibilities  are
assigned in all other areas.  One half of customs proceeds are mandated for states.  The Uniform
Taxation  Act of 1942  eliminated any role for states in income taxes and subsequent court rulings  closed
sales and excise  taxation fields  to states. State-Local governments  are responsible  for 50% of the total
outlay of the public  sector but raise only 17% of revenues.
CANADA: Canada has a two-tiered highly  decentralized system. In 1988, 59% of total
expenditures  were undertaken at the state-local  level. Tax  and expenditure  assignment  are transparent.
Tax assignment  is overlapping  but harmonized. Expenditure assignment  is as follows:
Federal: money,  banking, trade, airlines, railways,  foreign affairs,  defense, unemployment
insurance.
Federal-Provincial: Pensions, immigration,  agriculture,  industry.
Provincial: Education, health, social  welfare, police, natural resources and highways.
WEST GERMANY: The Upper House of the Parliament is called the Council of States
(BUNDESRAT).  State ministers or their deputies are represented on this council and vote at the
direction of their governments. This provides a check to any centralizing  tendency in the federation.
The expenditure assignment  is as follows:
Federal: defense, foreign affairs,  immigration,  railways,  air transport, post office.24
Concurrent: publicwelfare,  regulation  ofcommerce,  industry,  banking,  insuranceand labour
relations, promotion of social responsibility, public roads and shipping.  Note that all
concurrent responsibilities  are carried out by states (Laender).
States: Education, culture and residual powers.
Tax Assignment: Federal government has exclusive  authority over customs and federal
monopolies (alcohol etc.) and priority  over remaining  taxes. Taxes are primarily  collected
by the Centre and then shared with the states and local governments based on agreed
percentages.
MEXICO: Mexico is a highly centralized federation.  80% of public expenditures are
controlled by the central government.  In addition to the usual functions of a central government
(defense,  justice, external affairs,  commerce and finance), the federal government in Mexico  assumes
responsibilities  for functions  which are allocated to other levels  of government in other federations such
as health and education. States are responsible for public transport and infrastructure expenditures.
States  have  no own  source revenues and solely  depend upon federal transfers (18.1%  of federal revenues
are transferred and distributed 50% on a per capita basis and the remaining 50% based on historical
shares). The design  of these transfers are creating  certain anomalies  in tax  administration. For example,
in 1988, several states showed net negative VAT collections. Credit vouchers issued far exceeded
collections.
1.42  An Impressionistic Evaluation
Table 11 presents a bird's eye-view  of selected  federal systems  reviewed  earlier. The table
suggests that  Brazil compares quite well to  other federations on decentralization indicators.  It
nevertheless can learn a great deal from other federations in designing  transfers.  Of the countries
reviewed here, Canada and West Germany offer two alternative neat models of a federation.  The
former emphasizes  diversity  in public  services  with minimum  standards achieved  by tax harmonization
and transfers. The latter emphasizes  uniformity  in public  services  achieved  through rational  expenditureTABLE II
FEDERAL  SY8TfHS  - AN wIPR%SSIOUISTIC" VALUATION
Tax SeDaration  Tax Overla  nDin  Tat  Sharing
Selected  Indicators  Australia  Nexico  Canada  Unlited States  West  Germany  Brazil
National  Unity  Strong  strong  Fairly  strong  Strong  Strong  Strong
State  Influence  on  Federal  Falrly  strong  Weak  Strong  Fairly  veak  Strong  Strong
Policy-makers
State  Government Constitutional  Strong  Weak  Fairly  strong  Fairly  weak  Strong  Strong
Statue  de  jure;  very
strong  de  facto
Actual  State  Control  of  Local  Strong  Strong  Strong  Varies  from  fairly  Strong  Weak
Goverument  strong  to  fairly
weak
Range of  Local  Goverment  L$sited  Limited  Fairly  extensive  Extensive  Limited  Extensive
Responsibilities
Local  Government  Influence  on  Weak  Weak  Fairly  strong  Fairly  strong  Weak  Strong
State  Policy-makers
Local  Coveroment  lnfluenc,  on  Weak  Weak  Fairly  strong  Fairly  strong  Weak  Strong
State  Policy
Local  Govermnent  Inflence  on  Weak  Weak  Weak  Fairly  strong  Weak  Very  strong
Federal  Policy
The Character  of  Fiscal  Federalism  TWo-tiered;  Three-tired;  Two-tiered;  Three-tiered  Two-tiered  Three-tiered
centralized  centralized  decentralized  unstructured  integrated  decentralized
Federal-State  Intergovernmental  Important;  Important  Important;  Important;  Unimportant  Important
Transfers  emphasis  on  emphasis  on  un-  Emphasis  on con-  Emphasis  on tax
conditional  conditional  ditional  grants  sharing
grants  grants
Federallunterstate  Equalization  Very  strong;  Weak  Strong;  revenue  Very  weak  Strong;  revenue  Weak
Performance  revenue  and  disparities  and  some expendi-
expenditure  reduced  sub-  ture  disparities
disparities  stantiaily.  reduced  sub-
reduced  stantially
substantially.
State  Tax  Performance  Fairly  weak  Weak  Strong  Fairly  strong  Fairly  strong  Strong
Local  Government  Fiscal  Independence  Fairly  strong  Weak  Fairly  strong  Fairly  strong  Weak  WeakTax  SeDaration  Tax  Overlanpint  Tax  Sharina
Selected  Indicators  Australia  Mexico  Canada  United  States  West  Germanv  Brazil
Equalization  Formmla  Fed.  -state  implicit  a  Fed.  -State  Fiscal  Implicit  and  Explicit  and  Implicit  and
Explicit  piecemeal  Equalization  piecemeal  complex  piecemeal
State  tax  base  conformity  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No
State  tax  rate  uniformity  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes
Single  tax  collection  and  adamin.  Yes  No  Yes  Yea  Yes  No
State-Local  revenues  more  or  less  No  Yes  Yea  Yes  Yea  No
match  responsibility
Source:  Some data for  this table  are  extracted  from  a  Table  prepared  by  John  Shannon,  Washington,  D.C.  ACIR,  1980  entitled
"Rating  Federal  Systems  - An  Impressionistic  Evaluation).27
assignment  and tax sharing arrangements. Smaller developing countries like Sri Lanka could benefit
from the German model  whereas large  and diverse  countries  like Brazil,  India,  Mexico  and Pakistan  have
much to learn from the Canadian model. Interestingly,  U.S. reforms in recent years have also moved  it
in the direction of a Canadian style two-tiered system.
1.5  Conclusions
Fiscal federalism  issues have been more thoughtfully addressed in Brazil than any other
developing country. The New Constituf an makes a reasonably  clear assignment  of expenditure and
revenue assignment. This assignment  is also broadly consistent with economic principles  discussed in
this paper. Some problems  nevertheless remain. De facto expenditure  responsibilities  are not consistent
with the constitutional intent. The tax  sharing arrangements  have favoured  the municipal  sector at the
expense of  the  federal government.  The federal government is facing a  major squeeze while
municipalities  are reducing  own tax  efforts due to generous availability  of funds through tax sharing. As
the fiscal  pressures on the federal government mount, it is showing  willingness  to discuss  expenditure
turnbacks on a program by program basis. It is expected that by 1993, much of the kind of federal
irvolvement that is criticized here would have vanished due to revenue constraints.  The federal
government is well advised  to move in this direction sooner.
In the area of tax assignment,  ICMS (VAT) administration has been handed over to the
States Council which contrary to principles enunciated here allows states some flexibility  over its
coverage in their jurisdictions. Interstate trade is causing  a major havoc  with the ICMS administration
with energy producing states facing a major crunch on their revenues (ICMS is on the final sales of
energy  only). Tax  bases for IPI, ICMS and ISS somewhat  overlap  but are administered  by three different
levels of government. Further, rural property tax (1TR) which is more suitable for administration by
state governments  is currently a federal responsibility.
The following  reform options are suggested  to deal with these issues:
1.  Immediate turnback of direct federal involvement  in functions  of purely local nature
such as primary  and secondary  education, urban grading,  bridges,  zoning  etc. Further,28
administration  of health and education  should be a state responsibility.  Therefore, the
roles of federal ministries  of health and education be reduced to setting minimum
standards and providing  per capita block gr. As  to induce compliance.
2.  The three sales taxes,  IPI, ICMS and ISS be combined  into one tax to be administered
by the federal government on behalf of state and local governments. Thus proceeds
from the taxbe shared by  the three levels  in proportion to their current intake from this
source.
3.  The administration  of rural property tax be turned over to the state leveL
4.  The revenue sharing and transfer programs  be restructured as discussed  in the section
on intergovernmental  transfers.29
NOTES
1.  The implementation of above principles require operation of voting with feet mechanism.  This
brings us to the Tiebout literature which suggests that voting with feet will lead to jurisdiction
formations  creating a market analogue to public  service  provision.  Oates had earlier suggested  that
allocative  efficiency  questions associated  with voting  with one's feet could be settled by examining
tax and benefit capitalization. The existence of capitalization implies allocative efficiency.  This
conclusion  has been rejected by Jan Brueckner (1979, 1982)  and Ar.war Shah (1983, 1988, 1989,
1990).  Brueckner's test is based on the theoretical result that a non-positive  relationship between
public  services  and residential  propertyvalues is a definite  indication  of over-provision  of local  public
goods beyond optimal levels in the case of typical  mixed communities,  i.e. , communities  having
substantial business  property. An alternative  test proposed by Shah uses the criterion that, when the
level of local spending is optimal, a balanced budget change in local spending and residential
property taxation should leave residential property values unaltered. Thus a positive impact of a
balanced budget change would indicate under-provision  and a negative impact over-provision  of
public  services.
2.  For specific examples of these see Diogo Lordelle de Mello (1988), "Resources Mobilization
Strategies for Urban Development in Brazil",  processed.30
2.0  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  TRANSFERS  IN BRAZIL
The existing  structure of federal-state-local  transfers in Brazil  can be broadly  classified  into
two categories,  namely:  (1) tax transfers or revenue sharing arrangements  mandated by the Brazilian
Constitution and (2) Specific purpose transfers including  negotiated transfers (convenios). In 1989,
other than meeting  its obligations  forestablished  programs  such as  the Unified  and Decentralized  Health
Care System (SUDS), the federal government did not disburse any additional funds through the
convenios. In a typical  year, though convenios  accounted for nearly 10% of federal transfers to states.
The following  paragraphs present a brief description of revenue sharing arrangements and other
transfers.
2.1  Revenue  Sharing  Arrangements  in Brazil
Revenue sharing arrangements  have been specified  in the new Brazilian  Constitution. The
Constitution provides strict  criteria for the allocation  of revenues  to different levels  of government and
some guidelines on distribution of these through special  funds among units at the same level. Specific
distribution criteria are specified by parliamentary regulations. There is no stipulation as to the final
disposition  of these funds by the receiving  government. The Constitution, nevertheless, provides that
the Union must apply  a minimum  of 18%, states  and municipalities  each at least 25% of all tax revenues
(including intergovernmental transfers) on education. Sharing of federal revenues from income and
industrial product taxes are through participation funds established for this purpose.  In 1988, the
Federal Government transferred about  NCz$ 1.5  billion  to states and municipalities  through the revenue
sharing mechanisms  (see Table 12). Of this total amount, 52% went to relatively  less  prosperous states
in the north and the northeast regions of the nation. A description of major programs for revenue
sharing is given  in the following  sections.Table  12
BRAZIL: FEDERAL  TAX TRANSFERS  TO STATES  AND  MUNICIPALITIES  - 1988
(Current  NCzS  thousands)
Federal  STATE  GOVERNMENT  MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  TOTAL
Unit  ---------------------------  ------
Total  Per  capita  X of  total  Total  P-r  capita  X  of  total  Total  Per  capita  X of  total
Rondonia  18,222  17.88  2.43X  6,431  6.31  0.90X  24,662  24.19  1.88x
Acre  19,390  48.90  2.68X  3,928  9.91  O.55X  23,318  58.81  1.59x
Amazonas  22,638  11.94  3.02X  10,836  5.72  1.52X  33,474  17.86  2.29x
Roraima  13,862  122.56  1.85X  2,394  21.16  0.34X  16,266  143.73  1.11X
Para  42,730  9.04  5.70!  23,930  5.07  3.35X  68,660  14.11  4.55X
Aapa  18,654  77.66  2.49!  2,909  12.11  0.41X  21,663  89.77  1.47X
NORTH  135,496  16.15  18.06x  50,428  6.01  7.07X  186,924  22.16  12.70X
Maranhao  44,111  8.87  5.88x  27,961  5.63  3.92X  72,072  14.60  4.92x
Piaui  26,338  10.26  3.61X  17,162  6.68  2.40X  43,490  18.94  2.971
Ceara'  45,134  7.23  6.02!  33,858  5.43  4.765  78,993  12.86  S.40X
R Grand.  Nor  25,881  11.57  3.45X  18,651  8.30  2.60!  44,432  19.87  3.04X
Parslbe  28,368  9.00  3.78!  22,983  7.29  3.22X  61,341  16.29  3.51X
Pernambuco  42,048  5.91  5.6ox  36,805  5.03  5.02%  77,853  10.94  S.321
Alagoas  24,232  10.36  3.23X  16,090  6.87  2.26X  40,322  17.21  2.75X
Sergipe  24,188  17.67  3.22X  10,996  8.03  1.54X  35,184  26.70  2.40!
Bahia  69,702  6.17  9.29x  65,302  5.78  9.15X  135,004  11.94  9.22x
NORTHEAST  329,993  7.99  43.98x  248,698  6.02  34.86X  578,691  14.01  39.63x  1
Mines  Gerais  85,702  4.28  8.76x  98,047  6.39  13.74X  163,749  10.67  11.19x
Espirito  San  11,553  4.76  1.54X  12,843  5.29  1.80x  24,396  10.04  1.67X
Rio  de  Janei  31,070  2.29  4.14X  24,619  1.82  3.45X  65,690  4.11  3.8OX
Sao  Paulo  53,892  1.70  7.1ex  102,181  3.23  14.32X  158,072  4.93  10.66x
SOUTHEAST  162,217  2.68  21.62X  237,690  3.77  33.31X  399,907  6.36  27.32X
Parana  28,686  3.28  3.82x  48,783  5.59  6.84x  77,488  8.87  5.29X
Santa  Catari  15,301  3.55  2.04X  28,009  6.50  3.93x  43,309  10.05  2.96X
R Grande  Sul  25,795  2.90  3.44X  44,524  5.01  6.24X  70,319  7.91  4.80%
SOUTH  69,782  3.18  9.30x  121,316  5.53  17.00X  191,097  8.71  13.06x
M Crosso  Sul  9,784  5.71  1.30X  10,492  6.12  1.47X  20,276  11.83  1.39%
Mato  Grosso  15,711  9.64  2.09x  12,335  7.57  1.73X  28,046  17.21  1.92X
Coias  27,306  6.78  3.64X  32,507  8.86  4.61X  59,813  12.62  4.09x
(a)
CENTER  WEST  52,800  6.53  7.04X  55,334  6.84  7.7ex  108,134  13.38  7.39x
BRAZIL  (*)  750,288  5.26  1OO.OOX  713,465  5.00  1.OOOOX 1,463,753  10.26  1OO.OOX
Dist  Federal  4,956  2.84  2,287  1.31  7,243  4.15
Brazil  +  DF  755,244  6.23  716,762  4.96  1,470,996  10.19
Sources:  Ministerio  da  Fazenda  - Secretaris  Ceral  - Secretaris  de  Economis  * Financas  (MINIFAZ/SEF):  Unpublished  data
Note:
a  Data  exclude  the  Federal  District  (DF)32
2.11  State Participation  Fund (FPE: Fundo  de Participacao  dos Estados)
The federal government deposits  21.5%  each of income  tax (IR) and industrial products tax
(IPI) in a special fund for later distribution by the States' Council to individual  states . In determining
state shares from this fund, the fund first sets aside 85% of total funds for distribution to states in the
north, north-east and centre-west regions of the country  and the remaining 15% for the south and the
southeast region.  The Act 104-A, 1989 argues that this initial allocation is necessary  to safeguard
regional equity objectives  as tax assignment  carried out by the Constitution appears to favour the rich
states more than the poorer ones. The Act has further established  deadlines for the federal government
for the release of funds for distribution to states.  The intent of these deadlines is to limit federal
government incentives  to benefit from inflationary  gains by withholding  state funds a bit longer than
absolutely necessary.  The formula for the distribution of funds among states takes into account
population (a proxy for fiscal  need) and inverse of per capita income (fiscal  capacity indicator). The
criteria specified for this purposes is expressed mathematically  in Box 1.  A proposal to extend this
formula  to incorporate  land area (fiscal  need measure),  interstate trade orientation (spillover  factor)  and
ratio of own  revenues to expenditures (fiscal  effort indicator)  is currently  under discussion  in the Senate
(see also Lei #165/89, Senado Federal).
This formula  yields the participation  coefficients  for individual  states as given in Table 13.
These coefficients  however  were found unacceptable  by the Council  of Finance Ministers  of the States
and instead they developed modified  coefficients  as given  in column 3 based upon mutual negotiations.
These coefficients  are applicable  till 1991. Participation coefficients  for 1992  and later years  will  be re-
established  based upon a review  of the working  of the formula and new data from the 1990  census.
A similar fund established for distribution of federal transfers to municipalities  is named
Municipal Participation Fund (FPM:Fundo de Participacao dos Municipios). This fund is discussed
below:33
BOX 1
DISTRIBUTION  CRITERIA  FOR  THE  STATES  PARTICIPATION  FUND (FPE)
(FPE), - 0.85  *  G *  SN +  0.15  *  G *  Ss
Where  G - 0.215  *  (IR  +  IPI)
I  (POPP)i  *  (YPCF)1 1
N,SN  [  (POPF)i  *  (YPCF)i  ]
s-i
and  SN  - Participation  coefficient  for  a state  in the  northeast,  north
and  center-west  regions.
S  =  Participation  coefficient  for  a state  in the  south  and southeast
regions.
IR  - federal  tax  collection  from  income  taxes
IPI  - federal  tax  collections  from  industrial  products  tax.
POPF  - Population  factor.  The following  table is used for this
purpose.
Z of national  population
represented  by each  state  POPF
upto 2%  2.0
2-4x:
for  the  first  2%  2.0
for  each  additional  0.3%  0.3
5-10%:
for  the  first  5%  5.0
for  each  additional  0.5%  0.5
above  102  10.034
Box 1 (continued)
DISTRIBUTION  CRITERIA  FOR  FPE (Continued)
YPCF  - state  income  (per  capita)
YPCF  is determined  according  to the  following  table:
Average  Per  Capita  income  of all  states/  YPCF
Per  capita  income  of state  i
-----------------------------------------------------
Up to .00045  .4
Between  .0055  and .0065  .6
.0065  - .0075  .7
.0075  - .0085  .8
.0085  - .0095  .9
.0095  - .0110  1.0
.0110  - .0130  1.2
.0130  - .0150  1.4
.0150  - .0170  1.6
.0170  - .0190  1.8
.0190  - .0220  2.0
Above .0220  2.535
Table 13
FRE: PARTICIPATION COEFFICIENTS FOR BRAZILLAN  STATES
FOR 1990-1991
Federal Unit  Formula Share  Agreed Share
NORTH
Rondonia  2.1164  2.8150
Acre  2.6270  3.4210
Amazonas  2.1850  2.7904
Roraima  1.9090  2.4807
Para  4.7225  6.1120
Amapa  2.6200  3.4120
NORTHEAST
Maranhao  5.7415  7.2181
Piaui  3.3205  4.3214
Ceara'  7.0585  7.3369
R Grande Norte  3.2045  4.1779
Paraiba  3.6700  4.7889
Pernambuco  5.3960  4.3214
Alagoas  3,1900  4.1601
Sergipe  3.1860  4.1553
Bahia  9.4635  9.3962
SOUTHEAST
Minas Gerais  7.9545  4.4545
Espirito Santo  1.5470  1.5000
Rio de Janeiro  4.2435  1.5277
Sao Paulo  3.9460  1.0000
SOUTH
Parana  4.2400  2.8832
Santa Catarina  1.8800  1.2798
R Grande Sul  3.4615  2.3548
CENTER WEST
M Grosso Sul  1.4735  1.3320
Mato Grosss  2.5530  2.3079
Goias  3.1450  2.8431
Distrito Federal  0.7535  0.6902
Source: Camara dos Deputados
Projeto de Lei Cornplementar  No. 104-A,  de 1989.
Ministerio  da Fazenda  - Secretaria  Geral
Secretaria de Economia  e Financas(MINIFAZ/SEF)
Boletim Informativo No. 166,  December 198836
2.12  Municipal  Participation  Fund  (FPM)
FPM was  established as 13.5%  of federal income and industrial product taxes in 1984 and
raised to 20% in October 1988. This share of the specified  taxes  will  rise by 0.5 percentage point each
year  until the new  system  is fully  phased in 1993  with 22.5%  of these taxes  earmarked for the fund. 12%
of the FPM funds  are allocated to state capitals  and municipalities  with population greater than 400,000.
Of the remaining 88%, 6% is set aside for the Municipal Participation Reserve Fund (RFPM: the
Reserva  do Fundo de Participacao de Municipios).  The RFPM is  available  only to larger municipalities
other than state capitals  with 1990  population at least 4% of national population. The distribution of
funds to all municipalities  are by a formula which takes into consideration population and per capita
income of each municipality. Funds vary directly  by population and inversely  by per capita income.
Formulae details are given in Box 2.  Table 14 provides details on  the level of funding and the
participation  coefficients  by population size of the municipal  unit.
In addition to revenues through the FPM, municipalities  also receive 50% of revenues from the rural
property tax in proportion to the value of real estate properties located in their jurisdictions;  100% of
payroll deductions of income taxes of municipal employees;  70% of tax on gold by origin; 2.3% of
revenues  from crude  oil based on the value of production; and 50% of hydroelectricity  and mineral  taxes
by the sales value of the minerals  by origin.
2.2  Specific  Purpose  Transfers
Non-Constitutional Transfers: Overall there were 117 umbrella federal-state-municipal
transfer programs in 1989  of which 19 were open to municipal  participation. These prog-  ns can be
broadly  classified  into four categories:
(1) The first type  of transfers have  been instituted to simply  comply  with specific  laws  other
than the Constitutional  provisions. Major transfers of this type include transfers to the
Federal Capital (38% of total in 1987)  ; transfers related to the creation of new states
(21% of total in 1987)  and financial  compensation  (royalties) paid to states for the37
BOX 2
FORMULAE  FOR  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  MUNICIPAL  PARTICIPATION  FUND (FPM)
State  Capitals  and  Municipalities  with 1990  PoRulation  greater  than  400.000
SCPl4)i  - 0.12  *  G  *  (POPCL)  c  x  (YPCF) 1
(FPM)8i  0.12 * GFp  FPM
E  [(POPCL)i  x  (YPCF)i]
Other  Municipalities
(POPSM)
(FPM)'  GFP  *  0.82 x  ____ (FM  FP
ZRPOPSM)  i
(POPML)i  x  (YPCF)
+ 0.06 *  D  *  i
E (POPML)i  x  (YPCF)  i
When G  - 0.225 (IPI +  IR)
Di  - 1  If  municipality  has  a population  greater  than  156,216
or (POP)  /E(POP)  >  0.04 (includes  non-capital
municipalities  with population  greater  than 400,000).
0  otherwise
Superscript  sc refers  to state  capital
Superscript  om refers  to all  other  municipalities.
POPCL  - population  factor  for  state  capitals  and  larger
municipalities  determined  according  to the following  table:
Z of total  national  population  in this  POPCL
category  living  in  municipality
Up to 1%  1.0
Between  1  a-id  5%
- for the first 1Z  1.0
- for  each  additional  .5%  or fraction,  add  .5
Above  52  5.0
YPCF  - state  income  per  capita  factor  defined  in  the  FPE  section.38
BOX 2 (Continued)
FORMULAE  FOR  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  F.P.M (Continued)
POPSM  - population  factor  for small  and  medium  municipalities  with
population  less than 400,000  determined  according  to the
following  table:
Population  of  the  Municipality  POPSM
Up to 16,188
- for the first 10,188  .6
- for each additional 3,396 or fraction  +  .2
Between  16,800  and  50,940
- for the first 16,980  1.0
- for each additional 6,792 or fraction  +  .2
Between  50,940  and 101,880
- for the first 50,940  2.0
- for  each  additional  10,188  or fraction  +  .2
Between  1010,940  and 156,216
- for the first 101,880  3.0
- for  each  additional  13,584  or fraction  +  .2
Above  156,216  4.0
POPML  =  population  factor  for  eligible  (medium  and  large
municipalities) determined according to the following
table:
Z  of total  population  of eligible  POPML
municipalities  living  in  municipality
Up to 2%  2.0
Between  2 and  5%
- for the first 2%  2.0
- for  each  additional  .5%  or fraction,  add  .5
Above  5Z  5.0
Xt__=_S  8________s  __-------------- 39
Table  14
BRAZIL:  MUNICIPAL  PARTICIPATION  7UND  COEFFICIENTS
(1989)
Population  Amount  of  municipal
(Inhabitants)  Coefficient  participation  in  USS 000's
Up to 10,188  0.6  698
10,189  to  13,584  0.8  930
13,585  to  16,980  1.0  1,163
16,981  to  23,772  1.2  1,396
23,773  to  30,564  1.4  1,628
30,565  to  37,356  1.6  1,861
37,357  to  44,148  1.8  2,094
44,149  to  50,940  2.0  2,326
50,941  to  61,128  2.2  2,559
61,129  to  71,316  2.4  2,792
71,317  to  81,504  2.6  3,024
81,505  to  91,692  2.8  3,257
91,693  to 101,880  3.0  3,490
101,881  to 115,464  3.2  3,723
115,465  to 129,048  3.4  3,955
129,049  to 142,632  3.6  4,188
142,663  to 156,216  3.8  4,421
above 156,216  4.0  4,654
Source: Instituto  Brasileiro  Administracao  Municipal,  Noticiero,  No. 96,
September/89.40
extraction of oil within their jurisdiction. Typically  such transfers constitute 60% of
annual total non-constitutional  transfers.
(2) The second type of transfers are commonly referred to as convenios or negotiated
transfers. These are not regulated by law and are based on negotiations between the
federal and other levels  units  individually.  Support for  regional  development,  agriculture,
education, health and housing  are the priority areas for receipt of funds from convenios.
They constituted 40% of the non-constitutional  transfers in 1987.
(3) The third type of transfers are special  investment  funds/projects.  These projects may  be
undertaken by state and local governments on behalf of the federal government.
Financing  comes  from  the General Revenue Fund as  well  as the Social  Investments  Fund
(FINSOCIAL:  Fundo  de Investimento  Social)  and the programs  for National  Integration
(PIN) and Redistribution of Land to Stimulate the Agrarian Economies of North and
Northeast (PROTERRA). The transfers associated  with these funds  are not recorded
in the Balancos  Gerais da Uniao (BGU) as intergovernmental  transfers. Nearly  70% of
these funds are recorded under the umbrella  of planning. There is flexibility  in the use
of these funds. The only requirement is that they be used for the development of basic
social services  and infrastructure.
(4) The fourth type of transfers are the transfers  made through government agencies. These
transfers also do not show  up in the BGU. To account for these,  it is necessary  to enquire
from many  different agencies  for what they  record as  non-tax  transfers  especially  transfers
made in the form of convenios.  The collection  of data on these transfers is a difficult  task
since the government  agencies  do not aggregate  data so as to determine which  part of the
transfers went to state and local  govemments. The National Secretary  of Treasury  (STN:
Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional) reported that in 1986 8.5% of tax revenues went to
intergovernmental transfers not related to the sharing of tax revenues. Most of these
transfers come  from  the ministries  of Planning,  Education,  Finance, Urban Development
and Health. The northeast region  traditionally  receives  nearly  one third of total transfers
made through gcvernment agencies.41
A description of negotiated transfers briefly described  earlier follows:
2.21  Negotiated  Transfers  (Convenios)
A convenio represents federal transfer of funds to  state  and local governments for
undertaking expenditures on  behalf of  the federal government in areas of federal government
responsibility. These transfers are determined by supplemental laws  or directly negotiated between
different levels  of government. These transfers constituted 22% of total federal-state-local  transfers
and 8% of federal revenues in 1987. Nearly  90% of these transfers (excluding  those for enterprises) go
to states and the remaining  10%  to municipalities  (see Table 15). Transfers to municipalities  are usually
for urban development and housing prograr is. Occasionally  though large sums of money  were made
available to municipalities  in seeking  their political  support e.g. CZ$ 6 billion for support for writing  a
new constitution in 1987  (see Afonso, 1989).
In 1988, there were over 3000 convenios  with multitude of objectives. Tables 15 and 16
provide 1988  distribution  of these transfers by  destination (level of government) and by source (federal
ministry). An accounting  of these by programs  and by objectives  is not possible as it is an activity  which
the federal government  traditionally  does not monitor. A special  survey  done by  the Ministry  of Finance
in 1988  has analyzed  the data on convenios  by functional  classification  and by state for 1985-1986.  (see
Tables 18 and 19 and appendix Tables A.1-A3).  This survey established that nearly two-thirds of
conditional  transfers in 1985-86  were meant for planning and education. The northeast region received
a lion's share of transfers for education (46.4%  of total) and the centre-west region received  62.6% of
total transfers for planning. This survey  further confirmed  that most transfers on account of convenios
were based on ad hoc decisions  and devoid  of any formal  criteria and therefore could not be subjected
to any formal analysis.
The 1988  federal allocation  of negotiated transfers as  reported in Table 15  has an interesting
pattemofdistnrbution  amongstates. For example,  the State ofMaranhao, then-President Sarney's  home
state had a very peculiar  participation  in the overall distribution  of negotiated transfers in 1988.  Its state
government alone received  higher funding  through negotiated transfers than all the state governmentsTable  15
BRAZIL: FEDERAL  NEGOTIATED  TRANSFERS  - 1988
Convonlos,  Agreements,  Adjustments,  Protocols,  etc.
(Current  NCz3  thousands)
Federal  STATE  GOVERNMENT  MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  ENTERPRISES  TOTAL
Unit  ---------------------------  ---------------------------  ---------------------------  ---------------------------
Total  Per  capita  X  of  total  Total  Per  capita  % of  total  Total  Per  capita  X of  total  Total  Per  capita  X  of  total
Rondonla  7,253  7.02  1.86%  a6s  0.36  0.67%  963  0.94  0.45%  8,471  8.31  1.21%
Acre  2,787  6.98  0.64%  153  0.39  0.29X  873  2.20  0.41%  3,793  9.57  0.54%
Amazons  6,004  8.17  1.38X  919  0.48  1.72X  6,008  3.17  2.81%  12,931  6.82  1.84%
Roraiua  219  1.94  0.06X  467  4.13  0.88%  1,569  14.10  0.7sx  2,281  20.17  0.33X
Para  4,898  1.04  1.13X  1,798  0.38  3.37X  6,079  1.08  2.37X  11,776  2.49  1.68x
Amapa  312  1.30  0.07X  3,906  16.26  7.33X  3,144  13.09  1.47%  7,361  30.65  1.05X
NORTH  21,353  2.66  4.92%  7,697  0.91  14.26X  17,602  2.11  8.26X  46,812  5.58  6.66X
Maranhao  22,687  4.56  5.22%  4,605  0.93  8.64%  18,641  3.75  8.72%  45,933  9.24  6.65x
Piaui  9,518  3.71  2.19X  3,233  .28  6.07X  3,496  1.36  1.83%  16,247  6.33  2.32%
Ceara'  15,347  2.46  3.63X  1,834  0.29  3.44X  10,836  1.74  6.07X  28,017  4.49  3.99%
R  Grand.  Nor  8,734  3.91  2.01X  3,013  1.35  5.86x  6,032  2.26  2.36%  16,779  7.50  2.39%
Paraiba  7,292  2.31  1.68x  2,046  0.66  3.84x  4,387  1.39  2.05%  13,724  4.36  1.96x
Pernambuco  9,252  1.30  2.13%  2,173  0.31  4.09%  6,810  0.96  3.18%  18,236  2.66  2.60%
Alagoas  3,016  1.29  0.69%  2,835  1.21  5.32X  1,990  0.85  0.93%  7,841  3.35  1.12X
Sergipe  7,262  5.30  1.87%  2,394  1.75  4.49%  2,690  1.89  1.21%  12,238  8.94  1.74%
Bahia  10,874  0.96  2.60X  6,503  0.58  12.21%  9,009  0.80  4.21%  26,386  2.33  3.76X
NORTHEAST  93,972  2.28  21.64X  28,636  0.69  53.76%  62,791  1.62  29.36%  186,398  4.49  26.43X
Minas  Gerais  11,173  0.73  2.67%  2,769  0.18  6.18%  19,199  1.26  8.98%  33,131  2.16  4.72%
Espirito  San  1,506  0.62  0.35%  633  0.26  1.19X  1,162  0.48  0.54%  3,300  1.36  0.47%
Rio de Janei  4,963  0.37  1.14%  1,114  0.08  2.09%  88,209  6.03  31.89%  74,286  5.48  10.69%
Sao Paulo  243,268  7.69  66.02%  2,634  0.08  4.94%  10,980  0.36  5.13X  268,872  8.12  36.63%
SOUTHEAST  260,899  4.14  60.09%  7,140  0.11  13.40X  99,660  1.68  4e.66%  367,689  6.84  S2.41%
Parana  7,346  0.84  1.89%  1,808  0.21  3.39%  8,834  0.78  3.20%  15,988  1.83  2.28X
Santa  Catari  5,927  1.37  1.37X  2,201  0.51  4.13%  6,984  1.39  2.80%  14,112  3.27  2.01X
R Grande  Sul  13,368  1.60  3.08%  2,271  0.26  4.26X  9,098  1.02  4.25%  24,727  2.78  3.63x
SOUTH  26,631  1.21  6.13X  6,280  0.29  11.79X  21,916  1.00  10.26%  64,827  2.60  7.82%
M  Grosso  Sul  7,593  4.43  1.75%  917  0.53  1.72X  3,064  1.78  1.43X  11,6e4  6.74  1.65%
Mato  Grosso  7,661  4.63  1.74%  834  0.61  1.67%  1,980  1.22  0.93%  10,385  6.36  1.48%
Goias  16,202  3.42  3.73X  1,875  0.40  3.52%  6,924  1.46  3.24%  26,001  5.27  3.66%
CENTER  WEST  31,346  3.88  7.22X  3,626  0.46  6.81%  11,968  1.48  5.59x  46,930  5.81  6.69x
BRAZIL  434,201  3.04  100.00%  63,278  0.37  100.OOX  213,877  1.60  100.00%  701,366  4.92  100.OON
Sources:
Ministerlo  da  Fazenda  - Secretaria  do Tesouro  Nacional  - Secretaria  de  Contabilidade  (MINIFAZ/STN/SECON):  Unpublished  dataTable  16
BRAZIL: FEDERAL  NEGOTIATED  TRANSFERS  - 1988
Convenios,  Agreemnts,  Adjustments,  Protocols,  etc.
(Current  NCzS  thousands)
MINISTRY-FUNCTION  STATE  GOVERNMENTS  MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENTS  ENTERPRISES
Total  Per capita  X  of  total  Total  Per capita  X of  total  Total  Per capita  X of  total
INDUSTRY  A COMMERCE  287  0.00  0.06%  46  0.00  0.08%  297  0.00  0.12%
MINING A ENERGY  738  0.0.  1.31%  1,005  0.01  0.40%
IRRIGATION  19,719  0.14  3.81%  536  0.00  0.95%  6,017  0.04  1.99%
EDUCATION  31,166  0.22  6.02%  21,249  0.16  37.e4%  21,211  0.15  8.42%
COMMUNICATIONS  1  0.00  0.00%  162  0.00  0.06%
AGRICULTURE  16,416  0.12  3.17%  1,049  0.01  1.86%  42,198  0.30  18.76%
PLANNING  A  ADMINISTRATION  68,548  0.48  13.24%  338  0.00  0.59%  455  0.00  0.18%
TRANSPORTATION  860  0.01  0.17%  1,691  0.01  3.00%  112,463  0.79  44.64%
INTERIOR  88,187  0.46  12.78%  30,761  0.22  64.48%  67,883  0.48  28.94%
LABOR  68,636  0.48  13.26%  8  0.00  0.01%  81  0.00  0.03%
SCIENCE  A TECHNOLOGY  239,585  1.68  46.26%
OTHER  6,490  0.06  1.25%  44  0.00  0.08%  1,170  0.01  0.46%
TOTAL  517,893  3.63  100.00%  56,447  0.40  100.00%  251,942  1.77  100.00%
MINISTRY-FUNCTION  TOTAL  OF  ALL FEDERAL  NEGOTIATED  TRANSFES
Total  Per capita  X  of  total
INDUSTRY  A COMMERCE  629  0.00  0.08%
MINING A ENERGY  1,743  0.01  0.21%
IRRIGATION  25,272  0.18  3.08%
EDUCATION  73,625  0.62  8.91%
COMMUNICATIONS  163  0.00  0.02%
AGRICULTURE  59,683  0.42  7.22%
PLANNING  A ADMINISTRATION  69,339  0.49  8.39%
TRANSPORTATION  115,014  0.81  13.92%
INTERIOR  184,821  1.16  19.95%
LABOR  68,724  0.48  8.32%
SCIENCE  A TECHNOLOGY  239,586  1.68  29.00%
OTHER  7,704  0.05  0.93%
TOTAL  826,282  5.79  100.00%
Sources:  Ministerio  da  Fazenda  - Secretaria  do  Tesouro  Nacional  - Secretaria  de  Contabilidade  (MINIFAZ/STN/SECON):  Unpublished  da
Poputation  in  1988:  142,684.3  (thousands;  IBGE)
Notes:  Planning  and  Administration  includes:  MINIFAZ,  SADEN/PR,  SEPLAN/PR,  PRESIDENCIA  DA  REPUBLICA
Other  functions  are:  JUSTICE,  NAVY,  AERONAUTICS,  FOREIGN  AFFAIRSTable  17
BRAZIL: FEDERAL  TRANSFERS  BY FUNCTION
(1968 NCzS  Per  Capita)
states  Municipalities
Operating  Capital  Sp. Inves  Total  Operating  Capital  Sp. Inves  Total
Agriculture  0.02  0.22  0.09  0.32  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01
Regional  Development  4.14  0.43  0.09  4.65  4.20  0.01  0.02  4.23
Education  and  Culture  2.60  0.06  0.00  2.65  1.57  0.00  0.00  1.67
Energy  0.76  0.00  0.00  0.75  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.17
Housing  A Urban  Development  0.02  0.17  0.00  0.19  0.00  0.12  0.00  0.12
Industry  A Co e  rce  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Health  and Sanitation  0.a6  0.19  0.02  0.87  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01
Transportation  0.78  0.01  0.00  0.79  0.87  0.00  0.00  0.37
Social  Security  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Other  Functions  0.49  0.06  0.16  0.93  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01
Total  9.66  1.13  0.36  11.15  8631  0.14  0.04  6.49
States  A Municipalities
----------------------------------
Operating  Capital  Sp.  Inves  Total
Agriculture  0.02  0.22  0.10  0.88
Regional  Developmnt  8.84  0.44  0.11  8.88
Education  and  Culture  4.17  0.06  0.00  4.22
Energy  0.92  0.00  0.00  0.92
Housing  A Urban  Development  0.02  0.29  0.00  0.31
Industry  A Commerce  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Health  and Sanitation  0.65  0.20  0.02  0.88
Transportation  1.16  0.01  0.00  1.16
Social  Security  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.00
Other  Functions  0.49  0.06  0.17  0.94
Total  15.97  1.27  0.40  17.64
Sources:  Balancos  Gerais  de  Uniso  - 1988
Anuario  Estati;tico  do  Brasil  - 1989  (Population)45
Table  18
EVOLUTION OF  FEDERAL CONDITIONAL TRANSFERS
TO STATES  AND MUNICIPALITIES
(1983-87)
(percent)
Hous  lag &
Regional  Education  Urban  Health E  Other
Agriculture  Development  &  Culture  Energy  Development  Sanitation  Transportation  Functions  Total
983  100  100  100  100  100  100  0  100  100
984  92  58  103  136  62  97  0  105  88
985  34  40  177  127  45  137  0  154  107
986  178  79  199  125  1,418  169  - 182  166
987  189  8  228  61  609  204  - 291  161
Source: Sec. Progr. Financeira/STN e "Balancos Gerais da Uniao", HINIFAZ
Deflator: IGP-DI media (FGV)
Other Transfers - Intergov.rmental  Transfers minus Federal Tax Transfers
other Functions - Legislative, Judiciary, Planning and Administration, Defense, Coumerce and Industry.46
Table  19
DISTRIBUTION  OF TRANSFERS  THROUGH  "CONVENIOS"
TO STATES  AND KUNICIPALITIES
1985-86
(percent)
ReRions/  Planninx  Education  Health  Urban  Finance  Others  Total
States  Cash  In-kind  Total Cash  In-kind  Total  Development
Acre  2.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  1.6  0.4  0.9  0.2  7.8  1.0  2.1
Amazonas  3.0  1.8  1.8  1.8  2.5  2.2  2.4  1.5  0.0  0.2  2.0
Para  2.8  4.1  4.4  4.2  3.0  4.5  3.9  1.7  0.0  4.3  3.0
Rondonia  3.9  1.3  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.0  1.2  1.2  79.5  5.4  10.3
Amapa  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.4
Roraima  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.0  1.7  0.4
Maranhao  7.7  7.0  7.1  7.1  3.7  4.5  4.1  2.7  0.0  6.8  5.9
Piaui  4.3  4.8  3.6  4.4  6.0  3.1  4.6  2.6  0.0  2.5  23.7
Ceara  2.5  6.6  8.2  7.0  5.1  7.4  6.2  2.3  0.0  4.1  4.1
R.Gde.Norte  1.9  3.4  2.8  3.2  7.6  3.8  5.8  2.4  0.0  1.9  2.4
Paraiba  2.7  4.2  3.9  4.1  4.1  3.5  3.9  4.1  0.0  1.9  3.0
Pernambuco  1.8  7.6  7.2  7.4  9.0  9.1  8.8  11.5  0.0  3.7  5.4
Alagoas  1.9  2.6  2.9  2.8  4.8  3.6  4.3  2.1  0.0  1.2  2.1
Sergipe  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.1  3.8  2.0  2.9  2.0  0.02  1.1  1.6
Bahia  3.2  8.1  9.4  8.5  8.8  10.6  9.3  5.9  0.0  7.0  5.5
Mato  Grosso  4.6  2.1  1.8  2.0  2.8  1.1  1.9  2.8  1.5  2.5  2.9
M.  Grosso  Sul  2.4  2.0  2.7  2.3  2.4  2.0  2.2  2.4  0.0  3.1  2.2
Goias  2.1  4.4  3.5  4.1  3.5  4.2  3.9  3.9  0.0  5.4  3.0
Distrito  Pedl. 43.5  2.2  1.4  1.9  1.0  7.5  4.9  2.8  0.0  0.6  16.5
Minas  Gerais  0.5  9.5  12.9  10.8  8.2  5.3  6.9  7.0  0.0  12.6  5.5
Espirito  Santo  3.0  1.9  2.5  2.2  2.3  1.7  2.0  4.3  0.0  1.9  2.3
Rio  Janeiro  0.2  3.9  1.0  2.9  2.6  7.2  4.4  8.2  11.2  3.5  3.5
Sao Paulo  0.7  3.7  1.8  3.1  7.1  4.7  5.9  12.4  0.0  6.2  3.1
Parana  0.2  5.5  7.5  6.4  2.8  4.3  3.6  5.4  0.0  11.0  3.5
Sta.  Catarina  0.9  4.3  3.6  4.0  2.1  2.4  2.2  4.9  0.0  3.7  2.4
Rio  Gde.  Sul  0.2  5.5  5.1  5.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  5.6  0.0  6.5  2.9
NORTH  13.5  8.6  8.8  8.7  9.0  8.5  8.9  4.9  87.3  12.7  18.3
NORTHEAST  28.2  46.3  47.3  46.4  52.8  47.7  49.8  35.5  0.0  30.2  33.9
CENTRE-WEST  62.6  10.7  9.5  10.3  9.8  14.8  13.0  11.8  1.5  11.6  24.6
SOUTHEAST  4.4  19.0  18.2  18.9  20.2  18.9  19.2  31.9  11.2  24.4  14.4
SOUTH  1.3  15.4  16.2  15.7  8.2  10.0  9.2  15.9  0.6  21.2  8.8
---------------------------------------------------.---------------- __-------__--------------------
BRAZIL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  Silvia  Paiva,  STN/MINIFAZ,  Results  from  a special  survey  of government  agencies.47
in the northern region as a whole. Further, it claimed a lion's share (one-fourth) of all the negotiated
transfers made to the northeastern state governments in 1988 (see Table 15).  Of the regions, the
southeast came out a big winner in the negotiated transfers sweepstakes.  For example, its state
governments  received  60% of total negotiated  transfers in 1988.  Note that the same  region received  only
21.48%  of total tax transfers. Thus the negotiated transfers substantilaly  reverse the equity objectives
sought through the tax transfers. A closer look at the shares of individual  states from the negotiated
transfers in the southeast presents an interesting  picture. For example,  Table 15 shows  that the State
of Sao Paulo, the richest state in the region and the nation, received  90% of the total transfers made to
the southeast region. Here again,  as in the case  of Maranhao,  it would  be interesting to see whether an
apparently favourable access  to negotiated transfers available  to Sao Paulo is supported by economic
reasons or simply  a reflection on its political clout in the federation.
From the casual  observations  reported in earlier paragraphs,  two important issues  arise:(1)
the importance of political factors in the decisions  concerning negotiated transfers; and (2) the extent
to which  the redistributive  character  of the tax  sharing  mechanisms  are offset by  the negotiated transfers.
The political nature of negotiated transfers is well recognized though not yet fully documented, for
reasons descnbed earlier, in Brazil. Equity implications  of these transfers will  be discussed  further in a
later section on equalization.
A brief description of convenios  by major function follows:
Health Care: A federal program  to f,luance  an integrated (unified)  and decentralized  system
of health care named SUDS was initiated in 1987  by a Presidential  Order (Decree Law no. 94657). Its
objectives are to coordinate the health policies of the three different levels of government and to
establish  a unified health policy  for the nation as a whole. The 1988  Constitution has reiterated the same
objectives (vide article 198). The new Constitution has stressed decentralized delivery  of health care
with community  level participation  emphasizing  preventive  care.
In 1987,  a large number  of convenios  were negotiated between the Union and States with
the following  objectives:
(i)  management of INAMPS (National  Institute for Medical  Assistance  of the Social  Security
System)  centers;48
(ii)  financing  of INAMPS centers; and
(iii)  services  to be provided  by these centres.
Municipalities  had the option of participating  in the convenios  under the terms of agreement
acceptable to each state.
Financing for SUDS primarily  come from the Fundo de Previdencia e Assistencia  Social
(FPAS). FPAS comprises  of social  security  contributions of employers  and employees  through payroll
deductions. The amounts  to be transferred is  determined on a yearly  basis  by supplemental agreements
(TA:termos  aditivos) as established by the convenios. After the signing  of TAs , funds are transferred
in monthly  installments  to states (see Appendix  C for details).
The transfer of funds  currently  does not follow  any formal  criterion. The allocation  of funds
primarily takes place  through  the  Integrated  Programming-Budgeting  Project  (POI:Projeto  de
Programacao-orcamentacao Integrado).  POI  attempts to  reconcile needs  of  various levels of
government  for health care to the availability  of funds. Details of the POI process  are given  in appendix
C. Previous year allocation usually  serves as a reference point for current allocation. For example,  in
1989,  the MPAS (the federal Ministry  of Social  Security)  established  ceilings  for transfers to each state
based on a monetary correction of the actual transfers in 1988.
Of total spending on health at the state level (from all sources) federal transfers via
convenios  amounted to 7% of the total over the period 1981-86.  There is  a great deal of variation  among
states regarding  federal share of health care spending. Alagoas  received  13%  of total financing  whereas
Ceara received 4.3% of total only.
States and municipalities receive 43% of the  funds transferred by INAMPS, federal
government entities 2.3% and therefore the puL.; sector as a whole receives  45.3% of total transfers.
Of the remaining funds 11.7% is allocated to private contractors (contratos); 7% to the convenios-
network  and 26.7%  to the participation  of the private network  in the Hospital  Admissions  Authorization
Network (AIMs:  Autorizacao  para Intemacao Hospitalar). 1988  and 1989  distribution  of funds  by state
is presented in Table 20.
Regional  Development:  Not  much details  are  available on  programs for  regional
development. Most of the funds are reported as intergovernmental transfers under the heading49
Table  20
BUDGETARY  DISTRIBUTION  OF SUDS
By  Federal  Unit
(in  percent)
Federal  Unit  1988  1989
NORTH  5.77  6.68
Amazonas  1.55  1.47
Para  2.23  2.72
Acre  0.57  0.49
Amapa  0.23  0.20
Rondonia  1.14  1.00
Roraima  0.05  0.20
Tocantins  - 0.60
NORTHEAST  2'..84  28.55
Alagoas  1.28  1.45
Bahia  7.66  7.68
Ceara  3.87  4.64
Maranhao  2.61  2.97
Paraiba  1.82  2.30
Sergipe  0.72  0.99
Pernambuco  3.76  4.60
Piaui  1.14  1.85
Rio  Grande  do Norte  1.90  2.07
CENTRE-WEST  6.77  6.71
Goias  2.74  3.00
Mato  Grosso  0.91  1.01
Mato  Grosso  do Sul  1.03  1.15
Distrito  Federal  2.09  1.55
SOUTHEAST  48.43  43.42
Espirito  Santo  1.76  1.63
Minas  Gerais  6.60  7.78
Sao  Paulo  28.71  24.44
Rio  de Janeiro  11.36  9.57
SOUTH  14.19  14.64
Parana  6.11  5.88
Rio  Grande  do Sul  5.39  5.99
Santa  Catarina  2.69  2.77
BRAZIL  100.00  100.0050
Investimentos em Regime de Execucao Especial (IREE) in BGU.  In 1987,  8% of total conditional
transfers were for regional development (see Table 18).
Education: Typically  education transfers account for nearly one-third of total transfers.
Nearly half of these transfers go to the northeast region. Education financing in Brazil comes from
earmarked tax revenues (education salary  tax:2.5%  tax  on private sector wages  collected and returned
by origin and Finsocial:The  Social Investment Fund comprising  proceeds from a 0.5% tax on gross
receipts  of all  businesses.  All revenues  from this are earmarked  for social  services),  general revenue fund
and project grants through convenios. While not much  details are available  for convenios  for secondary
and post-secondary  education,  some details are available  for Convenio Unico - a major instrument for
the transfer of federal funding for primary education. This convenio establishes procedures for the
preparation,  submission and  review of  states  and  municipal requests  for  project  financing.
Documentation required for this purpose include a work plan organized by major edpicational  goals,
specific objectives under each goal and proposed projects to achieve the specified objectives. This
project submission  approval process is intended to give the federal government strong control over
establishment  of expenditure priorities at state and municipal  levels.
HousingandUrbanDevelopment:During 1984-87,10%  offederalnegotiated transferswere
made availabie  to states (26% of total) and to municipalities  (74% of total) to finance various housing
and urban development initiatives  (see Appendix Table Al).
PlanningandAdministration:  Conveniosforplanninganddevelopmentare  theresponsibility
of SEPLAN. The tunds transferred for planning and administration however need not be spent on
planning and administration. The funds  are intended to provide  financial  support to projects related to
the development of basic  social  services  and for infrastructure.
Agriculture: Typically  7% of total federal transfers in a given year go towards financing
agricultural  development  projects  initiated primarily  by the states and occasionally  by the municipalities.51
2.3  Intergovernmental Transfers: A Conceptual Perspective *
In  attempting an economic evaluation of  intergovernmental transfers in Brazil, it is
instructive  first to review  economic rationale of transfers in a federation. This review  will serve as a
framework  for passing  qualitative  judgements on the design of existing  transfers. From the theory  one
can predict the general direction  of influence  a grant may  have on the recipient's behaviour. Of course,
the magnitude  of this influence can oilly be determined by an empirical analysis  which is beyond the
scope of this paper (see Shah, 1980,1989  for an econometric model  which  distinguishes  the income and
price effects  of grants empirically).  Some knowledge  of the general direction of grants is useful both in
designing  grant programs to meet specific objectives as well as to evaluate the existing structure of
transfers. In the following  sections, major types of grant programs are discussed  and their rationale is
also reviewed. The Brazilian system of transfers is evaluated in terms of its consistency  with stated
objectives  and possible reform options are outlined.
2.31  Grant Types
2.311  Non-matching Transfers
Non-matching funds may be either selective or general (conditional or non-conditional).
Selective non-matching  transfers offer a given amount of funds without any local matching  required
provided it is spent for a particular purpose.  The effect of this upon a lower level government's
(hereafter referred as local government) budget constraint is shown  in Figure 1. The post-grant budget
line (ACD) is  the pre-grant budget line (AB) shifted  right  by the amount of the transfer (AC). Since  OE
(equal to AC) of the assisted  activity  is free good from the local perspective,  at least OE will  be acquired
and perhaps, but not necessarily,  mors.
Selective  non-matching  grants are best suited as a means of subsidizing  activities to which
the higher level  government (say  Federal government) assigns  a high priority but are given  low priority
by local governments. Such a case would occur if a program  generated a very high degree of spillovers
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up to some level  of provision (like OE) after which  the external benefits abruptly  terminate. Although,
there is no evidence to suggest that these features characterize state and local provision  of education,
health, regional developoment and agriculture in Brazil,  yet almost all the funding through convenios
is of the selective non-matching  variety.
If the non-matching  grant is unconditional  or general, then no constraints are put upon how
it is to be spent. Thus unlike the previous case no minimum  expenditure in any area is expected. -n this
case,  the recipient's budget line  is shifted  upwards  and to the right throughout  by the amount  of the grant
(AC=BD) and the new budget line becomes CD as opposed to AB (see Figure 2). The grant monies
can be spent on any combination,  public  goods  or services  and/or to provide  tax  relief to residents. Since
general non-matching  assistance  does not modify  relative prices and must not be spent for a particular
activity,  it is the least stimulative  of local expenditures. Typically,  local expenditure will  only increase
by less than NCz$ 0.50 for each additional NCz$ 1.00  of unconditional assistance  with the remaining
funds  going  towards  tax  relief (i.e.  made available  to local residents  to use for private goods  and services).
It has been noted that the portion of grants retained for greater local expenditure exceeds local
government's own revenue relative to resident's incomes. This is referred to as the "flypaper  effect"
(Gramlich, 1977); that is grant money tends to stick where it first lands. The implication is that for
political  and bureaucratic reasons  grants to local  governments  tend to result in greater local  expenditure
than would result if the same transfers were made directly  to local residents.
The federal tax  transfers  to states and municipalities  through the FPE and FPM areexamples
of grants  of this  variety. There is  some evidence  to suggest  that such transfers are inducing  municipalities
to underutilize their own tax bases.
Given an amount of available assistance,  recipients of grants prefer unconditional non-
matching  transfers. This is because these grants provide them with the maximum  flexbility to pursue
their own objectives  as they augment resources without influencing  their pattern of spending. Hence,
the recipient is able to maximize  his own  welfare. The grantor, however,  may  be prepared to sacrifice
some of the recipient's satisfaction  in order to ensure that the funds are directed towards expenditures
on which  he places a priority. This is  particularly  so when federal objectives  of affording  fiscal  assistance
to states and municipalities  is implemented  through the programs  o  many  different departments (e.g.54
planning, health, education etc.) rather than through the Ministry of Finance which does not have a
dominant influence in any specific area.  In this case, the different departments do not want their
program  funds to be shifted, or even seem to be shifted, by local governments  towards  expenditures in
other areas. In this situation, conditional (selective)  non-matching  "block"  grants are attractive. Such
funding of state-local assistance  can ensure that the funds are spent in a department's area of interest
(e.g. health care) yet need not distort local priorities among alternative activities  or :nduce inefficient
allocations  in that expenditure area. This would  appear to in part be the objectives  pursued through the
non-matching  SUDS programs, although as presently  structured, these programs may not be attaining
these objectives  in the most cost effective manner.
2.312  Selective  Matching  Transkrs
Selective matching grants are those which require that the funds be spent for a specific
purpose (i.e. conditional)  and that the recipient matches the funds  to some degree (e.g. 50:50,66.3:33.7
etc.).  They are also called cost-sharing programs.  Consider a 25 percent  subsidy program for
transportation. The effect of such a program on local  government budget constraint is  shown in Figure
3. Without this transportation subsidy,  AB  indicates  the combinations  of transportation and other public
goods  and services  a city  can acquire with a budget of OA (equal to OB). Introducing a federal subsidy
for transportation amounting to 25 percent of transportation expenditures  (or NCz$  3.00  of local funds
for each NCz$ 1.00  of grant), the budget line of attainable combinations  becomes  AC. At any level of
other goods and services, the community  can obtain one-third more transportation services than
previously.
If the community  chose combination  M prior to the grant, it will  likely  select a combination
such as N afterwards. At N, more transportation  is acquired. This results from two effects. One due to
the subsidy  the community  has more resources (i.e. higher income) and some of those go to acquiring
more transportation services.  This is the income effect. The income effect is reinforced by the price or
substitution effect.  Since the subsidy reduces the cost (or  price) per unit to the community of
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price and income effects of the subsidy  stimulate  the acquisition  of more transportation services.
Although the grant is for transportation, more of other public goods and services  ma"'  also
be acquired, although the relative price of other goods  increase (ie. they become more expensive)  and
the price effect works against  them. If the positive  income  effect is sufficiently  large,  it will  dominate  and
a part of the grant's  effect will  be greater level  of consumption  of other goods  and services. Most studies
tend to find that for grants of this kind, expenditures hi the specified area increase by less than the
amount of the grant with remainder shifted towards other public output and tax relief. For example,
NCz$ 1.00  of grant tends to increase expenditures in the assisted  area by NCz$ 0.80. The other NCz$
0.20 is diverted to finance other public services  (see Shah, 1979).
Open ended matching grants are well suited for correcting inefficiencies  in public goods
provision arising from benefit spillovers. Benefit spillovers , or externalities, occur when services
provided and financed by a local govermment  also benefit members  of other local governments  without
their contributing  to finance their provision. As members  of the providing  government perceive all the
costs but obtain only a portion of the benefits, they  will  tend to under-provide  the goods from the social
viewpoint. If compensation arranged through negotiation among the affected communities is not
feasible, the situation can be corrected by a senior government subsidizing  the provision of the public
service. The extent of spillover  should determine the degree of subsidy  (matching  ratio for grant).
While matching  grants can correct for inefficiencies  arising due to spillovers,  they do not
cope with problems  arising  from uneven or inadequate fiscal  capacities  among  state-local  governments.
Hence, local governments with ample resources, e.g.  Sao Paulo, can afford to meet the matching
requirements and so can acquire a substantial  amount of assistance. However,  other governments  such
as Para and Ceara with more limited  fiscal  capacities may  be unable to devote as much to match federal
funds  and so fail to obtain as much  assistance although their requirements may  be no less and, indeed,
their needs may  even be greater. Other forms  of assistance  are needed to equalize fiscal  capacities.
Closed ended matching  provisions  are usually  preferred by grantors as they then are better
able to control their budgets. The effect of closed  ended matching  grants on the local budget constraint
is  shown in Figure 4. AB  is the original  budget  line  with when no subsidies  are available. However,  when
assistance  for say education is available  at say 66.7 percent rate up to a limit,  the budget line is ACD.57
Initially,  costs are shared on a one-third:two-third  basis upto a level of OF at which the subsidy  limit  of
CD'(=CE) is reached. Expenditures for education beyond OF receive no subsidy  so the slope of the
budget line is 1:1 rather than 1:3 along the subsidized  segment, AC.
Although one would not expect closed ended grants to stimulate expenditures on the
subsidized  activity  more than open-ended grants, empirical  literature typically  finds them to be more
stimulating. Gramlich  (1977)  and Shah (1979,1989)  report that the estimated  response to an additional
$1.00  of this kind of grant is typically  $1.50. Institutional factors  may  explain  the rather large response.
Gramlich  notes that this type of grant is frequently used to encourage spending in areas  with elastic (i.e.
responsive to income and price effects) demands, the grants are large relative to normal spending by
recipients in these areas, and/or the granting governments take measures to discourage the reduction
of recipients'  expenditures on these aided activities.
One might reasonably ask  why the extensive  use of selective  closed ended matching  grants
by developed  countries when they  seem ill-designed  to solve  problems  and inefficiencies  in public  goods
provision.  The answer  seems to be that correcting  for inefficiencies  is not the sole and perhaps not even
the primary objective sought with their use.  Rather they are employed as a means of assisting local
governments  financially  while promoting expenditures on activities  given priority  by the grantor. The
selective aspects  or conditions  on the spending ensures that the funds are directed towards  a desirable
activity  in the grantor's  view. The local matching  or cost sharing component affords  the grantor a degree
of control over and requires a degree of accountability  by the recipient. Finally,  of course, the cost to
the granting government is known.
The conditional closed end matching grant has certain advantages from the grantor's
perspective  but there are also disadvantages.  While they may  result in a significant  transfer of resources
providing  financial  assistance,  it may  distort output and cause inefficiencies  in doing so. The reason for
this is that this aid is often only available for a few  activities  which results in excessive  spending in those
areas  while  others are underfinanced. The common argument is  that local priorities are distorted. Also,
it is typical  that capital outlays are subsidized  while operating wosts  are not.  This results in selecting
alternatives  which are too capital intensive  to be least cost. These aspects  will  be discussed  later in the
context of the Brazilian  system. A summary  view of the impact of selective transfers is presented in58
Table 21. This table suggests  that open ended selective  matching grants are most suitable vehicle in
inducing  increase in expenditure on the assisted function by lower level governments. General non-
matching  transfers, on the other hand, would  be preferred if the objective  was  simply  to enb-ince  welfare
of local residents.
2.32  The Economic Rationale for Intergovernmental Transfers
In the preceding sections grants were discussed  according to the different arrangements
under which they are provided, i.e., selective and general non-matching and open and closed ended
selective matching. In that discussion, the underlying rationale for grants was introduced but not
elaborated upon.  In order to re-emphasize this fundamental rationale and its implications  for grant
structure, the basic reasons for transfers are reiterated and summarized. Gramlich (1977), Boadway
(1980,1990),  and Shah (1979, 1983,  1984)  note that there are economic  and political  justifications  for
grants. Economic  justifications  include efficiency  (spillovers,  common market arguments, differential
net fiscal  benefits),  equity  (fiscal  gap, differential  net fiscal  benefits,  redistribution)  and to a minor  degree
stabilization objectives. An interesting aspect of the theory of grants is that efficiency  and equity
objectives  are often complementary. Boadway  (1980,1990)  suggests  that application of efficiency  and
equity principles  results in four main economic  reasons for grants. These are discussed  below:
(i)  Inter-jurisdictional  Spillovers:  Intergovernmental  transfers can be used to increase the
efficiency  with which public goods and services  are provided. Their major contribution
is to correct for inefficiencies  arising in the presence of interjurisdictional  spillovers.
Spillovers  usually  occur because the benefits of a locally  provided  good or service itself
spills beyond the local jurisdiction to benefit those not contributing to the costs (e.g.,
benefits from control of air and water poliution, and locally  educated students who
relocate) and because non-residents come to the locality  and enjoy the public services
provided  (e.g. parks, cultural,  recreational  and transportation facilities,  state universities,
state  welfare and  health  care system).  In  the  presence of  spillovers, state-local
governments  consider  own  benefits only  and under-provide  public  services. While otherTable  21
THE  CONCEPTUAL  IHPACT-OFcoITmoNAL  GRANTS
Type  of  Grant  Income  Effect  Price  (substitution)  Total  Effect  8A/BG  Rank  by  Objective  Function
Effect  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
*;  U  Si  U  S  A  U  5ncroasein
Expenditure  Welfare
A.  SELECTIVE  MATCHING
i  Open-_nded  t  t  t  t  t  tt  tt  tU  >1  1  8
ii.  Close-ended
binding constraint  t  t  t  1  1  2  I  if  U1  2 or 3  4
non-binding  constraint t  t  t  - - - t  t  t  ￿i  3  2
UV
8.  SELECTIVE  NON-MATCHINC  t  t  t  - - - t  t  t  1  2
C.  ENERAL  NON-MATCHING  t  t  - - - t  t  (1  3  1
Note  =  Assisted  subfunction
A  =  Assisted  Function
U  = Unassisted  functions  (services)
0  a  Grant
Source: Anwar  Shah (1985)60
approaches such as redrawingofjurisdictional  boundaries  and/orseparatejurisdiction for
each service  may  also be used (McMillan,  1975),  intergovernmental  transfers are a major
and often the most practical  means of alleviating  the inefficiencies  arising  from spillovers
of this kind. Open ended conditional  matching  grants  which  modify  relative  prices  are the
kind of transfers that is most appropriate for implementing  these corrections. The extent
of cost sharing by the higher level of government should be consistent  with the degree of
spiliover. Benefit spillovers  is not considered  to be a serious problem in BraziL
(ii)  Fiscal  Gap: A mismatch  between revenue means and expenditure  needs at various levels
creates a structural imbalance resulting in revenue shortfall usually  for a lower level
government. This imbalance  is  characterized as a fiscal  gap. Four often cited reasons for
this imbalance are:(a) inappropriate expenditure and tax assignment;(b)  limited and or
unproductive tax bases available  to a lower levels  of government so that tax rates would
have to be inefficiently  high (e.g.  in Mexico  and Pakistan);(c):regional  tax  competition  ie.
state and local  governments  fearful  of loosing  capital,  labour and business  activity  to other
jurisdictions do not fully  exploit business  tax potentials and thus provide lower levels  of
public services ; and (d): federal government crowds out tax room for state and local
public sector.
To correct for problems associated  with (a) and (b) above  joint occupancy of some tax
fields  or decentralization  of some taxes  are advocated. Alternately unconditional  grants
and/or revenue sharing  based on origin  principle  are also appropriatt solutions  to deal  with
this problem. Higher revenue effort by  the federal government  and unconditional  grants
are required to deal  with tax  competition issues  discussed  in (c) above. Finally,  to deal with
(d) above some form of tax abatement by the federal government is necessary  to provide
more tax room for lower levels in fields  jointly occupied by the two or three levels of
government.
(iii)  Minimum  Standards of Services:  A third justification for intergovernmentaJ  transfers is
based on an efficiency-cum-equity  case for ensuring common  minimum  standards across
jurisdictions  ina federation. Forcertainservices,  expenditureassignment  tostateandlocalgovernment  may be  based  on  efficiency of  public  service provision as  well as
responsiveness  to local  needs and concerns.  This may  conflict  with  the national  equity  and
efficiency  objectives  (see Boadway,  1980,  1990).
Musgrave (1976) has argued that the redistributive role of the public sector is best
performed by the federal government. Mobility  of factors  within a federation severely
limits  the redistributive  role of local governments. The New York city provides  a prime
example  in this case. Redistributive  policies adopted by the city in the 1970s  created a
major fiscal  crisis and the federal government  had to intervene and reverse these policies
to  restore the financial health of the city.  Hence, the case for the assignment of
redistributive function to the federal government is quite strong on theoretical grants.
Several of the public services  assigned to state and local governments on efficiency  or
accountability  grounds  are strongly redistributive  in character. Social insurance, health,
education and welfare are prime examples  of such services. Consider the case of health
and education services. These are quasi-private  goods and strictly from a technological
efficiency  point of view  would  be best provided  by the private sector. Indeed in the U.S.
health care is by  and large treated as a private good. The World  Bank, in recent years, has
marshalled  a great deal of resources  to advocate  private provision  of health and education
services  in developing  countries based on this view of economic  efficiency. Needless to
argue that such a viewpoint  completely ignores information asymmetries  such as moral
hazard and adverse selection associated  with private provision of such services. Fiscal
federalism  literature has argued that informational  inefficiencies  alone do not provide a
convincing  case for the public provision of health care and education.  This literature
points out that most governments  treat health care as a fundamental  public  responsibility
and strive  to provide these services  on a uniform  basis. This is because these services  are
viewed as "redistributions  in-kind". Thus a case for public provision of these services
primarily  rests on equity objectives. Consider the case of health services. Incidence of
disease is directly correlated with the incidence of poverty and by corollary inversely
associated with economic  well-being. Thus public finance and provision of health care62
enhances the redistnbutive role of the public sector.  Similarly  public provision of
education,  by  improving  access  of the poor, serves  to further equalityofopportunitygoals.
Relative importance of expenditures on health, education and social services further
suggests  that the redistribution  effected by the tax system  or direct cash transfers pale in.
comparison  with the in-kind  redistnbution made possible by these public services.
In a federal system,  lower level provision  of such services  while  desirable from efficiency,
preference matching and accountability  perspectives, create certain difficulties in the
fulfillment  of federal equity objectives. Factor mobility  and tax competition influences
createstrongincentives forlower levelgovernmentsto  under-providesuchservices  aswell
as restrict access  of such services  to those most in need such as the poor or the old in view
oftheirgreatersusceptibilityto disease  and therebyposing  potentiallygreaterrisks  forcost
curtailment. These perverse incentives  can be alleviated  by conditional selective non-
matching grants from the federal govemment.  Such grants would not  effect local
govemments incentives for cost efficiency while ensuring compliance with federally
specified standards for access  and level of services.
A second justification  for common  minimum  standards for public  services  in a federation
is based  on economic  efficiency  considerations. Common  minimum  standards  would  help
reduce interregional barriers to factor and goods mobility  and thereby contribute to
efficiency gains.  Establishment of some minimum standards of social services will
encourage labour mobility  and of infrastructure capital will  enhance factors and goods
mobility. Boadway  has emphasized  that harmonization of expenditures would improve
gains from interregional trade and help foster a common intemal market.
Common  minimum  standards  for public  services  across  different states  can be encouraged
through conditional non-matching  or conditional closed ended matching  programs. A
conditional non-matching program is to be preferred due to its non-obtrusive nature.
State governments  would be free to spend grant monies as they chose provided  certain
minimum  standards  ofservice and access  are met. The higher level  governmentwillsimply63
monitor compliance  with these standards. Note that conditional non-matching  grants in
pursuit of common minimum  standards serve both efficiency  and equity objectives.
(iv)  Differential Net Fiscal  Benefits Across States
Differential uiet  fiscal  benefits across  various states arise due to a number of reasons:
a. Some states are better endowed in natural resources and therefore have better access
to an enlarged revenue base than others;
b. Some states or localities  have relatively  higher incomes and therefore greater ability
to raise revenues from existing  bases; and
c. Some states or localities have inherited higher cost disability  factors such as lacking
the mininmum  threshold for scale economies or difficult  terrain factors etc. or higher
need factors  such as greater proportion of young,  old and the poor.
The presence of differential net fiscal  benefits encourages fiscally  induced migration.
Labour and capital may move to areas with positive net fiscal  benefits based on fiscal
considerations alone.  In the process, some negative externalities imposed on the
jurisdictions  they leave and the jurisdictions they enter are ignored. A fisherman from
Para may  migrate to Minas Gerais, although he may not have any gainful employment
opportunity there.  Overall result of such fiscally  induced migration  would be that too
many of the factors will move to resource rich areas creating in its wake social and
economic  problems and thereby serious inefficiencies  and inequities. Inefficiency  arises
as factor movement takes place in response to fiscal considerations alone.  Inequity is
caused by identical  persons in various states being  treated differently  by  the public  sector
as a whole.  National welfare is reduced by the externalities imposed by the fiscally
induced migration.
Fiscal  equalization  grants to eliminate/reduce  differential net fiscal  benefits across  states
can enhance both the efficiency  and equity of a federal system. An ideal form of such
transfers would be an interstate revenue pool which provides  both negative  and positive
equalization  grants  to member  states  such that net transfers equal zero. Thus the program
by design will  be self financing. Such a grant system  must be unconditional  and must not64
reward strategic behaviour to enhance positive  grant entitlement or minimize  negative
transfer by member states. Thus grant design must incorporate factors  over which states
have little control. Three grant programs  that have endured and are broadly  consistent
with the above  guidelines  are the West German, Canadian and the Australian  systems  of
equalization transfers. The West German system is a fraternal system of equalization
among the German states.  The federal government simply acts as an observer and
occasionally  as  a mediator. The Canadian  and Australian  system  are not self financing  and
instead are federal programs.  The Canadian system attempts to augment the fiscal
capacity  of member provinces  up to the national  average capacity. The system  measures
the fiscal  capacity  of a state by the revenue that could be raised in that state if the state
goven  lent  employed all of the standardi  revenue sources at the nationwide average
intensity  of use. The Australian  system  worries about  expenditure needs as well  (see Shah
1983,1984). Issues  in the design  of an equalization  program  are discussed  in an appendix
to this chapter.
A  further  but  infrequently mentioned objective of  these  transfers is to  advance
stabilization  policies  of the federal government as discussed  below:
(v)  Stabilization Objectives: Intergovernmental transfers can also be turned to  assist in
achieving  economic stabilization  objectives. Grants could increase in periods of slack
economic  activity  to encourage local  expenditure and diminish  during the upswing  of the
economic  cycle.  Capital  grants would  be a suitable instrument  for this purpose. Care must
be exercised  in  ensuring that funds  are available  for operating  expenditures  associated  with
such initiatives.
2.4  Intergovernmental Transfers in Brazil: An Economic  Evaluation
The conceptual basis  of intergo'  r; mental grants enunciated in earlier section provides  us
with a framework to evaluate the existing s;.  ire of intergovernmental transfers in Brazil.  The
following  sections  present observatir ns on the tax  sharing and transfer programs in Brazil.65
2.41  Tax Sharing  Program:  A Closer  Examination
As discussed  earlier revenue sharing in Brazil  takes  place through two  major funds,  one each
for states (FPE) and municipalities  (FPM) and for certain taxes  distribution  of funds  by  origin  according
to pre-specified  shares. The following  discussion  takes a closer look at the two revenue sharing pools
mentioneG 'hove.
2.411  States Participation  Fund:  A Critical  Look
The tax  sharing program  for states (FPE) in place in Brazil  is  modelled  after the now  defunct
U.S. Revenue Sharing  Program of the 1970s.  This program  represents a significant  improvement  over
the U.S. program but many  shortcomings  remain.
The program is transparent and enjoys popular political support.  It pays due regard to
political autonomy of recipient units and places no special restrictions on the use of funds. It offers
predictability  of grant shares of individual  states and thereby encourages federal units in taking a long
term view of their expenditure priorities. The program is redistributive in nature.  Grant funds are
intended to vary directly  with fiscal  need (population size) and inversely  with fiscal  capacity  (per capita
income). Incorporation of population and per capita income have  been done with a finesse. The values
of these factors have  been restricted to a range to avoid  undue infuence of abnormal values of one or
more factors on a state's share.  Furthermore such a range specification  implicitly  recognizes a basic
minimum  grant level for each state ( per capita NCz$ 1.70  in 1988).
State Participation Fund (FPE) as currently structured is beset with many  difficulties.  It
incorporates per capita income as a measure of fiscal  capacity. Per capita income  is an imperfect guide
to the ability  of a state government to raise taxes as it is conceivable  that a significant  proportion of
income may  accrue to non-resident owners  of factors  of production. Even if these conceptual problems
are ignored, significant  errors in estimating  state gross domestic product in Brazil are encountered to
make the measure unacceptable for an equalization program. Moreover, estimates of state per capita
income are quite dated (most recent estimates  are for 1980)  and therefore of little relevance for use in66
a program  of fundamental importance in federal-state fiscal  relations such as the FPE. All factors are
combined in the formula in a multiplicative  manner and therefore an outlier performance on account
of one factor can significantly  influence the state entitlement from the FPE.  The FPE attempts to
achieve a number of  diverse and somewhat conflicting objectives such as revenue sharing and
equalization  in a single  measure  and thereforeexpectedlysignificantlyfallsshort  on individualobjectives.
Consider the equity  objectives. While the formula  is indeed redistributive  in nature in its overall impact,
certain inequities  in individual  state shares arise  from its application. For example  the States oftAcre  and
Para both had the same 1988  per capita income of NCz$266  but Para qualified for NCz$9.00  in tax
transfers as  opposed to NCz$49  for  Acre. Roraima,  on the other hand, had only  slightly  higher  per capita
income of NCz$286 but received NCz$123  in per capita tax transfers (see Table 9).  While federal
transfers do promote regional equity, the standard they strive to achieve remains to be specified. Per
capita  revenues inclusive  of transfers in the northeast and the north in 1988  only reached roughly 2/3rd
of the national average.  Finally,  while there is no visible opposition to the formula for the FPE in
political  or even academic circles in Brazil, States' Council in recent years has rejected its results and
instead have decided to allocate the revenue pool on the basis of a political compromise  which makes
a further  downward  adjustment  in the participation  coefficients  (shares) of richer states. It is remarkable
that such a compromise  could be struck.
2.412  MunICipal  Participation Fund: A Review
MunicipalParticipationFund(FPM)  is auniqueprogramoffederal-municipalunconditional
transfers. Brazilian  Institute of Municipal  Administration  (IBAM) has labelled it as "the most generous
tax (transfer) system of municipal revenues among all developing count:ies" (IBAM Press Release
No.96,  September 1989). IBAM notes that federal tax transfer to municipalities  through this fund in
Brazil  far exceeds  the total budget of similar  sized  municipalities  in other Latin American countries. For
a large number of municipalities,  FPM represents more than two-third  of their gross revenues from all
sources.67
The program is transparent and thoughtfully  designed  in certain respects. For example,  the
formula recognizes population size an important determinant of need and also recognizes certain
thresholds in population size. The distribution  of funds  is primarily  based on population size and state
per capita income. State capitals  and larger municipalities  because of their differential fiscal  capacities
and needs are treated separately from smaller and medium  sized municipalities.
The FPM formula nevertheless  has significant  drawbacks. State per capita income is used
as a proxy  for municipal  fiscal  capacity  in the distribution  formula. This causes a number of difficulties.
First, there is no municipal  income  tax  in Brazil (and none is  called for due to capital and labour mobility)
and therefore per capita income is a poor indicator of a local government's ability  to raise revenues.
Second,  state per capita  income is also a poor index  of municipal  ptr capita income as per capita income
varies  a great deal within  most Brazilian  states. In short, the formula fails  to reflect  upon the differential
fiscal  capacity  of Brazilian  municipalities  in a meaningful  way and as a result does not distribute federal
funds among Brazilian  municipalities  in a fair and equitable manner. For example,  in 1988,  per capita
transfers to n unicipalities  in Minas Gerais, a rich state, was NCz$6.39  as opposed to NCz  $5.07  in Para,
a have-not state.
The so-called  generosity  of federal funding for municipal  functions  creates some problems
as well. For example, there is some evidence to suggest that generous availability  of federal funds  has
resulted in some municipalities  under-utilizing  and in some instances  abandoning  own  tax bases e.g. the
property tax. Revenues from the urban property tax (IPTU) have been observed to decline in recent
years. Almost  all municipalities  are paying  inadequate attention to user charges. Thus the overall  effect
of the current arrangements  have  been to discourage  own fiscal  effort by municipalities  as their revenue
gains have outstripped  any concomitant increase in  their  responsibilities.  Further,  municipal
accountability  has been significantly  reduced as local politicians  have no great need to convince  voters
about the desirability  of local spending.68
2.42  Negotiated Transfers: An Examination
It was earlier noted that most negotiated transfers in Brazil are of selective non-matching
project grants. Such grants are useful when the expenditure priorities of the grantor and the recipient
differ substantially. Project review and approval process is an attempt to safeguard the grantor's
objectives. Most of the time such an attempt fails  as the process  creates incentives  for recipients to put
forward  their best and of mutual interest projects which they would have  financed any way and use the
funds  to finance  other services  of interest only to the recipient. The ingenuity  of bureaucrats to convert
grant monies into fungible  resources can hardly  be understated.
The federal government in Brazil, in the past, has attempted to use project review and
approval process to influence  state and local priorities to secure federal objectives. SUDS represents
an example of such an attempt.  In more recent years, these transfers have served not as a means of
safeguarding  any federal objectives  but more as a vehicle for pork-barrel politics and therefore, grant
programs have multiplied  and for many  of these programs,  program objectives  are either not specified
or specified  vaguely. Afonso (1988,  p.15) notes that examples  abound when funds  were made available
prior to the submission  of project proposal. Further, in many  instances,  federal funds  are made available
to finance purely  local functions. In 1988,  there were 117  federal-state-local  major programs  with over
5000 sub-programs  (convenios). Each of the state has several thousands  of its own convenios. Sheer
numbers of these programs discourage  attempts at an analysis. Further, all three levels  of government
do not maintain  any central inventories  of such programs. There are some obvious  reasons for this state
of affairs. Various governments  can exercise  complete discretion over these funds  without having  any
accountability. Enhanced flexibility  is being achieved at the cost of transparency, objectivity and
accountability.
Of a large number  of convenios  mentioned earlier,  the major convenios  for financing  health
care and education deserve some comments.
Integrated and Decentralized  Health Care System (SUDS): SUDS represents one of the
better thought of convenios. It does not follow any formal criteria for allocation of funds to state and
local and private sector entities. Allocation  to governmental units is based on a history of past health
expenditures and any agreed  upon capital projects. Formal  processes  have  been established  for requests69
and delivery  of funds  to state and local  governments.  This process  seeks  to balance  expenditure  demands
with available  resources.
The existing  design of SUDS is subject to a number of cufrent and potential difficulties.
These center on: the availability  of funds;  degree of federal involvement;  differential  treatment of public
and private providers  of health care.
Availability  and Predictability  of funds:  SUDS  is financed  by  social  security  contnbutions and
therefore competes with other social  security  related expenditures for financing. The 1988  Constitution
has expanded the  range of social security benefits available to employees.  There  has been no
corresponding  increases in social  security contributions. Further, new tax sharing arrangements have
limited  the revenues at the disposal  of the federal  government. These  fiscal  strains are likely  to constrain
the federal funds available  for the SUDS.
Degree of Federal Involvement:  The 1988 Constitution has defined health care a shared
responsibility  between different levels  of government. While the constitutional assignment  is open to
conflicting  interpretations by various levels,  the intent is fairly  clear. The federal government has the
primary  responsibility  in setting norms and distribution of federal funds; the states are responsible  for
delivery  of health care under the norms specified  by the federal goverment.  Municipalities  are seen
as executing  agents  on behalf of the state go  vernments. In practice,  federal government  is involved  both
in defining  health policy  but also the delivery  of health care. In 1988,  only 41.6% of total expenditures
of SUDS were directed by  state and local govemments. Even for the transfers made available  to state
and local govemments, for a large proportion of these funds, effective  control remained at the centre
in view  of project approval  process. This centralization  of authority  is clearly  incompatible  both with the
stated objectives  of SUDS as well  as with the constitutional assignment  of health care responsibilities.
Based on the economic principles enunciated earlier also, the federal involvement  in health care is
justified  on account of the redistributive  nature of this public  service. This  would call for a more passive
role by the federal government than is currently exercised by the INAMPS (National Institute for
Medical  Assistance and Social  Security  of the Federal Ministry  of Social  Security).
Differential Treatment of Public and Private Sectors:  High rates of inflation and time lags
in the delivery  of transfers create certain anomalies  in the treatment of public vs private providers of70
health care by the INAMPS. Current time lag for the transfer  of funds  upon approval from the federal
treasury to state and local governments  is about 70 days  (see Afonso 1989)  whereas the same  lag for the
private sector is about 45 days. Ihis lag results in a loss  of nearly half the value of expected transfers in
real terms for the state and local public sector. The loss to the private providers is substantially  less.
Further, in 1989,  private providers were entitled to an upward  adjustment  based on the consumer price
index of their entitlements. Similar  treatment to the public sector was denied.
In conclusion,  SUDS represents one of the better conditional transfer programs currently
in place yet substantial further improvements  in its design are possible to further its objectives.
Education:  Asdescribedearlier,throughtheConvenioUnico,federalgovernmentascertains
the needs of state and local  governments  for the finance of primary  education in Brazil as well as makes
in-kind  transfers primarily  in the form of school lunches  and textbooks. Through this convenio, federal
government attempts to reshape educational spending priorities of state and local governments. The
New Constitution sees mnicly an advisory  function for the federal government in the field of primary
education. lTus  there is no longer any  justification for this convenio. Further, primary  education is
primarily  a local function  with very little if any spillovers  beyond the boundaries of area providing  the
service. Thus it is  best to give  local governments  complete  autonomy  in the provision  and finance  of such
a service.
In summary,  while  some of the individual  programs have a number of  desirable features,
overali the system  of conditional  transfers in Brazil  is in need of major  reform. These options are taken
up in the next section.
2.5  Reform  Options
This section outlines reform options based on some fundamental flaws of the existing
structure identified in earlier sections. Altemative strategies for the reform  of the revenue sharing and
conditional  transfer programs are outlined below.71
2.51  Revenue Sharing
Existing tax assignment and revenue  sharing system severely constrains the  federal
government while at the same time it gives  municipalities  almost a free ride. The federal govermment
now  commands  only 31.5%  of final dispisition of revenues as opposed to 45.5% for state governments
and 23.5% for municipalities  (see Table 7). Policy  emphasis  on trade liberalization,  export promotion
and international competitiveness  further limits federal government choices in exploiting  its exclusive
bases. Tbis suggests  that the federal governmrent  should withdraw  from involvement  in local functions.
Further in subjects  jointly shared with state governments  it must stay in policy  development arena and
program development and administration be left to the states themselves.  Specific comments on
individual  programs follow:
States Participation Fund (FPE): It is suggested that the FPE may simply  be used as a
mechanism  for distnbution of revenues  by  origin  only  and equalization  and other objectives  be addressed
through separate and distinct programs designed  for those purposes  only. If this view is accepted, then
the [CMS  could  be administered  by the federal gover-ment on behalf of states and revenues returned
by  origin. Similarly,  revenues currently in the FPE pool could be returned to states in proportion of the
revenues raised from their territories.
Municipal  Participation  Fund (FPM): Direct federal transfers  to municipalities  do not satisfy
any of the economic criteria mentioned earlier and on the other  hand provide dis-incentives  for
municipalities  to exploit  own  revenue sources. Thus it is  suggested  that the FPM be disbanded. Instead,
states be encouraged to strengthen their unconditional  transfers program  to municipalities. States are
in a better position than the federal government to monitor the fiscal  positions of their municipalities
and provide appropriate assistance. With the rural property tax (ITR) being returned to states and
higher levels of transfers from the federal level, states would be in a better position to provide this
assistance  than currently. States transfers to municipal  levels  could  be based on a formula similar  to the
FPM but which incorporates per capita municipal  fiscal capacity as an important factor and further
incorporates a basic per capita grant into the formula.72
2.52  Negotiated  Transfers
The system of negotiated transfers as it stands today needs to be completely revamped.
These may be replaced by a system of selective (specific purpose) non-matching (block) per capita
grants. Such grants will not interfere with the fiscal autonomy of state governments, will  encourage
innovation by individual  governments and will help bridge the fiscal gap.  Federal objectives will be
fulfilled  by making these grants conditional on achieving  certain objectively  verifiable criteria relating
to minimum  standards and access. Such grants would  be particularly  suitable for health and education
financing.  Through these grants the federal  government could  induce  states to provide  certain minimum
standards of services  while  giving  special access  to the needy but poorer segments  of the populations.
Since there is no discernible differences in federal vs state priorities in these areas, project and/or
matchinggrantswouldsimplycreateadministrativeinefficiencieswithouthavinganybehaviouralimpacts
in the desired  direction. Federal direct participation  in municipal  projects  may  be restricted  to technical
and financial  assistance  for major projects such as mass  transit systems  in large cities.
2.53  Equalization Program
Finally, to deal with interstate differentials in fiscal capacity,  an over-arching program of
equalization transfers be instituted to be administered by the Federal government on behalf of the
Council  of States. The program  would  be financed  by applying  negative  and positive  entitlements based
on a formula to the monies available  for distnbution through the newly constituted FPE  Thus final
disposition  of revenues to each state will be based on revenues available to that state based on the
derivation  principle  plus  a positive  or a negative  entitlement based on an equalization adjustment. One
possible  standard of equalization for this purpose could be the per capita national average yield from
sources  to which state and local  governments  have direct or indirect access. More specifically,  consider
the arithmetic  mean of all  states as the standard  of equalization  and that all state and local tax  bases are
to included in the calculations. These include:
Shared Taxes (partial inclusion  based on percentage share of State-Municipal  sector):
Income tax73
Payroll  tax
Tax  on industrial  products
Hydroelectricity  tax
Mineral  Products  Tax
State  Taxes:
General  Value-added  Tax (ICMS)
Inheritance  and  gift  taxes
Motor  Vehicle  Registration  Tax (IPVA)
Supplementary  Capital  Gains  Tax
Municipal  Taxes:
Services  tax  (ISS)
Urban  Property  Tax  (IPTU)
Fuels  Tax  (IVVCLG)
Property  transfers  (ITBI)
Frontage  Tax
Note  that  thedataon taxbases  forshared  taxes  andstate  taxes  is  currently  maintainedby  the
federal and state governments  but hardly  ever analyzed  for effective  utilization. The proposed
equalization  program  will  encourage  use of such  data  in tax  policy  analyses.  The data  on munnicipal  tax
bases  would  initially  create problems  of comparison  and therefore  would  require  adjustment  factors  to
be applied  based  on sample  values  -a tradition  followed  in Canada.  An attractive  strategy  in  this  regard
may  be to attempt  equalization  in the first  five  years  of the  program  based  on state  level  revenue  sources
only  and later phase-in  municipal  revenue  bases  as and  when  comparable  data  on municipal  tax  bases
becomes  available.
Given  a decision  on the standard  and  the  tax  bases  to be included  is  consistent  with  the above
discussion,  an equalization  entitlement  for a state say  x for revenue  source  i could  be determined  as
follows:74
Ez  :  (POP)X  L  (PCTB)na  x  ti
- {(PCTB)  x  x  t  } x  na
where  E = Equalization  entitlement of state x from revenue
source i.
POP  = Population
PCT'B = Per capita tax base of revenue source i
t = National average tax rate of revenue source i.
subscript na = national average
Subscript x = state x.
The equalization  entitlement for a state from a particular revenue source could  be negative,
positive  or zero. These figures  then would  have  to be summed  up for all revenue sources considered  for
equalization and the overall sum would  indicate whether a state would receive a positive  or a negative
entitlement from the interstate revenue sharing pool.  Note that the application of  agreed upon
equalization  standard to existing  tax bases wili  be determining  both the total level of funding available
for equalization  purposes as weli  as state entitlements. Thus the proposed formula makes  equalization
explicit  and transparent in an objective manner.  It will foster a greater sense of participation in the
federation by member units especially  have-not states.
Recapitulating policy  reform proposed above have three elements:
namely  tax sharing arrangements based on origin principle,  conditional per capita block federal-state
grants with federally  specified  minimum  standards as the condition for such grants and an equalization
program to raise the fiscal  capacity  of have-not states to a certain specified  standard.75
2.6  State-Municipal Transfers In Brazil
The  following  sections  review  tax  sharing  and  state-municipal  conditional  transfers  in BraziL
A broad overview  of these arrangements for the country as a whole is presented while drawing  upon
specific  examples  from  the States  of Para and  Parana.
2.61  State-Municipal Revenue  Sharing
Earlier  sections  of  this  paper  elaborated  upon  the  importance  ofFederal  transfers  as  a  source
of  municipal  revenue  and  drew  implications  of  this  for municipal  fiscal  management.  Asecond  important
source  of municipal  revenues  in Brazil  is  the constitutionally  mandated  state-municipal  revenue  sharing
arrangements.  These  transfers  constitute  one-third  of municipal  revenues  in Brazil  (31.6%  in 1987,  see
Table  22). It is  remarkable  that  the municipalities  of some  states  in Brazil  raise  as little  as 2% of total
revenues  from own sources  (see 1987  figures  for Maranhao  in Table 23).  Mechanisms  for these
arrangements  have  been  specified  in  the regulations  drafted  by  the Federal  Parliament The regulations
provide  specifics  of the formula  as  well  as timing  for the release  of funds. Most  recent regulations  as
given  in Projeto  de lei Complementar  no.177  (1989)  are presented  in Box  3. This law  specifies  that
municipal  shares  of federal  and  state transfers  should  be immediately  deposited  in the joint account  of
all municipalities.  Further,  individual  municipal  accounts  should  be credited  no later than  the second
working  day  of each  week  for all  revenues  received  in the previous  weel.
Box  3 shows  that a highly  transparent  system  of transfers  has been instituted  by Federal  regulations.
Distribution  of tax  transfers  for  the most  part  follows  the  origin  principle.  ICMS  revenues  are  distnbuted
by a formula  which  mandates  that at least 75 percent  of such  revenues  to municipal  governments  be
allocated  by  value-added.  Since  ICMS  is  a value-added  type  tax,  this  clearly  recognizes  the origin  as the
guiding  principle in the distribution of these transfers.  Following  this principle, wide divergence of
municipal  transfers in per capita terms by state is obtained as shown in Tables 22 & 23. A small  weight
is given in the formula to other factors which the individual states may consider important in the
distribution of these monies in their jurisdictions.Table  22
1987 - STATE  TAX  TRANSFERS  RECEIVED  BY BRAZILIAN  MUNICIPALITIES
(Values  in  Current  NCzS  Thousands)
Federal  STATE  TAX  TRANSFERS,
Unit  STATE  TAX  TRANSFERS  - CURRENT  STATE  TAX  TRANSFERS  - CAPITAL  STATE  TAX  TRANSFERS  - TOTAL  X  OF  WMNICI. RWSS
value per capita  X of  total  valu,  per capita  X of  total  value  per capita  X  of  total  REVENUES
Rondonia  277  0.28  0.23X  0  277  0.28  0.23x  18.26X
Acre  67  0.15  O0.6x  0  67  0.15  0.06x  6.26X
Amazonas  601  0.o3  0.5a  59s  0.32  27.39X  1,196  0.65  0.97x  30.20X
Roraima  31  0.28  0.03o  0  31  0.28  0.0a!  8.49!
Para  785  0.17  0.6sx  0  786  0.17  0.64X  13.92X
Amapa  41  0.18  0.03X  7  0.03  0.32X  48  0.21  0.04!  9.27X
NORTH  1,792  0.22  1.49X  602  0.07  27.72x  2,394  0.29  1.95!  18.28X
Maranhao  802  0.06  0.25X  12  0.00  0.66x  314  0.06  0.28x  6.64X
Piaui  414  0.16  0.34X  2  0.00  0.09X  416  0.17  0.34X  10.13X
Ceara'  1,776  0.29  1.47X  20  0.00  0.92X  1,796  0.29  1.46X  17.13X
R  Grande  Norte  547  0.25  0.46X  21  0.01  0.97X  588  0.26  0.46X  12.53X
Paraiba  709  0.23  0.69X  1  0.00  0.05x  710  0.23  0.658  14.25X
Pernambuco  8,176  0.45  2.63X  16  0.00  0.74x  8,191  0.46  2.60X  26.28x
Alagoas  948  0.41  0.7sx  0  948  0.41  0.77X  23.14!
Sergipe  522  0.39  0.43x  0  0.00  0.00!  522  0.39  0.43x  14.5oX
Bahia  5,119  0.47  4.29x  s0  0.00  2.30X  5,219  0.47  4.26X  28.64x
NORTHEAST  13,660  0.33  11.24X  122  0.00  5.62X  13,682  0.34  11.14X  19.11x
Minas  Cerals  11,935  0.79  9.9ox  376  0.02  17.27X  12,310  0.82  10.03X  33.09x
Espirito  Santo  2,001  0.84  1.6ex  1S  O.Oi  o.69x  2,016  0.85  1.64X  32.42X
Rio  de  Janeiro  11,988  0.90  9.94X  37  0.00  1.70X  12,026  0.91  9.79X  30.08x
Sao  Paulo  60,489  1.63  41.87X  702  0.02  32.32X  51,191  1.65  41.70X  37.89!
SOUTHEAST  76,413  1.24  63.38X  1,129  0.02  51.98x  77,542  1.26  63.1ex  35.49X
Parana  7,749  0.91  6.43X  167  0.02  7.69X  7,916  0.93  6.46X  31.77X
Santa  Catarina  4,887  1.14  4.01!  23  0.01  1.06x  4,860  1.16  3.9ex  36.30x
R Crande  Sul  9,874  1.13  8.19x  26  0.00  1.20X  9,900  1.13  8.06x  41.88X
SOUTH  22,480  1.04  18.82X  216  0.01  9.94X  22,676  1.05  18.47X  36.61x
U Grosso  Sul  1,882  1.12  1.56%  2  0.00  0.09X  1,884  1.13  1.53X  33.93x
Mato Crosao  1,513  0.96  1.25X  101  0.06  4.65X  1,614  1.02  1.31X  24.9!x
Goias  2,977  0.64  2.47X  0  0.00  o.ooX  2,977  0.64  2.42X  26.45X
Distrito  Federal
CENTER  WEST  6,372  0.67  6.28x  103  0.01  4.74X  6,475  0.68  5.27X  27.82x
BRAZIL  120,697  0.85  100.OOX  2,172  0.02  100.0OX  122,769  0.87  100.OOX  81.61x
Source:  UINIFAZ/SEFTable  23
1987 ^ OWN  REVENUES  AND  TOTAL  EXPENDITURES  OF  BRAZIUN  WIM  NCI-ALITIES
(Values In  Current  NCz8  Thousands)
Federal
Unit  GROSS  REVENUES  TOTAL  FED. AND  STATE  TRANSFERS  034 REVENlIES  TOTAL  EXPENDITLURES
Voluo  per  capita  X of  tOtsl  value  per  capita  X of  total  value  per  capita  X of  total  Volue  per  capita  X of  total
Rondonia  1,704  1.74  0.  44  1,847  1.87  0.83  357  0.as  0.26X  1,765  1.80  0.44X
Acre  910  2.38  0.23x  826  2.14  0.33x  8s  0.22  o.o0s  899  2.83  0.22X
AMaSonS  3,960  2.15  1.02X  8,348  1.82  1.323  612  0.33  0.45X  4,300  2.33  1.07X
Roraima  86  .83  0.09X  821  2.93  0.183  44  0.40  0.083  400  8.65  0.10X
Para  6,689  1.23  1.453  4,40a  0.96  1.74X  1,286  0.27  0.92x  5,836  1.17  1.8a3
Amps  Si8  2.23  0.13X  428  1.84  0.17X  90  0.39  0.07X  656  2.82  0.163
NORTH  18,096  1.61  8.373  10,672  1.31  4.21X  2,424  0.80  1.79%  18,383  1.64  8.32x
Maranhao  5,565  1.14  1.433  5,429  1.12  2.143  136  0.03  0.103  5,135  1.06  1.273
Piaui  4,107  1.63  1.061  3,754  1.49  1.48X  853  0.14  0.263  3,940  1.56  0.9ex
Coors,  10,486  1.71  2.70X  7,615  1.24  8.013  2,871  0.47  2.18%  10,623  1.74  2.638
R Grands Nor  4,533  2.07  1.17X  3,528  1.81  1.393  1,007  0.46  0.75X  4,168  1.90  1.033
Paraiba  4,984  1.61  1.28x  4,879  1.4).  1.73  606  0.20  0.46X  4,795  1.54  1.19X
Pornmbuco  12,144  1.74  3.183  9,218  1.32  3.643  2,926  0.42  2.17X  11,760  1.68  2.913
Alagoas  4,089  1.78  1.0SX  3,278  1.42  1.293  811  0.36  0.60X  3,827  1.66  0.953
Sergipe  8,601  2.68  0.933  2,773  2.06  1.09X  828  0.62  0.61x  8,484  2.59  0.863
Bahia  22,073  1.99  5.68x  14,944  1.35  5.90X  7,129  0.64  6.28x  21,464  1.94  6.32%
NORTHEAST  71,582  1.77  18.43X  54,916  1.86  21.68X  1e,ee6  0.41  12.843  69,194  1.71  17.153
Minas Gerais  87,202  2.46  9.583  28,299  1.87  11.17X  8,903  0.69  6.659  38,259  2.63  9.48X  Z'
Espirito  San  6,219  2.61  1.60%  4,147  1.74  1.64X  2,072  0.87  1.53X  6,865  2.80  1.65X
Rio  de  Janel  89,973  3.01  10.29X  16,696  1.26  6.593  23,277  1.75  17.24X  45,181  3.41  11.20%
Sao  Paulo  135,090  4.37  34.78x  74,207  2.40  29.29x  e0,883  1.97  45.083  148,339  4.73  36.27X
SOUTHEAST  218,484  3.54  S6.25X  123,849  2.00  48.69X  96,136  1.54  70.45X  236,444  3.83  58.813
Parana  24,917  2.92  6.42X  17,708  2.08  6.99x  7,209  0.86  5.34x  23,662  2.77  5.86x
Santa Catari  18,388  8.16  3.45X  10,911  2.58  4.813  2,477  0.58  1.833  13,131  3.10  3.25%
R Grande Sul  23,637  2.70  6.09o  17,859  2.04  7.06X  5,778  0.66  4.283  23,348  2.67  5.79X
SOUTH  1,942  2.88  15.95x  46,478  2.18  18.353  15,464  0.72  11.45S  60,141  2.80  14.91X
M Grosso Sul  5,568  8.32  1.43X  4,006  2.39  1.58x  1,547  0.92  1.15X  6,165  3.68  1.533
Mato Gronso  6,488  4.09  1.67X  4,710  2.98  1.8ex  1,758  1.11  1.303  6,966  4.41  1.73%
Golas  11,257  2.48  2.90%  9,205  1.98  8.63x  2,052  0.44  1.523  11,157  2.41  2.77X
Distrito  Fod
CENTER  WEST  28,278  2.43  5.99%  17,921  1.87  7.07X  5,857  0.66  8.97x  24,288  2.54  8.023
BRAZIL  888,a32  2.75  100.00%  258,386  1.79  100.00X  135,048  0.95  100.00%  408,450  2.85  lOO.OO0
Source:  MINIFAZ/SEFTable 23 (Continuation)
Federal


















Minas  Corals  23.27%
Espirito  Santo  31.09%
Rio  de  Janeiro  61.62X
Sao  Paulo  41.60X  00
SOUTHEAST  40.24X
Parana  30.47X
Santa  Catarina  18.86X
R Orand.  Sul  24.76X
SOUTH  26.71X
M Grosso  Sul  25.09%
Mato Crosso  26.24%
Goias  18.39X
Distrito  Federal




STATE - MUNICIPAL  REVENUE  SHARING IN BRAZIL 1
Revenue  Source  Distribution  Crit.,ria
nd  Distribution
State  Value  Added Tax  Mlv  .25  *  ICMS  'V,)*  p  +  (  other  factors)  (1-p)|
(ICAIS)  VS 
Sl,ares:  where:
State  0.75  Ml  Funds  allocated  to  municipality  I
Mtuni. 0.25  VA =  Value  Added (average  of  past  two  years)  =
value  of  outflow  of  goods
+ value  of  services  rendered  within  municipality
- value  of  inflow  of  goods.
p  = proportion  of  funds  distributed  by  values  added  component
The  following  range  for  p  is  specified  by  law  (L.C.  no.  177)
.75  s  p  s  1.
Other  factors  =  Each  state  is  given  complete  discretion  over
specific  other  factors  to  be  included  in the  formula.
x  lotor  Vehicle  Registration  Tax  - Returned  by  State  Trea-ury  by  origin.
(IPVA)  Immediate  credit  of  municipality  upon  coilection.
Shares:  State  0.50;  Munic. 0.50
c.  10% of  Federal  IPI  - Same  as  ICMS
(Pass-through  revenues)
Shares:  Note:  This  is  intended  to  provide  financial  compensation  to  states
State:  0.75  for  loss  of  ICMS revenues  on  account  of  exports.
Munic. 0.25
'Source:  Projeto  de  Lel  Complementar  No.  17780
The State of Para uses population  (7% weight)  area (2% weight),  and fiscal  effort (9%
weight)  as  specidal  factors.  In addition,  it distributes  7% of the fund  in equal  amounts  per municipality
(see Box  4). The State  of Parana  uses  proportion  of population  in rural  areas,  population  and area as
special  need  factors.
2.62  Conditional Tmusfers
Varmous  details  needed  for an  analysis  of  state  conditional  transfers  to municipalities  are not
avilable. Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that most  states  have  a large  number  of convenios  usually  in
thousands  to provide  project  assistance.  Further that most  of these project  grants  are motivated  by
political  considerations  rather  than any  sound  (or even  unsound)  economic  analysis.
2.63  Am  Evaluation  and Policy  Recommeniations
The existing  revenue  sharing  system  primarily  serves  to return ICMS  revenues  by  origin.
25%  of total  revenues  are intended  to be consistent  with  fiscal  eds  of individual  municipalities.  It is
in this area that formula  designs  of individual  states  need  re-examination.  Consider  the state  of Para,
75%  of the funds  vary  directly  by value-added,  9% by ratio  of municipal  revenues  to state revenues.
Thus  for  84* of the funds  r  -nicipalities  with above  average  fiscal  capacity  but not necessarily  having
higher  fiscal  effort  stand  to gain  more  than  proportionately.
Another  9% are distributed  by  taking  into account  municipality  size  determined  by  relative  population
ani area. Finally,  the remaining  7% are allocated  equally  among  all  municipalities.  Fiscal  equalization
by  varying  a proportion  of funds  inversely  with  fiscal  capacity  ( tax  bases  for municipal  sources)  is not
re  oed  in this formula.  in fact  municipal  tax  bases  hardly  enter into the formula.  Even  the fiscal
effort  compensation  is  poorly  designed  and  serves  to benefit  larger  municipalities  only  without  any  due
rgurd fr  their fiscal  effort.
mhe  existing  formula  can be improved  by; (1)  incorporating  an explicit  equalization
component  in the formula  based  on a ratio  of per  capita  average  fiscal  capacity  of all municipalities  to81
BOX  4
MUNICIPALITIES  SHARE  OF ICMS
STATE  OF PARA
Municipalities  Participation  Coefficient:  1
(  V.ADg  POPI  Al  RTI  \ 
II  75  I  +  7  )+  2  + 9  _ 
V.ADE  POPE  AE  RTE 
E  E  E 
where:
I = Municipality's  i  participation  coefficient
,.V.AD
V,AD  )  =  Ratio  of Municipality's  Value  Added  and  State's
V.ADE  Value  Added.
,POP




IT  )  =  Ratio  of  Municipality's  and  State's  Tax  Receipts
E
N =  Number  of Municipalities  in  the  State.
A =  Area
Note:
The Municipality's  Value Added Is given by the sum of Its
Aggregate  Value in the  two  years  that  preceded  the computation  of
the  coefficient:
V.AD =  V.A  +  V.A
I  1,t-1  I,t
where:82
V.A  =  Aggregate  Value  of  Municipality  I  at year t.
Aggregate  Value  Formula:
VA  I+C+P.P  +  (  ICMRET  +  EST ) +  (  HFG+CFO+COOP )
where:
IC  =  Difference  between  in-flow  and out-flow  OI  goods (Industry
and  Commerce).
P.P  =  Primary  production.
ICMRET=  ICM  withheld
EST =  estimates  of ICM revenues  computed  by the regional  bureaus
of the  state  secretary  of Finance.
CFP =  (Company  for the Financing  of Production).  Value of goods
purchased.
COOP  =  value  of the  comme-ce  undertaken  by cooperatives.
1  Source : Governo  do Estado  do Para - Secretaria  de Estado  da
Fazenda.  ICM  dos  Municipios  - Manual  da Cota  Parte  198983
per capita fiscal  capacity  of municipality  i in the formula and distributing  a fixed  percentage of funds  by
this factor and; (2) the current fiscal  effort index  should be replaced by the following  measure:
Fiscal  Effort  Component  = (percapitaown revenues/percapita  taxbase)dividedby  (average
per capita own revenues of all municipalities/  average per capita tax base for all municipalities). Shah
(1983)  specifies  altemative approaches to incorporating  these factors  in a formula. The incorporation
of fiscal  equalization  and fiscal  effort components into the formula for state-municipal  revenue sharing
system  will provide  special compensation  for fiscal  need and fiscal  effort but at the same time will  help
states better monitoring of the fiscal  health of municipal  governments  in their jurisdictions.
Conditional  transfer programs  are also in need of restructuring. Only a handful  of programs
with explicit objectives say e.g. spillover  compensation or ensuring certain minimum  transportation
standards etc. need to be developed and then their design should reflect their objectives. For example,
a transportation program which intends to compensate a municipality  for the use of its roads by non-
residents would be a matching  program  with matching  determined by the spillover  factor. A program
to upgrade transportation services  to certain minimum  standards would  be a block  grant program with
adherence to the specified standards as a pre-condition for receipt of funds. Following  this approach,
the Brazilian  states could  reduce their conditional  programs  to a dozen or less program  from the current
count of several thousands.  Such a design will enable the higher level government to achieve its
objectives in a  cost-effective  manner without distorting local priorities. Given the almost universal
criticism  of existing  conditional  transfers in Brazil,  the reform of these arrangements  should be a matter
of high priority for ail levels  of governments.84
3.0  SUMMARY  AND POLICY  RECOMMENDATIONS
In this chapter, the major results of previous chapters are brought together to provide an
overview  of the existing  state of riscal  federalism  in Brazil  and the directions  for change advocated  in this
paper.  For this purpose, first the tax and expenditure assignment issues are reviewed and their
implications  for horizontal and vertical  fiscal  balance are examined. Second, federal transfers to states
and municipalities  are briefly described and analyzed. Third, state transfers to municipalities are
examined. Fourth, implications  of the above analyses as to the potential directions for reform are
summarized.  Finally,  the implications  of the reform  proposals for efficiency  and equity  of public  service
provision  and macroeconomic  management are addressed.
3.1  The Assignment Issues
The 1988  Constitution has made a reasonably  clear assignment  of public  service provision
and revenue raising  responsibilities  to federal,  state and municipal  levels  in Brazil. Purely local  functions
such as intracity  transport, zoning,  preventive  health care and elementary education has been assigned
to the municipal  level exclusively.  The responsibility  for public  services  that are national in scope such
as defense and foreign affairs  etc. has been entrusted to the federal level and the remaining  functions
are designated as shared responsibilities  of the federal and state levels with the federal government
setting the norms and the state government responsible  for the delivery  of services. Unfortunately, the
de facto assignment  or the practice in Brazil is at substantial variance  with the de jure assignment  and
the federal government's direct involvement  in purely local functions  is quite pervasive.
The constitutional tax  assignment  has created some difficulties  as welL These are primarily
in the area of sales taxes.  Al  three levels have partially overlapping responsibilities  in tax policy
development and administration  for value-added  type taxes. The federal government is responsible  for
a manufacturer  level  sales tax  called  by  the name of Industrial  Product Tax (IPI). The municipalities  can
levy a value-added tax on services (ISS). The states have the mand  ite of a general value-added tax
whose  base encompasses  IPI and ISS. This multiplicity  in administration  raises the administration  andB5
compliance  costs  of these taxes. Further, Brazil  is the only  country  in the world  with a state level general
value-added  tax. This has the potential of evolving  into a tax with multiple rates on non-uniform  bases
in the long run.  Already inter-state tax crediting issues remain by and large unresolved and are fast
becoming  a source of major concern for the Council  of States. A second source of difficulty  concerns
the assignment  of the rural property tax. This tax is more suitable for administration  at the state-local
level but is currently being administered  at the federal level.
3.2  Issues in Intergovernmental Transfers
The federal transfers to state and municipalities  are based either on  revenue sharing
arrangements  or specific  purpose transfers. Revenue sharing  mechanisms  are well  defind  One of the
main instruments for federal-state revenue sharing is the State Participation Fund.  The Federal
Gcvernment transfers a pre-specified  share of certain federal taxes  to this pool. The Council  of States
then determines  state shares based on a formula  that incorporates  population and per capita income as
its main  components. A proposal currently under discussion  would extend this list of components to
include land area, interstate trade auid  fical  effort factnrs.  In recent years formula  determined shares
have  been found unacceptable  to the Council  and therefore, it had to resort to a compromise  allocation
based on an arbitrary adjustment to formula shares. The principal merits of the this program are the
consistency  of its design  with transparency, predi^tability  and local autonony objectives. The program
further pays  some attention to fiscal  equalization  objectives.  The program  nevertheless has many  design
flaws  which inhibit achievement  of its objectives. For example,  state per capita income is included as
a measure of fiscal  capacity. It is an imperfect guide to the ability  of a state government to raise taxes
as it is  conceivable  that a significant  proportion of income may  accrue to non-resident owners  of factors
of production. Further only a small proportion of to.a  state revenues are raised from income taxes
alone. This measure is also  subject to implementation  difficulties  in Brazil. Estimates of state per capita
income are subject to significant  errors and are available  with a long lag. For example,  currently only
1980  estimates  are available. These difficulties  significantly  diminish  the usefulness  of per capita  income
for use in a program of fundamental importance in federal-state fiscal relations.  The FPE further86
combines  diverse and sometimes conflicting  objectives  such as revenue sharing and riscal  equalization
at the state level into a single  formula in a multiplicative  manner and therefore significantly  falls  short
on individual  objectives.  The program  is redistributive  in its overall impact  but consistency  of individual
state shares  with the formula  objectives  is not assured  and states with  similar  fiscal  capacity  receive  widely
different entitlements. Since  the formula  lacks  an expiicit  equalization  standard, it also fails  to address
regional equity objectives in a satisfactory  manner. These failings  explains why the Council  of States
finds  it easier to strike a political  compromise  rather than accept the formula results.
The program to channel federal revenue sharing monies to municipalities is called the
Municipal  Participation  Fund (FPM). This program  considers  municipal  population and state per capita
income in the determination of shares of individual municipalities. This program has two major
drawbacks. First, the formula used for this program fails to incorporate differential fiscal  capacity  of
the Brazilian  municipalities  in a meaningful  way  and therefore formula application does not result in a
fair and equitable distribution  of funds  among individual  municipalities.  As there is no local income tax
in Brazil  (and none is  called for due to capital  and labour mobility),  per capita income is a poor indicator
of a local government's ability  to raise revenues. Further, in each state rich municipalities  coexist  with
poor municipalities  but state per capita income, by definition,  would fail to make a distinction  between
the two  classes. Second, this program,  is observed  to discourage  local  fiscal  effort by meeting  nearly  two-
third of municipal revenue requirements from the federal revenue sources.  Such overwhelming
dependence of municipal  governments  on outside revenues  creates a dichotomy  between spending and
revenue raising  decisions  and contnbutes to reduced financial  accountability  at the local level.
Specific purpose transfers support important policy objectives in a federation.  These
objectives  include:  benefit spillover  compensation;  bridging  fiscal  gap; ensuring minimum  standards of
public  services  across the nation; fulfilLment  of the redistr.:butive  function of the federal government;
creation of a  common internal market; reduction in net  fiscal benefits across jurisdictions and
achievement  of economic  stabilization  objectives. Grant objectives  would pre-determine grant design.
The federal and state governments in Brazil have an incredibly  large number of specific purpose
programs. For many  of these programs,  program  objectives  are either not specified  or specified  vaguely
and in some instances  reflection upon grant objectives  is done after the release of funds. In more recent87
years, federal specific purpose transfers have served not as a means of safeguarding  federal objectives
but increasingly  as a vehicle for pork-barrel politics. There are only a handful of programs  with some
desirable features. One such program  is for unified and decentralized  system  of health care provision
known as SUDS. Federal financing is provided to achieve  certain minimum  standards of health care
across  the nation. The intent of the program  is for the federal government to specify  policies  and state
and local governments  to implement federally  mandated programs. In practice, however,  the federal
government continues to be heavily involved in program administration as weli and therefore the
decentralization  objectives  have as yet not been fully  achieved. In the coming  years, fiscal  pressures  of
the new fiscal  arrangements on the federal government are also likely  to constrain the federal funding
for the SUDS. Finally,  the existing  program gives preferential treatment to private contractors over
state and local government agencies.
Finally,  State-municipal  transfers have two important components. One such component
is the constitutionally  mandated state-municipal revenue sharing arrangements  or state-municipal  tax
transfers. The distribi'tion  of such transfers for the most part follows  the origin  principle. 75% of state
value-added  tax (ICMS) revenues  are distributed in proportion to the value added in each municipality
and for the remaining  25% states have been given  discretion in incorporating  fiscal  need factors  as they
see fit. Population and area are the two most commonly  used need factors. Some  states have also used
fiscal  effort as a special factor. A major criticism  of the existing  arrangements  is that fiscal  equalization
by varying  a proportion of funds inversely  with fiscal  capacity  (tax bases for municipal  sources) is not
recognized in the formulae currently in vogue.  In fact, municipal tax bases hardly enter into any
consideration. Even the fiscal  effort component is usually  poorly designed  and serves to benefit larger
municipalities  only  -iithout any due regard for their fiscal  effort. A second component of state transfers
to municipalities  is specific purpose or negotiated transfers.  Most states have a large number of
convenios  usually  in thousands to provide  project assistance. Sheer numbers of these transfers defy any
analysis.  Anecdotal evidence  suggests  that political  considerations  dominate in the distnbution of grant
funds.88
3.3  Implicatons  of ExistIng  Arragements
This assessment  of existing  structure of fiscal  relations has identified  a number  of significant
failings. Most prominent of these are:
a.  Federal and state governments are involved in some purely local functions in an
uncoordinated fashion;
b.  Sales taxes  administration  by  the three levels  results in some  duplication  and confusion;
c.  The administration of the general value added tax at the state level creates yet
unresolved issues  in tax crediting  on interstate trade;
d.  The FPE and FPM fail to distribute revenues in a fair and an equitable manner;
e.  Conditional transfers are arbitrary and primarily  driven by politcal considerations.
Various programs work at cross purposes and therefore hamper success  in achieving
major objectives. Highly  subjective nature of these transfers may even be sending
wrong  signals  to lower levels  of government regarding fiscal  management. For if it is
alright for the federal government to follow imprudent policies then lower level
governments  also would not feel the need for fiscal  restraint. ; and
f.  The net impact  of expenditure  and tax assignment  and revenue sharing  measures  have
been to severely  constrain the federal government's ability  to fulfill  its mandate as a
national government while generous availability  of funds to municipal  governments
without any concomitant increase in their responsibilities  create 3trong incentives  for
fiscal  mismanageme  nt. There is some  evidence  to suggest  that munic.pal  governments
are,  shying  away  (om raising  revenues  from property taxes  and user charges. Ihe  state
governments  are also fecing  a financial  squeeze in the short run but given  their access
to thevalue added  tax-  a dynamic  source of revenues,  their fiscal  problems  are expected
to be short lived. Thus the existing fiscal  arrangements have been instrumental in
creating a vertical imbalance  in the nation. The problem for the federal government
is structural in nature.  Its revenue means significantly  fail short of its expenditure
needs. Fiscal  imbalance  forstate governments,  on the other hand, is likely  to disappear89
with increase in revenues from the ICMS and restraints in expenditures.  Fiscal
imbalance for the municipal  governments is of the reverse nature.  Their current
revenue means if fully  exploited substantially  exceed their expenditure needs.
In conclusion,  many  aspects  of the existing  arrangements  contribute to a fiscal  malaise  in the
country  and therefore, an urgent  need for reform  can hardly  be over-emphasiz-.d.  The following  sections
presents some reform options.
3.4  Proposals for Reform
The following  reform options are suggested to deal with the shortcomings  of the existing
arrangements identified earlier.
Towards an Economic Constitution:  Earlier analysis  suggested that the Constitutional
assignment in Brazil is broadly consistent with economic principles.  The following  suggestions, if
implemented,  will  move Brazil a step closer to having  an economic  constitution.
i.  Immediate tumback of direct federal involvement  in functions  of purely local nature
such as primary  and secondary  education, urban grading,  bridges,  zoning  etc. Further,
administration  of health and education as stipulated in the Constitution should be a
state responsibility.  Therefore, the roles of federal ministries  of health and education
be reduced to setting minimum  standards and providing per capita block grants to
induce compliance.
ii.  Direct federal role in municipal finance and administration need to be severely
restrained.
iin.  he three sales taxes,  IPI, ICMS and ISS be combined  into one tax  to be administered
by the federal govermment  on behalf of state and local governments. The proceec.
from the tax then be shared by the three levels in proportion to their current intake
from this source.
iv.  The administration  of the rural property tax be turned over to the state level.
v.  A restructuring of revenue sharing and transfer programs as outlined below.
s  v  _ 90
Restructuring Proposals for Federal Transfcrs to States:
i.  No change in the source of funds  for the State Participation Fund is proposed. Initial
allocations  from this Fund would  be based simply  on the derivation principle  and final
allocations  to be determined by equalization  adjustments discussed  in the following.
ii.  It is proposed that the existing  system  of negotiated transfers be completely  revamped.
These transfers  may  be replaced  by  a system  of specific  purpose block  per capita  grants.
Thesegrantswillbeconditionalonmeetingfederallyspecifiedandobjectivelyverifiable
criteria relating to minimum  standards and access.
iii.  It is proposed that an equalization program be instituted to  deal with inters'4ae
differentials  in fiscal  capacity.  This program  would  be financed  by applying  positive  and
nepative entitlements based on a formula to the monies available for distribution
through the FPE  based on the origin  principle.  The representative taxsystem  approach
as outlined earlier may  be used to determine state entitlements.
Restructuring Proposals for Transfers to Municipalities
i.  It is proposed that federal unconditional transfers to municipalities  be completely
eliminated. To this end, the Municipal Participation  Fund be disbanded  and states be
encouragedtostrengthen theirunconditionaltransfersprogramstoownmunicipalities.
Thus the FPM could be reconstituted at the state level. State transfers to municipal
levels  on account of a restructured FPM would be based on a formula similar to the
FPM but which incorporates  per capita municipal  fiscal  capacity  as an important factor
and further incorporates a basic  per capita grant and a fiscal  effort component
ii.  State specific  purpose transfers be consolidated  into a handful  of programs  with clearly
stated objectives  based on verifiable indicators.
3.5  Implications  of Reform Proposals
The restructuring options discussed  earlier will  satisfy  the following  objectives.
i  Tax and expenditure assignment  will  be brought in close conformity  with economicprinciples  and thereby enhancing the efficiency  and equity in public  service provision.
ii.  The proposed equalization program  would foster a sense of greater participation  by
member units in the Union. The have-not states wilH  realize a contnbution by the
Union to their uplift and the have  states  will  enjoysome  satisfaction  in  seeing  an explicit
recognition  of their contributions for the greater well-being  of the nation as a whole.
Fiscal management goals will also be advanced by this program as it will provide
monitoring  of fiscal  capacities of member units. Higher level governments  would be
in a better position to take corrective  actions for fiscal  adjustment  in a iimely  fashion.
iii.  The system  of transfers  woud be rationalized  offering  predictabilitywhile  safeguarding
local autonomy objectives. Long term planning and judicious exploitation of own
revenue bases would be encouraged.
iv.  Finally,  structural imbalances  would be eliminated and remaining imbalances  could
potentially be corrected by  own actions by  various govermnents.92
APPENDIX  A
THE DESIGN  OF  A FISCAL  EOUALIZATION  PROGRAM:
ISSUES AND  OPTIONS
An equalization  program  in addition  to safeguarding  national  objectives  of providing  certain
minimum  levels of public services  across the nation can foster a greater sense of participation in the
federation of member states and therefore is often viewed  as a glue that holds a federation together.
Economic  literature has long recognized  that equalization  is justified  on horizontal equity grounds  and
in  recent  years, that  under  certain  conditions it could promote economic efficiency.  Recent
constitutional changes  in Brazil  suggest that equalization is a matter of high priority in the country. A
recent World Bank mission  has nevertheless observed that the existing  fiscal  arrangements fail to deal
adequatelywith  this objective. The following  paragraphs  deal with  some fundamental issues  in designing
an equalization  program.
In  principle, a properly designed fiscal equalization transfers program would correct
distortions  caused  by  fiscally  induced  migration.  Such  a program  would  equalize  net fiscal  benefits across
states and  thereby  promote  economic efficiency.  To  measure net  fiscal benefits  reasonable
approximation of costs and benefits of public services  provision in various states is essential.  ITis
requires  developing  measures  of differential  revenue raising  abilities  and the costs  of provision  of public
services  of the Brazilian  states. Equalization  of net fiscal  benefits could  then be attempted by adopting
a standard of equalization and establishing the means of financing  these transfers. These and related
issues  of unconditionality;  tax effort; stabilization  effects; and employment  of strategy are discussed  in
the following  subsections.
Measurement of Fiscal Capacitv
The estimation  of fiscal  capacity,  i.e.,  the abilityof  governmental  units  to raise  revenues from
their own sources, is difficult  both conceptually and empirically. The alternative measures of fiscal
capacity  are unlikely  to show approximately  the same results. Of a large variety of such measures that
are available  the two most prominent measures  are discussed  below.93
Macro Indicators
Various income or output measures  serve as indicators  of ability  to bear tax burdens by the
residents  of a state. Among the better known  measures are:
(i)  Personal Income: The personal income of a state is the sum of all incomes
received  by the residents  of a state. It is not a satisfactory  measure  of overall
fiscal capacity as it is a measure of ability  to bear tax burdens but a highly
imperfect and partial measure of ability  to impose them.
(ii)  Personal Disposable Income: Personal disposable income is defined as
personal income less direct taxes.  This concept of income shares the
weakness  of personal income as a measure of fiscal  capacity.
(iii)  State Gross Domestic Product: It represents the total value of goods and
services  produced within  a state. It also is an imperfect  guide  to the ability  of
a state government to raise taxes as it is conceivable that a significant
proportion of income may accrue to  non-resident owners of factors of
production. Even  if these conceptual  problems  are ignored,  significant  errors
in esti.nating  provincial  gross domestic product  in Brazil  are encountered to
make the measure unacceptable for an equalization  program.
We already noted that the equalization  of net fiscal  benefits across  states is required
from the standpoint  of economic  efficiency.  The estimation  of these net benefits is best done by a
comparative  analysis  of taxing  and spending  behavior  of state and local  governmental  units. Various
income concepts do not relate to the taxing practices  of the states but merely indicate  what they
potentially have available for taxation. Fortunately, a representative tax  system approach is well
suited for such a task. This approach is discussed  below.
The Representative Tax System (RTS)
This system  measures  the fscal capacity  of a state by the revenue that could  be raised
in that state if the state government  employed  all of the standard sources  at the nationwide  average
intensity of use.94
To estimate equalization  entitlements  based  on a representative tax  system  approach,
information  on both the tax  bases and tax  rates for each state is required. For most revenue sources
this information  is usually  readily  available. Then a decision has to be made as to the standard of
equalization  i.e. whether fiscal  capacity  of the have-not  states should  be brought up to the median,
arithmatic  mean or some other norm based on all states data. As an example,  consider arithmatic
mean of all states as a standard. Then equalization entitlement for a state say (x) for resource
source i could be determined as follows:
EL  (POP).  {(PCTB),  x  t.)
- {(PCTB) 5 x  t,,.
where  E' = equalization  entitlement of state  from revenue source'.
POP  = Population
PCTB' = Per capita tax base of revenue source i.
e = national average tax rate of revenue source i.
subscript na = national average
subscript x = State x
The equalization  entitlement for a state from  a particular  revenue  source could  be negative,  positive
or zero. These figures  would then have to be summed  up for all revenue sources considered for
equalization and the overall sum would indicate whether a state would receive a positive or a
negative  entitlement from the interstate revenue sharing pooL
It should be noted that the data on tax bases and tax collections required for the
implementation  of a RIS are already  being  published  on a regular  basis  by various  departments and
agencies of the federal Government. Thus the RTS does not impose any new data requirements
and could be implemented  using the existing  data.
Measurement of Expenditure Needs
Economic  theory suggests  that an ideal equalization transfers program should also95
take into consideration  the expenditure side of the provincial-local  budgetary  operations. Many
economists have argued for taking expenditure needs and differential unit costs of provision of
public services into account.  Several countries follow this approach. The following  paragraphs
examine  this issue.
We already  noted that the case  for equalization  rests  on differential  net fiscal  benefits
across  states. These differentials could arise either due to differences in revenue raising  capacity
and/or due to differences in the cost of provision  of public  services. Consider two states with the
same  revenue raising  capacitywhere  the residents  have identical  tastes for provincial  public  services
but the cost of providing  them differs  due to supply  factors. For example,  differences in the degree
of urbanization,  population density and age distribution among  states will have significant  effects
upon the relative  costs  of public  services.  The degree of urbanization  can  effect the costs  of salaries
and wages,  land, and construction, as well as particular services  such as pollution control, public
transit, police and fire protection and the provision  of utilities. Population density  will  effect the
costs of providing  public utilities and will  also effect the costs of highways. Age distribution will
influence  the need for school rooms, hospitals,  recreational  facilities  etc.
These differential costs are likely to cause substantial variations across the two
jurisdictions  in the level and mixof  public  goods  provided,  resulting  in differential  net fiscal  benefits.
A strong case  for equalization  can. therefore, be established  on both efficiency  and equity  grounds
to compensate for cost differentials  that give  rise to  differential net fiscal  benefits.
The fical federalism  literature, ingeneral,  treatsdifferentialcosts  assynonymouswith
differential needs but it must be noted that some cost differences  may  arise  due to deliberate policy
decisions of the provincial governments and thus do not constitute need.  Compensation for
unavoidable  cost variations resulting from differences in the costs of inputs and from dissimilar
input-output relationships which might arise because of distance from sources of supply and
geographic features can be justified on equity grounds.  Equalization  grants should offset such
inherent disabilities  but should  disregard  cost differences  due to differences  in efficiency  with  which
resources are used.  These questions do not pose any special difficulties  for a regression based
approach to the measurement of expenditure needs.96
Expenditure need is more difficult to define and derive than a measure of fiscal
apacity.  Thedifficultiesinvolvedin  measuringexpenditure  needaresubstantiallyhigherthan those
encountered in using  a representative tax  system  to measure fiscal  capacity. They include defining
an equalization  standard,  determining  differential  costs  due to differing  input-output relationships,
nature of service areas, composition of population and isolating need/cost differentials due to
differential  tastes or policy  decisions  as distinct from inherent cost disabilities. A further concern
would be the susceptibility  of the grant shares based on need factors to strategic behavior on the
part of the recipient states. The experience of Australia, West Germany,  Switzerland  with federal
unconditional  transfers, of the U.S.  with highway  grants and of the Canadian states with provincial-
municipal transfers, indicates that  these concerns can be  addressed and expenditure need
incorporated in formula grants in a manner acceptable to both the donor(s) and the recipients.
Some empirical questions are resolved easily.  For example, to  avoid problems
associated with subjective standards such as 'minimum service levels' or 'reasonable levels of
services',  expenditure need could be defined as "the cost of supplying  average performance levels
for the exsting mix of provincial  - local programs". Relative expenditure needs could then be
determined empirically  either using direct imputation methods  or by adopting a simpler approach
using  a representative expenditure system. The latter approach is preferred for its objectivity  and
ease of computation. Furthermore, it enables the analyst to derive expenditure need measures
based on actual observed behavior of the provincial-local  governments under study rather than
basing  it on ad hoc value judgements. The relative  weights to be assigned to various need factors
in the representative expenditure  system  could  be determined by  econometric analysis.  This method
requiresspecificationofdeterminants foreachservice categorytobe analyzed.  These  determinants
would include relevant fiscal  capacity  and public  services  need variables. The estInating equation
so specified would then yield quantitative estimates as to the independent influence of each
specified factor in determining the spending level for that category of public service.  This
information  could also be analyzed  further to determine as to what each state would have actually
spent if it had average fiscal  capacity and average tastes but actual need factors.
Morespecifically,  the formula  forequalizationentitlement  on account  ofexpenditure97
classification  i for state x could be stated as follows:
EEIX  =  (POP),  {(PCSE)I - (PCSE)',,J)
where
EEi,  =  Equalizataion  entitlement  on  account  of  expenditure
classification  i for state x
POP.  =  Population of state x
(PCSE)i,  =  Per Capita standardized  expenditure by state x on expenditure
classification  (i). This is the estimated  expenditure  which  a state
would have  spent if it had national average fiscal  capacity  but its
actual need factors.
(PCSE)',,.  =  National  average  per  capita standardized expenditure on
expenditure  classification  i. This is  the estimated  expenditure for
all states based on national average  values  of fiscal  capacity  and
need factors.
Equalization entitlement on account of a particular expenditure classification  could be positive,
negative  or zero. These entitlements would have to be summed  up for all expenditure categories
considered for equalization.
Overall  entitlement of astatebased on a comprehensivesystemof  equalizationwould
be determined by summation of its separate entitlements from the Representative Tax System
(RTS)  and  the  Representative Expenditure System (RES).  Only the  states with positive
entitlements  would  be eligible  to receive  transfers  in equivalent  or some  fraction of the total amount
(the fraction to be determined by the centre depending upon the availability  of funds) from the
centre.
A phased approach to a comprehensive  equalization may  be well advised. Initially,
a representative tax system  could  be implemented  for a five  year period. Then depending upon this
experience a reS  resentative expenditure  system  could be brought in to complement  the RTS in the
next five  years. A joint Federal -States Fiscal  Arrangements  Sub-Committee  may  be instituted to
monitor the working of the system  closely.98
The Equalization Standard
Equalization of net fiscal benefits requires that we adopt an explicit standard of
equalization. The specified  standard would  be the level to which  each state would  be entitled to be
raised  to enable it to provide  public  sector net benefits per household comparable  with other states.
Simplicity  dictates choosing either the arithmatic mean or the median of the govemmental units
involved as the standard.  Arithmatic mean provides a good representation of the data in the
absence of extreme values. In the event that the sample values have wide range, the median or
the arithmatic  mean after elimination  of extreme values  would provide  a better representation of
the sample. Mean is to be preferred over the median, however, for ease of computation.
Costs and Financing
An  ideal fisca; equalization program would be  self-financing.  The  member
governments  are assessed  both pvsitive and negative  entitlements  which sum to zero. The federal
government merely acts as conduit for such a policy. If such an interstatal revenue sharing pool in
practice  would  create, administrative  difficulties,  then the equalization  program  could be financed
out of general federal revenues  which are in part derived from the equalization receiving  states.
Other Considerations
So far the discussion  has focussed  on the basic  elements  of an equalization program.
Several related aspects of equalization  transfers are considered in the following  subsections.
Unconditionaliq
There is a general consensus  in the academic  literature that an equalization system
should  enable stau. governments  to provide  a standard bundle of public  services  if the government
imposes  a standard level of taxes on the bases at its disposaL The state governments  (or certainly
their citizens)  should, however,  be permitted to substitute lower rates of taxation for higher level
of services and vice versa.  As such the equalization payments should be  in the nature  of
unconditional grants having only income effects.  Service areas in which there appears a good99
reason to actually  set minimum  national standards are better handled by conditional grants and
shared cost programs. It should be noted that by raising  a state's fiscal  capacity,  the unconditional
equalization grants enable the poor states to more easily  participate in the shared cost programs.
Tax Effort
Incorporating tax  effort into the formula for determining  equalization  would  inN  olve
making  the equalization  entitlement a function  of the ratio of actual  tax collections  in a state to its
own tax base. Potentially non-recipient states may  wish  to see such a factor incorporated into the
program to prevent states with a positive fiscal  deficiency  in an area from collecting  equalization
payments  even if they may  not levy  a tax in the area. Potentially  recipient  states may  wish  to see tax
effort incorporated because  without it, extra tax  effort on their part will  be relatively  unproductive
compared to a wealthy state.
Problems  exist  with incorporating  tax effort into the program. First, the inclusion  of
tax effort will  cause the program  to depart from its unconditional  nature. A state should be free to
substitute grant funds for revenue from own sources. Similarly,  if a state raises taxes in order to
provide a bundle of services  that is higher than the standard it should not receive equalization  for
doing so,  e.g. other states should not have  to pay most of the cost if a state decides  to paint its roads.
Incorporating  taxeffort would  tie the federal  govemment  toexpenditure philosophies  of thevarious
states. A problem also arises in that some states do not have tax bases in all areas. Incorporating
tax effort may also encourage the employment of strategy by a state.  Another major problem
associated  with the inclusion  of tax effort in the formula  is that in view  of the differential abilities
of the states to export taxes,  the measurement of tax effort would  be crude. Inclusion  of tax  effort
in the formula could also result in increase in taxes on the poor states.  In view of the above
considerations, it appears that a program of equalization payments would not be improved by
including  tax effort.
Stabilization  Effects
If the equalization payments in Brazil were to be based upon relative measures of100
fiscal  capacity,  they will  be expected to have a stabilizing  effect upon state revenues. The level of
payments  will  move in a direction  opposite to that in which  the states own revenue raising  capacity
moves. Maximum  stabilization  of state-local revenues  will  occur when the payments are based on
all revenue sources, a national average standard of equalization is used, cyclical  fluctuations in
provincial  economies are small and the time lag in calculating  the grants is relatively  shor.  When
any large component of the total base is quite volatile, such as natural resource revenues, the
destabilizing  efiects can be quite large and some sort of averaging formula would have to be
employed  to ease the difficulties  associated  with provincial  budgeting in the face of uncertainty.
Strategy
Strategy refers basically  to the actions  that provincial  governments  can take to affect
the level of payments they receive. A scheme that enables a state to employ strategy must be
considered undesirable  because in general such extra payments  received  may  not have any relation
with actual disparities. For example,  a program  employing  tax effort could enable states to raise
their payments by imposing  heavy  taxes in areas in which they have a below average base. This
problem, however,  is much  less serious in practice than it might appear as the room for additional
taxation from sources in which the potentially "have-not"  states are not well-endowed  would be
extremely  limite.d.
Concluding  Remarks
Economic  theory provides  a strong  rationale for  fiscal  decentralization  as it promotes
efficient provision of public services by promoting a better match of these services  with citizens
preferences; by minimizing the cost of political decision making and by encouraging political
accountability  and by addressing  regional and local concerns. In Brazil such a program could be
helpful addressing  regional equity and stabilization  objectives  of the federal government.101
APPENDIX  B
OPERATIONAL  MECHANISMS  OF CONVENIOS
The  provisions of  convenios vary by functional objectives.  There  are some general
procedures,  however,  that should  be observed  when forming  a convenio  (Decreto-lei #200 of Feb/2/67,
2300  of Nov/1  1/86,93872  of Dec/23/86.)
A convenio is legally  defined (200/67)  as a way to decentralize the activities  of the federal
government  by delegation of powers and funds for the conduction of federal projects (projects under
the responsibility  of the Union) to the local authorities  where the project is to take place. The source
of the funds can vary in many  ways. Usually the funds come as supplemental credits or as recursos
vinculados (earmarked resources).  In the first case, the federal government uses the excess in tax
collections to supplement the funds allocated to convenios  by more than the other funds. As far as
earmarked sources are concemed, these would be the FINSOCIAL, PIN/PROTERRA, education
salary,  and lotteries, as well as the share of the special fund (FE) for which  there is no fixed  distribution
criteria.
Stages forthe implementation  of a convenio:  proposal, authorization,  penho", delivery
of funds,  monitoring and control.
For each petition filed by a state/local government, there is a separate proces-.  In the
petition there must be a justification  and, in most  cases,  a detailed plan for the use of the funds  (schedule
of tasks and expenses).
The pctition is  examined  by  a technical  committee. This analysis  checks  for the compatibility
of the petition with the activities  of the ministry.
Once the technical  committee  gives  a favorable  appreciation,  the petition is  forwarded  to the
general secretary of the ministry  so the value of the convenio can be approved and so that it can be
verified whether funds are available.
A convenio contract has the following  general characteristics:  definition  of the authorities
involved,  the object of the convenio, the duties of each part, a schedule for the delivery  of the funds,
deadlines and conditions  for alteration. The convenio  is usually  signed in a public  ceremony in the state102
capital.
Convenios  larger  than  CzS  2 million  must  be published  at the Diario  Official.  (The  official
daily  publication  of the federal  government.
For each convenio  there exists  a checking  account  at Banco de Brasil  where to federal
government  deposits  the funds  according  to the predetermined  schedule.  There are then  hundreds  of
such  accounts.  The  beneficiary  (state  or local  government)  should  report  to the federal  government  on
the progress  and utilization  of the  funds.  However,  this  not always  occurs  since  some  local  governments
lack  the personnel  and the expertise  to submit  the detailed  reports  asked  by the federal  government.
As  far  as  the employment  of the funds  is  concerned,  however,  the beneficiary  has to at least  present  the
statements  of the above  mentioned  account  as a way  to document  the proper use of the funds. The
misuse  of such  funds  constitutes  an act  subject  to criminal  charges.  Usually  it is  only  at the end,  after  the
last  withdrawal  is  made  that the federal  government  asks  for receipts  on the expenses  made,
In many  cases  the  beneficiary  has  also  to commit  some  of their  own  revenues  to the convenio,
but there are no formal  criteria  for such  matching  of funds. A complete  and detailed  account  of the
transfers  received  through  the convenio  is  not  always  submitted  to the  appropriate  state/local  legislature
so it is  not always  the case  that one  can find  them  in the official  accounts  of states  and municipalities  as
inter  government  transfers.
It is  also  very  common  to have  changes  in the original  terms  of the convenio  or to readjust
predetermined  values If the  likelihood  of these  changes  was  not  foreseen  when  the  convenio  was  signed
than  a new  convenio  has to be made. In many  cases,  values  need  to be readjusted  due to the high  rate
of inflation  and to the time it takes for the actual  delivery  of funds. To avoid  this problem  some
local/state  governments  overstate  the values  of their  convenios.
Source:  Afonso  (1989).103
APPENDLC C
THE ADMINISTRATIVE  PROCESS OF SUDS
1. Mechanisms  of Transfers of Funds
The funds transferred from  the INAMPS (National Institute for Medical Assistance  of the
Social  Security System)  to the states come from the Fundo de Previdencia  Assistencia  Social (FPAS).
This fund is  constituted  by the Social  Security  contnbutions of employers  and employees  (deducted from
pay roll).
The amount to be transferred is determined on a yearly basis by the "termos aditivost
(additional agreements) as established  by the convenios.
Delivery  of Funds from INAMPS to States
INAMPS  =  once the Additional Agreement (TA) is signed, it makes the transfer of
funds in monthly installments  according to the schedule of withdrawals
(CD-see below) and to the availability  of funds in its budget.
BANCO DO BRASIL =  funds are deposited in earmarked accounts.
States  =  uses part of the funds and transfers the rest to the municipalities. States
will  receive  the 4th, 7th, 10th and installments  conditioned  on the approval
of the rendering  of account (PC) coJncerning  the last  quarter. Consolidates
the PCs of the municipalities.
INAMPS/Office  =  has 15 days  to evaluate the PC.
DOF/INAMPS  =  approves  the TA elapses,  they have 30 days to present a consolidated  PC
for the entire year. The signing  of a new  TA is  conditioned  on the approval
of the PC.
2  Matchbng  of Funds
As it was noted before, PO  is the process  by which  resources are allocated to the providers
of health-care. There is some matching  of funds here since aUl  levels  of government participate in the
process  with some of their own revenues. There seems to exist no clear and predetermined matching
condition, however. What follows  is a description of the way the process  works:104
CIMS (municip)  - prepares the plan of application of funds (PA) and the schedule of
withdrawal of funds (CD) for the coming year.  PA and CD should
discriminate between the allocation of go  revenues and transferred
revenues.
CMS (municip)  =  evaluates and approve the PA/CD. Sends them back to CIMS.
CIMS  =  has up to September 30 to send the PA/CD to the state (CIS).
CIS  =  consolidates  the state PA/CD wit1i  nhe  manydifferent  municipal  ones. The
consolidated report will indicate the real growth in the participation of
states in the financing  of SUDS and the identification  of funds according
to their source: municipalitv  sae  -NAMPE,  and other.
CES  =  evaluates  and approves the PA/CD. Sends them back to CIS.
CIS  =  has up to November  30 to send them to the Regional Office  of INAMPS.
INAMPS  =  analyses  the PA/CD. Its main role is to provide  orientation to CIMS and
CIS  in the preparation of the PA/CD. Sends  the PA/CD to DOF/INAMPS.
DOF/INAMPS  =  analyses  and consolidates  the PC/CDs from all  states. It may  ask the states
to change them. Prepares the POI which is the unified health budget for
the nation for the comingyear.  Prepares the "termos  Aditivos"  to be signed
everyyearbyStates andMunicipalities.  Submitseverything  to the approval
of CIPLAN. Has  up to December 10  to send approval  notice to offices  and
states.
CIPLAN  =  Approves  the HTermos  Aditivos."
INAMPS Offices  =  States and municipalities  sign the "Termos  Aditivosw  (TA). The TA must
specify  the amounts of co-participation  of the parties involved.
States/Mun.  management  of the budget through SES and SMS, respectively.
Source:  Afonso (1989).Table  A. 
FEDERAL  CONDITIONAL  TRANSFERS  BY FUNCTION  AND  BY LEVEL  OF COVERZIENT
(1987)
(in  percent)
functiona  Functional  Distributions  Distributiors  between  Intergivarnment  capital  transfers  made
levels  of  govaroment  through  the  special  investments  account
(as a  2 of  ... )
States  Hun.  Total  States  hun.  Total  Special  Other  inter-  Other  Inter-
lnvestments  gaw,  capital  gav,  transfers
transfers
Administration  and  Planning  71.2  72.3  71.7  56.4  43.6  100.0  69.9  1,220.3  165.9
Agriculture  10.5  1.4  6.6  90.6  9.4  100.0  40.5  1,364.0  87.8
Regional  Developvent  11.8  7.9  10.1  66.1  33.9  100.0  53.1  439.3  405.7
Energy  and  Minerals  0.0  1.0  0.4  0.0  100.0  100.0  0.4  - 13.9
Houain%  and  Urban  Development  4.6  16.8  9.9  26.2  73.8  100.0  30.1  107.4  107.4
Health  And Sanitation  1.9  0.5  1.3  82-3  17.7  100.0  34.1  17.5  5.8
Labor  0.0  0.0  0.0  76.9  23.1  100.0  19.6  184.1  72.7
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  56.7  43.3  100.0  37.4  302.6  70.7
Source:  'Balancos  Gerais  da  Uniao  - 1987r,  HINIFAZ
- Include  Capital  Trausfers,  made  ln the  Special  Investments  Acccunt,  to  States  -- d  DP,  and  to  Municipalities
- Investments  in  Special  Execution:  Account  4130  in  the  BGU
- Intergoverment  Capital  Ttansfers:  Account  (4320)
- Intergovernment  Current  Transfers:  Account  (3220)
- Other  Transfers  a  (3220  +  4320)  minus  Federal  Tax  Transfers
- lutergovernment  Capital  Transfers  made  to irates  In  the  Special  Investments:  Account  4230.47
- Intergoverimant  Transfers  to  Mun.  in the  Special  Investment  Account  4730.48.106
Table  A.2
8RAZILs  FEDERAL CONDITIONAL TRANSFERS TO




Regional  Education  Urban  Health &  Other
%griculture  Development  & Culture  Energy  Development  Sanitation  Transportation  Functions  Total
------------------------------.------------------------------ __--------------__----------------------
983  4.5  34.4  15.8  6.0  1.7  12.8  0.0  24.9  100.0
984  4.7  22.8  18.4  9.2  1.2  14.0  0.0  29.7  100.0
985  1.4  12.8  26.0  7.1  0.7  16.4  0.0  35.6  100.0
986  4.8  16.5  19.0  4.5  14.7  13.1  0.1  27.3  100.0
987  5.3  1.8  22.4  2.3  6.5  16.2  0.6  45.0  100.0
ource: Sac. Progr. Financeira/STN e "Balancos Gerais da Uniaom, MINIFAZ
eflatort IGP-DI  medio  (FGV)
cher Transfera - Intergovernmental Transfers minus Federal Tax Transfers
ther Functions - Legislative, Judiciary, Planning and Administration, Defense, Commerce and Industry.107
Table  A.3
DiSTRIBUTION  OF  FEDERAL TRANSFERS THROUGH  TEZ COIVENIOS  TO
STATES  AND HUNICIPALITIES  BY THE GRANTINO  FEDERAL KINISTRY
1985-86
(percent)
Regions/  Planning  Education  Health  Urban  Finance  Others  Total
States  Cash In-kind  Total  Cash In-kLad  Total  Develoument
Acre  43.5  7.4  4.0  11.5  2.7  0.8  3.4  0.7  38.4  2.5  100.0
Amazonas  52.4  18.7  11.0  29.7  4.4  4.4  8.8  8.5  0.0  0.6  100.0
Para  32.2  28.5  17.2  45.6  3.6  6.1  9.7  5.1  0.0  7.4  100.0
Rondonia  13.2  2.6  1.2  3.8  0.5  0.4  0.9  0.6  78.5  2.7  100.0
Amapa  53.2  20.0  17.4  37.4  0.0  3.5  3.5  4.7  0.0  1.2  100.0
Roraima  44.8  18.6  10.0  27.9  4.9  0.9  5.8  2.5  0.0  18.9  100.0
Maranhao  45.3  24.9  14.7  39.6  2.2  2.9  5.2  4.3  0.0  5.7  100.0
Piaui  41.4  27.1  12.2  39.3  6.0  3.1  9.1  6.9  0.0  3.3  100.0
Ceara  21.4  33.9  23.2  57.0  4.5  6.9  11.4  4.8  0.0  5.3  100.0
R.Gde.Norte  27.9  29.4  14.4  43.8  11.5  6.1  17.6  6.8  0.0  4.0  100.0
Paraiba  31.5  29.3  16.0  45.3  5.0  4.6  9.6  10.4  0.0  3.3  100.0
Pernambuco  12.5  31.6  16.2  47.8  6.9  6.2  13.1  22.5  0.0  4.2  100.0
Al.agoas  31.0  26.4  16.5  42.9  8.2  .7  14.9  8.2  0.0  3.0  100.0
Sergipe  39.0  23.3  13.9  37.2  7.7  4.1  11.9  9.2  0.0  2.6  100.0
Bahia  20.5  30.7  20.3  50.9  5.7  6.8  12.5  9.5  0.0  6.6  100.0
Mato Grosso  54.7  14.7  7.6  22.4  3.4  1.5  4.9  8.7  5.1  4.2  100.0
M4.  Grosso Sul  38.4  20.4  14.9  35.3  4.1  3.6  7.7  11.3  0.0  7.2  100.0
Goias  24.8  30.9  13.9  44.8  4.2  6.0  10.2  11.4  0.0  8.8  100.0
Distrito Fedl.  92.1  2.9  1.0  3.9  0.2  2.3  2.5  1.3  0.0  0.27  100.0
Hinas  Gerais  2.8  37.4  27.5  64.9  5.5  3.8  9.3  11.5  6.0  11.4  100.0
Espirito Santo  42.2  20.2  13.0  33.2  3.7  2.8  6.5  13.4  0.0  4.7  100.0
Rio Janeiro  1.8  24.9  3.5  28.4  2.7  6.8  9.5  23.1  33.2  4.1  100.0
Sao Paulo  7.9  26.4  7.0  33.3  9.4  5.4  14.8  33.1  0.0  10.8  100.0
Parana  1.5  34.6  25.4  60.0  2.8  4.8  7.6  14.4  0.0  16.4  100.0
Sta. Catarina  13.9  37.6  18.3  56.0  3.2  4.0  7.1  14.7  0.0  8.8  100.0
Rio Gde. Sul  2.7  40.7  20.6  61.3  4.2  4.3  8.5  16.2  0.0  11.3  100.0
-------------------------------- _---------------------------__--____---_-----__---_-_-----------------
NORTH  25.7  10.0  5.8  15.8  1.8  2.0  3.7  2.6  48.6  3.6  100.0
NORTHEAST  29.1  28.7  16.6  45.3  5.7  5.1  10.8  10.2  0.0  4.6  100.0
CENTRE-WEST  74.6  9.2  4.7  13.9  1.4  2.8  4.2  4.4  0.6  2.3  100.0
SOUTHEAST  9.9  29.4  15.0  44.4  5.3  4.6  9.9  19.4  8.0  8.4  100.0
SOUTH  5.2  37.4  21.9  59.3  3.4  4.4  7.8  15.12  0.0  12.5  100.0
BRAZIL  34.9  21.2  12.0  33.1  3.6  3.8  7.4  9.3  10.2  5.1  100.0
Source:  Silvia  Paiva,  STN/IfNIFAZ,  Results  from  a  special  survey  of  government agencies.108
Table  A4
OVERALL  IMPACT  OF  THE  NEW FEDERALISM
ON STATE AND  MUNICIPAL  FINANCES:
States  of Para  and  Parana
Fiscal  Impact  on







Sources:  - Secretaria  de Estado  da Fazenda  do Parana - Coordenacao
de Assuntos  Econ6micos.-
- Barrato,  G. (1989)  Impacto  da Reforma Tributaria na  Receita
Disponivel  do Parana.  (manuscript)
- CondurCi  Jr.,  R. P.  (1988). 0  Ganhos Tributarios do
Estado  e  Municipios  Paraenses.  Para  Desenvolvimento  No.  24
() Average  Impact  on all  Brazilian  municipalities  as reported by
Condur(u  (1988)Table  A.S
1987  - FEDERAL  TAX TRANSFERS  RECEIVED  BY BRAZILIAN  MUNICIPALITIES
(Values  in  Current  NCz3  Thousands)
Federal
Unit  CURRENT  TRANSFERS  (FPM)  CAPITAL  TRANSFERS  (FPM)  TOTAL  FEDERAL  TAX  TRANSFERS  (FPM)
value  per  capita  X  of  total  value  per  capita  X of  total  value  per  capita  X of  total
Rondonia  608  0.62  0.73%  163  0.17  0.80%  671  0.68  0.75%
Acre  413  1.07  0.59%  109  0.28  0.54%  522  1.35  0.68%
Amazonas  533  0.29  0.77%  220  0.12  1.09%  763  0.41  0.84%
Roraima  234  2.14  0.34%  3  0.03  0.01%  237  2.16  0.26%
Para  1,784  0.39  2.58%  972  0.21  4.80%  2,756  0.60  3.07%
Amapa  241  1.04  0.36%  90  0.39  0.44%  331  1.42  0.37%
NORTH  3,713  0.48  5.33%  1,567  0.19  7.89%  5,270  0.65  5.86%
Maranhao  2,248  0.48  3.23%  1,108  0.23  5.47%  3,354  0.89  3.73%
Piai  1,374  0.65  1.97%  888  0.36  4.37%  2,260  0.90  2.61%
Ceara'  3,893  0.64  5.59%  562  0.09  2.77%  4,455  0.73  4.96%
R Grande  Norte  2,011  0.92  2.89%  538  0.24  2.65%  2,547  1.18  2.83%
Paraiba  2,369  0.76  3.40%  818  0.26  4.04%  3,187  1.03  3.S5%
Pernambuco  3,864  0.52  5.26%  902  0.13  4.45%  4,568  0.65  5.08%
Alagoas  1,551  0.67  2.23%  487  0.21  2.40X  2,038  0.89  2.27%
Sergipe  1,348  1.00  1.94%  87  0.06  0.43%  1,435  1.07  1.80%
Bahia  5,405  0.49  7.76%  2,546  0.23  12.57%  7,951  0.72  8.85%
NORTHEAST  23,861  0.59  34.28%  7,932  0.20  39.16%  31,793  0.78  35.38%
Minas  Cerais  7,927  0.52  11.39%  4,840  0.31  22.91%  12,567  0.83  13.98%
Espirito  Santo  1,012  0.42  1.45%  868  0.28  3.28%  1,677  0.70  1.87%
Rio  de  Janeiro  2,278  0.17  3.27%  520  0.04  2.57%  2,798  0.21  3.11%
Sao  Paulo  11,486  0.37  16.5ox  1,377  0.04  8.80%  12,863  0.42  14.31%
SOUTHEAST  22,703  0.37  32.62%  7,202  0.12  35.56X  29,905  0.48  33.28%
Parana  5,395  0.63  7.76%  1,071  0.13  5.29%  6,466  0.76  7.20%
Santa  Catarina  3,281  0.77  4.68%  485  0.11  2.30%  3,726  0.88  4.15%
R Grand.  Sul  5,049  0.68  7.25%  734  0.08  3.62%  5,783  O.88  6.44%
SOUTH  13,705  0.64  19.69%  2,270  0.11  11.21%  15,975  0.74  17.78%
M Grosso  Sul  1,148  0.68  1.85%  154  0.09  0.76%  1,300  0.78  1.45%
Mato  Crosso  954  0.60  1.37%  418  0.28  2.0e%  1,372  0.87  1.53%
Goias  3,527  0.78  5.07%  724  0.18  3.57%  4,251  0.92  4.73%
Distrito  Federal
CENTER  WEST  5,627  0.59  8.08%  1,298  0.14  6.40%  6,923  0.72  7.70%
BRAZIL  89,609  0.49  100.00%  20,257  0.14  100.00%  89,886  0.64  100.00%
Source:  MINIFAZ/SEFTable  A.6
1987  - NON-TAX  TRANSFERS  RECEIVED  BY  BRAZILIAN  MUNICIPALITIES
(Values  in  Current  NCz3 Thousands)
Federal
Unit  CURRENT  ST.  A FED  NON-TAX  TRANSFERS  CAP. ST. A FED NON-TAX  TRANSFERS TOTAL  ST.  A FED  NON-TAX  TRANSFERS
value per  capita X of  total  value per  capita X of  total  value per  capita % of  total
Rondonia  339  0.36  1.56%  60  0.06  0.32X  399  0.41  0.98%
Acre  42  0.11  0.19%  204  0.63  1.09X  248  0.64  0.e0%
Amazonas  127  0.07  0.68%  1,272  0.69  6.77%  1,399  0.76  3.44%
Roraima  20  0.18  0.09%  33  0.30  0.18X  53  0.48  0.13%
Para  411  0.09  1.87X  451  0.10  2.40%  862  0.19  2.12%
Amapa  26  0.11  0.12X  23  0.10  0.12X  49  0.21  0.12X
NORTH  965  0.12  4.40%  2,043  0.26  10.88x  3,008  0.37  7.39X
Maranhao  382  0.08  1.74X  1,379  0.28  7.34X  1,761  0.38  4.33%
Piaui  221  0.09  1.01%  867  0.34  4.68X  1,078  0.43  2.65X
Ceara'  803  0.13  3.8ex  681  0.09  2.99X  1,364  0.22  3.35X
R  Grande  Nor  278  0.13  1.27X  133  0.06  0.71X  411  0.19  1.01%
Paraiba  216  0.07  0.99X  286  0.09  1.42X  482  0.16  1.18%
Pernambuco  790  0.11  3.8oX  671  0.10  3.67%  1,481  0.21  3.69x
Alagoas  198  0.09  0.90%  98  0.04  0.51%  294  0.13  0.72X
Sergipe  263  0.20  1.20%  653  0.41  2.96%  818  0.61  2.00%
Bahia  712  0.06  3.25%  1,062  0.10  6.86%  1,774  0.16  4.36X
NORTHEAST  3,883  0.10  17.62X  5,678  0.14  29.71X  9,441  0.23  23.20%
Uinas  Cerais  1,328  0.09  6.06%  2,094  0.14  11.15X  3,422  0.23  8.41X
Espirito  San  219  0.09  1.00%  236  0.10  1.26X  464  0.19  1.12X
Rio  do Janei 1,631  0.12  7.44X  242  0.02  1.29%  1,873  0.14  4.60X
Sao  Paulo  7,720  0.26  36.21%  2,433  0.08  12.9ex  10,163  0.33  24.96x
SOUTHEAST  10,898  0.18  49.71%  5,004  0.08  28.86X  15,902  0.26  39.07%
Parana  2,068  0.24  9.38%  1,270  0.15  8.78X  3,328  0.39  8.17X
Santa  Catari  1,100  0.28  6.02%  1,226  0.29  e.62%  2,326  0.65  6.71X
R Grande  Sul  1,497  0.17  6.83X  679  0.08  3.62%  2,176  0.26  S.36X
SOUTH  4,863  0.22  21.22X  3,174  0.16  16.9OX  7,827  0.36  19.23X
M Grosso  Sul  388  0.22  1.68X  464  0.27  2.42%  822  0.49  2.02X
Mato  Grosso  473  0.30  2.18X  1,261  0.79  6.88x  1,724  1.09  4.24%
Goias  705  0.16  3.22X  1,272  0.27  6.77X  1,977  0.43  4.88X
Distrito  Fed
CENTER  WEST  1,648  0.18  7.06X  2,977  0.31  15.88X  4,623  0.47  11.11X
BRAZIL  21,926  0.15  100.00X  18,776  0.13  100.00%  40,701  0.29  100.00%
Source:  MINIFAZ/SEFTable  A.7
1987  - SUMMARY  OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL  TRANSFERS  RECEIVED  BY  BRAZILIAN  MUNICIPALITIES
(Values  in  Current  NCzr  Thousands)
Federal
Unit  TOTAL  FED  AND  ST.  TAX  TRANSFERS  OTHER  ST.  A FED TRANSFERS  TOTAL  FED.  AND  STATE  TRANSFERS
value per  capita X  of total  value per  capita X  of total  value per  capita %  of  total
Rondonia  948  0.97  0.4S%  399  0.41  0.98X  1,347  1.37  0.53X
Acre  679  1.60  0.27%  246  0.64  0.80X  825  2.14  0.33%
Amazonas  1,949  1.08  0.92%  1,399  0.76  3.44%  3,348  1.82  1.32%
Roraima  288  2.45  0.13%  63  0.48  0.13X  321  2.93  0.13%
Para  3,641  0.77  1.67%  862  0.19  2.12X  4,403  0.96  1.74%
Aapa  379  1.63  0.18K  49  0.21  0.12X  428  1.84  0.17%
NORTH  7,884  0.94  3.80%  3,008  0.37  7.39X  10,672  1.31  4.21%
Maranhao  3,688  0.76  1.73%  1,761  0.38  4.33X  5,429  1.12  2.14%
Piaui  2,676  1.06  1.26%  1,078  0.43  2.66X  3,754  1.49  1.48X
Ceara'  8,251  1.02  2.94%  1,364  0.22  3.36X  7,615  1.24  3.01X
R  Grand.  Norte  3,115  1.42  1.46%  411  0.19  1.01%  3,626  1.61  1.39K
Paraiba  3,897  1.26  1.83X  482  0.16  1.18X  4,379  1.41  1.73X
Pernambuco  7,757  1.11  3.86%  1,481  0.21  3.S9X  9,218  1.32  3.84X
Alagoas  2,984  1.30  1.40%  294  0.13  0.72%  3,278  1.42  1.29%
Sorgipe  1,957  1.46  0.92X  816  0.61  2.00%  2,773  2.06  1.09%
Bahia  13,170  1.19  6.19%  1,774  0.16  4.38%  14,944  1.36  6.90X
NORTHEAST  46,476  1.12  21.39%  9,441  0.23  23.20X  64,916  1.36  21.68X
Minas  Coraia  24,877  1.65  11.70%  3,422  0.23  8.41%  28,299  1.87  11.17X
Espirito  Santo  3,693  1.66  1.74K  464  0.19  1.12%  4,147  1.74  1.64K
Rio  do  Janeiro  14,823  1.12  6.97%  1,873  0.14  4.60%  16,696  1.26  6.69%
Sao  Paulo  64,064  2.07  30.12K  10,153  0.33  24.95X  74,207  2.40  29.29%
SOUTHEAST  107,447  1.74  60.63%  16,902  0.26  39.07K  123,349  2.00  48.69X
Parana  14,382  1.69  8.76K  3,328  0.39  8.17K  17,708  2.08  6.99x
Santa  Catarina  8,586  2.03  4.04X  2,326  0.66  6.71%  10,911  2.68  4.31X
R Grande  Sul  16,683  1.79  7.38X  2,176  0.26  6.36%  17,869  2.04  7.06X
SOUTH  38,661  1.80  18.18%  7,827  0.38  19.23X  46,478  2.18  18.35X
M Crosso  Sul  J,184  1.90  1.60%  822  0.49  2.02%  4,006  2.39  1.68X
Mato  Grosso  2,986  1.89  1.40%  1,724  1.09  4.24%  4,710  2.98  1.86X
Goiar  7,228  1.56  3.40%  1,977  0.43  4.88K  9,206  1.98  3.63%
Dintrito  Federal
CENTER  WEST  13,398  1.40  6.30%  4,523  0.47  11.11%  17,921  1.87  7.07K
BRAZIL  212,636  1.60  100.00%  40,701  0.29  100.00%  263,336  1.79  100.00X
Source:  MINIFAZ/SEF112
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